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Abstract 
This thesis has evaluated Bakkafrost holistically and estimated share price of the company. 
The thesis has used WACC-based DCF approach to calculate the intrinsic value and 
complemented it with multiples-based valuation using P/E multiple and EV/EBIT multiple. 
The estimated share price as of 18th May is NOK 850, and is a weighted average of 
fundamental and multiples-based valuation, with 70% weight to the fundamental valuation. 
The market price of the share as of 17th May was NOK 685; the estimated share price offers 
an upside of over 24% and hence, the author issues a “BUY” recommendation. 
The financial valuation has been grounded in industry and economic realities using strategic 
analysis. The analysis finds that salmon farming industry is well-suited to the emerging 
consumer trends of health, wellness, and sustainability. Furthermore, salmon farming remains 
politically and socially accepted in the countries Bakkafrost operates in. Moreover, Bakkafrost 
has demonstrated success over the years and is currently focusing on enhancing capacity and 
improving efficiency, which will lead to higher cash inflows in the future. 
Nonetheless, the salmon farming industry is not without its challenges. The growth in the 
industry is constrained due to limited number of farming licenses; however, the limited 
availability of licenses also creates a high barrier to entry, thereby protecting the industry from 
new entrants and high rivalry. Limited growth, coupled with increasing demand, is set to push 
prices up. Global warming and extreme weather events pose a threat to salmon farming 
because salmon growth requires very particular environmental conditions. But perhaps, the 
single largest challenge is salmon lice, which continues to reappear in significant levels in 
different countries and imposes various costs on salmon farmers. 
All in all, as per the author, salmon farming’s competitive landscape has moderate rivalry and 
is well positioned to capitalize on the macro-trends in the world. The author issues a “BUY” 
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This paper is an attempt to holistically analyse Bakkafrost and conduct its valuation. To do so, 
literature from finance, economics and strategy have been utilized. The thesis can be used not 
only by those who are interested in Bakkafrost but also by those interested in learning about 
the salmon farming industry in Norway, Scotland, and the Faroe Islands. 
1.1 Motivation 
The author has chosen to conduct financial valuation and strategic analysis of Bakkafrost 
because it requires application of financial models and theories along with a holistic 
understanding of macro and micro level factors that affect salmon farming industry. Hence, to 
conduct financial valuation and strategic analysis, the author would have to step outside the 
world of finance and apply theories from different disciplines. This would inherently be a 
challenging task. Nonetheless, the challenge – and the steep learning curve that it brings – is 
the reason why the author has chosen to conduct strategic analysis and valuation of Bakkafrost. 
1.2 Research Question 
The primary objective of this thesis is to evaluate Bakkafrost holistically and consequently, 
provide a recommendation to equity investors on whether they should SELL, BUY or HOLD 
equity in the said company.1 Therefore, the research question is: 
“Is Bakkafrost a good investment for equity investors as of 18th May 2021?” 
To answer the above research question, this thesis has essentially been divided into 2 halves. 
In the first half, i.e., in chapters 2-5, qualitative analysis has been carried out, and in the second 
half, i.e., in chapters 6-11, quantitative analysis has been carried out.  
Apart from investment recommendation, this thesis serves a secondary purpose: the strategic 
analysis (i.e., the qualitative part of this thesis) can serve as a ‘handbook’ for anyone trying to 
understand the salmon farming industry and Bakkafrost’s position within it. In a sense, it could 
 
1It must be noted that this is an academic exercise and not investment advice. The author does not take any liability for any 
losses incurred because of acting on the conclusion of this thesis. 
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be considered a complimentary handbook to the one issued by Mowi Group, the difference 
being that this one has been made with Bakkafrost at the core. Strategic analysis has been 
complemented by an analysis of capital structure and financial ratios, to better understand the 
nexus between capital structure and company strategies in the salmon industry – this area has 
not been explored in earlier publications. 
1.3 Resources Used & Citations 
The author has used literature from different disciplines for this thesis. 
Within the field of finance, literature by Aswath Damodaran and Koller et al. (2015) have been 
used extensively. Whenever Koller et al. has been mentioned, it refers to the 6th edition of 
“Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (Wiley Finance)”. The year 
2015 has often been emitted when Koller et al. is referenced in favour of brevity. 
Michael Porter’s 5 Forces Framework and SWOT Framework forms the cornerstone of 
strategic analysis. Moreover, PEST analysis has been carried out to better analyse the industry 
characteristics, and VRIO framework by Barney has been used to evaluate the resources that 
Bakkafrost has.  
Furthermore, work of Tuan and Thapa (2020) and Stangeland and Vu (2019), have been used 
to help structure this thesis. It must be noted, however, that the said papers are themselves 
based on the work of Koller et al. (2015). Work of Malin, Mathias, & Saad (2016) has formed 
the basis of calculation of operating tax and to estimate the premium that Bakkafrost earns per 
kg of salmon. Nonetheless, the valuation chapters are primarily based on the work of Koller 
et al. (2015), and the work of Malin et al. is itself based on the work of Koller et al. (2015). 
The thesis has been cited using APA format. All reasonable efforts have been made to 
reference everything properly, and only items of common knowledge have been left 
unreferenced; however, once something has been referenced, it has not always been referenced 
subsequently. APA citation requires page number to be provided only when a direct quote is 
taken, nonetheless, the author has provided page numbers in a lot of instances even when no 
direct quote has been taken – this is done simply because it is the recommended approach. In 
direct quotes, page numbers have been omitted only when it was not possible to include page 
number, e.g., in newspaper articles, and in such cases all efforts have been made to provide an 
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alternative, e.g., section name or paragraph number, so that the reader can easily pinpoint 
source of the direct quote. 
Furthermore, the URL’s mentioned in the references need to be copy and pasted in the browser 
for them to work. 
1.4 Limitations 
The primary limitation of this thesis stems from the fact that valuation requires several 
assumptions. Given the amount of inputs and the assumptions involved, it is very likely that 
the estimated share price will not be perfect. Moreover, due to the Covid-19, we are all 
engulfed by an unprecedented level of uncertainty. This uncertainty is hard to quantify. 
Furthermore, because of the Covid-19 related lockdowns, the author been unable to access 
Bloomberg Terminal (except once very early on in the thesis) and hence, the author’s access 
to analyst reports and market data has been almost non-existent.  
1.5 Structure 
This paper has been divided into different chapters and structured in a manner that allows the 
research question to be answered from both strategy and finance perspectives. 
In chapter 2, the industry and production process have been introduced, followed by company 
introduction in chapter 3. Chapters 2 and 3 help provide the context for chapter 4, where 
strategic analysis has been conducted. In chapter 5, historic financial analysis has been 
conducted to see the financial structure of the industry and to evaluate Bakkafrost’s financial 
health. Chapter 5 also has detailed note on capital structure and on how a company’s strategy 
is impacted by its capital structure; based on this, Bakkafrost and its competitors’ capital 
structure and strategic behaviour have been analysed towards the end of chapter 5. It must be 
mentioned here that capital structure analysis does not directly contribute to valuation, 
nonetheless, it is important to do a capital structure analysis since it impacts the company’s 
strategy. Moreover, without a capital structure analysis of salmon farming companies, the 
thesis would be rather incomplete for those who want to use it as a handbook. Interestingly, 
the widely used resources issued by Mowi and EY on salmon farming do not have discussion 
on capital structure of salmon farming companies, and hence, chapter 5 fills this gap. Together, 
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chapters 2 to 5 holistically analyse salmon farming industry and Bakkafrost in a primarily 
qualitative manner. 
Chapters 6 to 11 are related to fundamental valuation of Bakkafrost. In chapter 6, review of 
valuation techniques has been done. In chapter 7, historic financial statements have been 
reorganized based on whether items are operational or non-operational. In chapter 8, financial 
statements have been forecasted. Following forecasting of financial statements, in chapter 9, 
method of calculation of cost of capital is introduced, followed by calculation of Bakkafrost’s 
WACC. In chapter 10, fundamental value is calculated using DCF valuation. Finally, in 
chapter 11, multiples-based valuation has been conducted to compliment the fundamental 
valuation. 
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis.  
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2. Company & Industry Overview 
2.1 Bakkafrost 
Bakkafrost Group is the seventh-largest salmon farming group (by volume) in the world 
(Berge, 2020), and farms Atlantic Salmon (Bakkafrost, n.d.-b). Bakkafrost traces its roots to 
1968, and in 2010, was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The company has its salmon 
farming farms primarily in the Faroe Islands but has recently expanded its farming operations 
to Scotland by means of an acquisition. The company claims to be “… the most vertically 
integrated salmon farming company in the world” (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 22), and controls 
almost the entire value chain, from production of feed for salmon to processing and packaging 
of fresh & value-added salmon. 
The company is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and as of 26th February 2021, had market 
capitalization of NOK 36,43 billion (by May 17th, the market capitalization had surpassed 
NOK 40 billion). The company’s stock price has grown considerably over the years, from 
NOK 320 per share in March 2016 to NOK 616 per share in February 2021 – a CAGR of 14%. 
In comparison, the Oslo Stock Exchange’s Benchmark Index has grown by a CAGR of 
11,36% over the same period. 
The primary source of external revenue to the company are its fish farming and value-added 
products segments, while most of the revenue in the fish oil & feed segment is internally 
generated and not reported in the group financial statements in accordance with IFRS 10. The 
group’s presentation and operational currency is DKK. 
2.2 Industry Overview 
Salmon aquaculture is a fast-moving industry (Bell & Johnson, 2016). Since salmon is a 
commodity, its prices have seen significant fluctuations over the years, primarily due to the 
economics of supply & demand (Bakkafrost, 2010). The production of salmon takes almost 3 
years; hence, the producers are unable to adjust to short term fluctuations in demand, which 
causes prices to fluctuate2. Similarly, the production of salmon is not evenly distributed 
 
2 Details of production are explained later in the thesis. 
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throughout the year, the harvest is usually highest in the fall and hence, prices tend to go down 
in fall, as per the author’s discussion with an industry expert. Apart from seasonal fluctuations 
in prices, fluctuations over the years have also been significant. Figure 1 below illustrates 
fluctuations in Atlantic salmon prices over the years (Fish Pool, n.d.). The price fluctuation is 
evident; however, it can also be seen that on average, the prices have risen over the years with 
a very significant increase being in 2016. 
 
Figure 1: Plot of historical fluctuation in salmon price in Euros; Data Source: Fish Pool 
2.2.1 Salmonoids 
Salmon belongs to the family of Salmonids. Other species belonging to the same family 
include trout, chars, freshwater whitefishes, and graylings. Within the family of salmonids, 
Atlantic salmon is harvested more than all the other salmonoid species combined (Mowi ASA, 
2020). The wild Atlantic salmon’s population has stagnated over the years due to overfishing 
and currently, almost all “… commercially available Atlantic salmon” is farmed (Bell & 
Johnson, 2016, p. 3). In fact, in several countries, including the US, fishing for wild-Atlantic 
salmon is prohibited and only available Atlantic salmon for consumption is farmed salmon 
(NOAA, n.d.). Farming of salmon is governed and regulated by licenses, and the length and 
amount of these licenses vary by jurisdictions3. 
Salmon is highly prized for its high protein and omega-3 content, it also has low levels of 
saturated fats and can lower the risks of cardiovascular disease, dementia, and Alzheimer’s 
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(WebMD, 2019). According to SINTEF, production of salmon has significantly lower carbon 
footprint than other sources of animal meat and protein (Winther et al., 2020).  
Within the global seafood harvest (both farmed and wild), salmonoids are only 4,4% (Mowi 
ASA, 2020, p. 14). Despite being a relatively small part of the global seafood supply, the 
harvesting of Atlantic salmon is more industrialized than any other seafood (Mowi ASA, 2020, 
p. 15). Due to high and intensive industrialization, salmon farmers are able to control different 
aspects of salmon farming (e.g., they administer feed with the help of cameras, are able to 
control harvest timings, smolt size, etc.), which consequently, means that the risks involved in 
the farming are reduced since the value chain is highly controlled, as per the author’s 
discussion with an industry expert. The farming of seafood is seen by experts as a major 
solution to worldwide shortages of protein-intensive foods (Bell & Johnson, 2016). 
The quality of salmon, based on the author’s discussion with an industry expert, are 
determined by farming practices and the quality of feed and not by the country it is farmed in. 
It is worth mentioning here that salmon produced by Bakkafrost tends to be priced higher than 
average salmon (Bakkafrost, 2020). 
2.2.2 Industry Trends 
The harvest of Atlantic salmon has experienced a global CAGR of 6% during the period 2000-
2019, as per Kontali Analyse (Mowi ASA, 2020). However, the CAGR for the years 2021-25 
is expected to be 4% (Mowi, 2021a). The decrease in growth stems from the fact that the 
industry has already reached high efficiency levels and is therefore, facing diminishing 
marginal returns. For the growth to increase, progress in technology & pharmaceutical 
products is needed (Mowi ASA, 2020). However, perhaps the single largest limitation to 
growth of salmon farming is limited availability of farming licenses (and how those licenses 
are to be used), since the industry is highly regulated4. Between 2009 and 2018, the market 
price per kg of salmon has risen, from an average of 3,58 Euros, to 6,01 Euros (Fish Pool, 
n.d.). In 2010, the global salmon harvest was 1455 M tons, by 2019 it had risen to 2599 M 
tons, as reported by Statista (GAA, 2019). 
 
4 The regulations are discussed in detail in the PESTEL section. 
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2.2.3 Major Players 
The largest players in Salmon farming industry are Norway and Chile. Mowi, a Norwegian 
company headquartered in Bergen, is the single largest salmon producer globally (producing 
more than twice than the second largest salmon farming company). The industry has 
undergone consolidation in the last 2 decades and all major salmon farming companies today 
are vertically integrated (Bell & Johnson, 2016), as this allows not only for cost synergies but 
also helps ensure product quality and safety (Bakkafrost, 2019). In Norway, 90 companies 
control the entirety of salmon farming, whereas in Chile, 13 companies hold 90% of the 
licenses (Mowi ASA, 2020, p. 49), this shows how consolidated the industry is. 
2.2.4 Production Process & Value Chain 
Salmon farming is a capital-intensive process, and it takes about 3 years for one growing cycle 
to complete (Bell & Johnson, 2016). A 3-year long period of production implies that the supply 
is inelastic in the short-term and requires high working capital. 
Of this, the time spent in freshwater tanks lasts between 10-16 months whereas the seawater 
cages take about 12-24 months (Mowi ASA, 2020). To avoid flooding the market (and hence, 
driving the price down) at any given time, the salmon farming companies harvest fish all 
around the year. However, the 3-year production cycle referred to above, can fluctuate based 
on the sea water temperatures, as Salmon is a cold-blooded animal5. The optimal temperatures 
for salmon farming are between 8 and 14 °C (CORDIS, 2020). This means that salmon cannot 
be farmed everywhere and is the reason why salmon farming is restricted to certain 
geographies. Moreover, the time that salmon needs to spend in the sea cages can be reduced 
by having larger size smolt, which could ultimately lead to greater harvest from the same 
license. 
The first step in salmon farming is the production of eggs. Eggs are produced using broodstock 
(in simple words, eggs are produced by breeding mature salmons). Most of the major 
companies have their own broodstock program, which resultantly means that they produce 
 
5 As a cold-blooded animal, Salmon cannot regulate its body temperature. Rather, its body temperature is dependent on the 
temperature of its environment. If this external temperature is within the optimal range for Salmon growth, the fish will grow 
quicker. If the temperature is too warm, it can lead to diseases and if it is too cold, it can lead to high mortality amongst the 
fishes. 
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their own eggs. However, a lot of these companies are not self-sufficient in egg production 
and source them from external providers as well. 
During the production stage, eggs are placed in freshwater tanks, and at this stage, fertilization 
of eggs takes place and “… the fish are grown to 100 grams in controlled freshwater…” (EY, 
2020, p. 36). Artificial lighting and plastic covers for tanks are used to create optimal 
environment for hatching and growth of salmon at this stage (Bell & Johnson, 2016, p. 4). The 
salmon at this stage are called “smolt”. Once the salmon has spent about eight to fifteen months 
in these tanks, they are moved to the sea where they spend a further 12 to 24 months (Bell & 
Johnson, 2016; Mowi ASA, 2020). Transferring fish from freshwater tanks to the sea is done 
using dedicated tankers (Bakkafrost, 2020) and utmost care is taken to ensure that no fish 
escapes the seawater cages, as any fish that escape seawater cages can lead to inbreeding with 
wild fish and can also spread diseases. In sea water cages, fish grow to weights of about 4 to 
5 kgs (EY, 2020, p. 36). For Bakkafrost, the weights are 4-5 kgs in Scotland and 5-6 kgs in 
the Faroe Islands (Bakkafrost, 2020). Once the fish are ready, the tankers bring fishes back 
from sea to land where they are processed further (Bell & Johnson, 2016). After harvesting of 
a site, it is fallowed for 2 to 4 months in the Faroe Islands and over 2 months in Scotland 
(Bakkafrost, 2020). The tankers are also cleaned after every trip, to avoid contamination and 
transfer of disease. Given the inter-linked processes, salmon farming can be considered a 
value-chain based process (as opposed to value networks or value shops), keeping in view the 
explanation of each of these by Stabell & Fjellstad (1998). 
The process is summarized in Figure 2 below: 
Figure 2: Visual summary of salmon farming process; Taken from: (EY, 2021, p. 45) 
Even though the annual report of Bakkafrost does not mention this, but the Faroese 
Government’s legislation requires that the provision of feed to salmon be monitored via 
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sensors and cameras, leading to higher feed conversion ratios as compared to the global 
averages and reduction in feed waste (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-a). 
It is important to mention here that salmon is sold as fresh fish and as fillets (e.g., the salmon 
fillets available in the supermarkets). Fresh fish is sold as head-on-gutted (HOG), which means 
that their visceral parts have been removed. Fillets is the processed salmon and is also called 
“value-added product (VAP)”. Both fresh fish and salmon fillets (VAP) have different 
qualities, which are explained in chapter 3, sub-section 3.1.2. 
2.2.5 Global Consumption & Demand of Fish 
As per the UN, the population has grown at a rate of 1,6% between 1961-2007, whereas the 
fish consumption for the same period has increased by 3,1% (FAO, 2020b). Moreover, for the 
same period, fish consumption outpaced consumption from all other animal sources of protein, 
which grew by a CAGR of 2.1% (FAO, 2020b). In 2019, the production of Atlantic salmon 
increased by 7% (FAO, 2020a). In 2017, fish provided 7% of the global protein consumption 
(Mowi ASA, 2020). Mowi estimates that for the foreseeable future, the demand of salmon will 
grow by twice the salmon supply growth (Mowi, 2021a). Furthermore, it is widely accepted 
that salmon farming is well-in-line with other global macro trends, e.g., rising middle class, 
increasing population and water scarcity (amongst others) – the details have been covered in 
the PESTEL analysis. 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has briefly introduced Bakkafrost and the salmon farming industry, followed by 
a description of how salmon is farmed. Bakkafrost is one of the largest salmon farming groups 
with operations in the Faroe Islands and Scotland. The salmon farming industry is dominated 
by a few players. The production of salmon is approximately a 3-year long process, is capital 
intensive, and requires specific environmental conditions. The prices of salmon tend to 
fluctuate, however, a general trend of increase in salmon prices is visible. 
The following chapter explores Bakkafrost in detail and covers the operational challenges and 
risks that the company faces. 
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3. Company Details 
Bakkafrost traces its roots back to 1968, when it was established as a family-owned company 
(Bakkafrost, 2019). It was listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in 2010 after a series of M&As 
(Bakkafrost, 2019). Since then, it has acquired several companies and consolidated its value 
chain vertically. The two major acquisitions were of P/F Havsbrun in 2011 and of Scottish 
Salmon Company (SSC) in 2019; Havsbrun produces fishmeal, fish oil and fish feed (FOF) 
whereas SSC is an integrated salmon farmer in Scotland (Bakkafrost, 2021).  
Today, Bakkafrost’s farming operations are based in the Faroe Islands and Scotland, and 
include smolt production, fish farming, processing of harvested fish, and packaging of fresh 
fish and value-added products. It also produces FOF products, but most of them are sold 
internally. The company has recently established its own Biogas plant in Faroe Islands in a 
bid to be more circular and has also taken over the native Faroese broodstock program 
(Bakkafrost, 2020).  
3.1 Markets & Segments 
3.1.1 Markets 
Bakkafrost sells its fish in all major salmon markets, except Japan. Even though the company 
has farming operations only in the Faroe Islands and Scotland, it does have sales offices in 
England and the US (Bakkafrost, 2020). Within the US, Bakkafrost has also established a 
processing facility. Bakkafrost’s distribution network includes ship, plane, and land transport 
– based on where the product is being sent (Bakkafrost, 2020). 
Bakkafrost aims to balance between different product segments and geographical markets to 
diversify market risk (Bakkafrost, 2020). The current markets for Bakkafrost include Eastern 
Europe (including Russia), Asia (primarily China), Europe, and North America. In 2019, the 
company sold salmon products to 37 countries, with Western Europe being the dominant 
market (Bakkafrost, 2020). For the year ended 2020, 67% of the company’s sales were in 
Western Europe and 18% in North America (Bakkafrost, 2021). However, Eastern Europe – 
primarily Russia – is also one of the major markets for the company, with 8% and 5% of sales 
being in Eastern Europe in 2019 and 2020, respectively. 
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3.1.2 Segments 
The different segments within the company are discussed below. 
Fresh Fish 
Selling fresh fish in the open/spot market is Bakkafrost’s major source of revenue. Fresh fish 
is sold as head-on-gutted (also called gutted whole fish). The company’s sale of fresh fish has 
fluctuated in different years due to various biological and market forces. However, overall, the 
segment has grown in both volume and revenues. The fresh fish from the Faroe Islands are 
sold on the spot market whereas fresh fish from its Scotland’s operations are sold both in the 
spot market and through long-term contracts (Bakkafrost, 2021). It is worth mentioning here 
that the Scottish subsidiary of Bakkafrost only sells fresh fish. 
Fresh fish has three different quality standards: superior, ordinary and production, based on 
the author’s discussions with an industry expert. However, Bakkafrost does not disclose details 
about its quality standards; nonetheless, it does disclose that it sells its superior salmon to 
HoReCa segment (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 4). 
Value Added Products (VAP) 
VAP segment involves processing of fish which are then sold as fillets. Unlike fresh fish, 
value-added products are not sold in the spot market, rather VAP are sold only via long-term 
contracts (Bakkafrost, 2021). These contracts usually are 6-12 months in the future and their 
prices are set using forward prices (Bakkafrost, 2021). Given that there is a time lag between 
spot prices and forward prices, the VAP segment does relatively poorly when spot prices are 
rising (Bakkafrost, 2017, p. 6).  
Bakkafrost’s long-term goal is to have between 40% to 50% of its sales via the VAP segment 
as this allows for minimizing the risk of salmon price fluctuations which is inherent in the spot 
market. 
VAP salmon has three different quality standards: premium, standard, and processing, as per 




Fish Oil & Feed (FOF) 
Fishmeal, Oil and Feed segment is primarily meant to supply “food” for the salmon that 
Bakkafrost harvests. In 2019, 79% of produced feed and 100% of produced oil was used 
internally (Bakkafrost, 2020). In comparison to 2019, in 2018, Bakkafrost utilized 90% of the 
produced feed and 95% of the produced oil internally (Bakkafrost, 2019). 
FOF operations are conducted at Havsbrun facility in Faroe Islands and the company’s 
production of FOF fluctuates due to raw material availability which is regulated by pelagic 
fishery quotas in the North Atlantic (Bakkafrost, 2019, p. 34)6. Starting from 2022, the 
company expects almost all FOF sales to be internal. 
3.2 Bakkafrost’s Value Chain 
In chapter 2, production process and value chain of salmon was explained. In this section, 
Bakkafrost’s operations and value chain will be touched upon briefly.  
Bakkafrost operates one of the most integrated value chains in the industry. It is pertinent to 
mention here that Bakkafrost not only owns the factories and facilities necessary to carry out 
its operations but has recently also established a Biogas plant to be more circular in its 
operations. The Biogas plant will produce electricity for the national grid of the Faroe Islands 
and will also produce fertilizers that will be distributed to the farmers of the Faroe Islands 
(Bakkafrost, 2021). In addition to this, Bakkafrost has taken over the responsibility of Faroese 
Broodstock Program7 from the Government (Bakkafrost, 2020); this would allow Bakkafrost 
to move from external sourcing of salmon eggs to internal production (Bakkafrost, 2020, p. 
23). The company is also making investments to significantly increase capacity and quality of 
its hatcheries both in Scotland and the Faroe Islands. 
  
 
6 Pelagic fish are fish that are used to make salmon feed. 
7 “Broodstock, or broodfish, are a group of mature individuals used in aquaculture for breeding purposes” (Wikipedia, 2021, 
para. 1) 
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The value chain of Bakkafrost Group is illustrated below in Figure 3, the first row shows its 
value chain in the Faroe Islands, whereas the second row illustrates the Group’s value chain 
in Scotland (i.e., Scottish Salmon Company). 
 
Figure 3: Visual summary of Bakkafrost Group’s operations & value chain; Source: (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 24) 
3.3 Future Investments & Capacity Enhancements 
Bakkafrost has conducted various acquisitions, both before and after its listing on Oslo Børs. 
In 2016, Bakkafrost announced a five-year investment plan for the five years ending 2020. 
The total planned investment was DKK 2,2 billion, including maintenance CAPEX 
(Bakkafrost, 2017, p. 15). These investments were primarily meant to help Bakkafrost become 
self-sufficient in smolt production and increase smolt weight to 500 grams. Another major 
aspect of this investment was to develop a new VAP/harvest factory in Glyvrar (in the Faroe 
Islands).  
In 2018, another investment plan was announced, with the primary aim to increase farming 
capacity to 100 000 tons annual head on gutted (HOG) in the Faroe Islands. As of now, 
Bakkafrost aims to achieve smolt production size in the Faroe Islands to 400 grams in 2021 
and 500 grams by 2022 (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 8). The company has also applied for licenses 
for offshore farming in the Faroe Islands and expects to receive the licenses in 2021 
(Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 5). By 2025, the company hopes to achieve its target of 100 000 tons 
annual HOG in the Faroe Islands, and for capacity increase beyond this, Bakkafrost is looking 
at offshore farming.  
In Scotland, the aim is to invest DKK 350 to 400 M annually for the years 2020 to 2024 
(Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 12). A significant portion of this investment is meant to develop three 
hatcheries in Scotland, one of which is already under construction (at Applecross). These three 
hatcheries will replace all the current hatcheries that Bakkafrost currently operates in Scotland. 
The current capacity of hatcheries in Scotland is 8 M smolts with average size of 90 grams 
(Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 26). The new Applecross hatchery alone will have capacity of 11 M 
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smolts with average weight of 250 grams and will be operational by 2023 (Bakkafrost, 2021, 
p. 26). These investments signify that Bakkafrost plans to significantly enhance capacity in 
Scotland. 
All in all, Bakkafrost has made significant capital outlays in the past and significant 
investments are planned for the foreseeable future. Consequently, the positive benefits of these 
investments will flow to the company in the future. 
3.4 Operational Challenges in Salmon Farming 
The major operational challenges in Atlantic salmon farming for Bakkafrost are listed and 
explained below. It is worth noting here that these are challenges and risks are not limited only 
to Bakkafrost and other salmon farmers face similar challenges. 
¨ Fish Health & Parasite 
Salmon is a living being and as such is not immune to diseases. There are numerous diseases 
that Atlantic salmon can catch or develop. The immediate impact of such diseases is not 
limited to the loss of fish (Bakkafrost, 2016). Rather, the impact goes further, including 
increased cost of treatment, decrease in quality and “… subsequent periodic reduced 
production capacity” (Bakkafrost, 2016, p. 40). Closely tied to fish health is the issue of 
mortality. The Faroese Islands have had lower mortality than global averages and Bakkafrost 
aims to have mortality rate of no more than 6% (Bakkafrost, 2021). 
However, the primary challenge under the umbrella of fish health, is salmon lice. In fact, 
salmon lice is considered to be “… the biggest threat to Norwegian fish health…” (EY, 2021, 
p. 51). Whereas the report by EY focuses only on Norway, sea lice is a problem prevalent in 
all countries where salmon is farmed. In 2020, Scotland was reported to have “horrendous” 
levels of sea lice (Hutchison, 2020, para. 1). Similarly, Chile had the highest levels of sea lice 
in 2020 since 2012 (Mutter, 2020). Presence of lice could lead to more diseases, early 
harvesting, and punitive actions by the concerned regulatory authorities. Salmon lice lead to 
direct and indirect costs on the farmers. A paper by Berle and Rim (2018) define direct costs 
as the costs involved in treating and/or preventing lice and “… the indirect costs as the revenue 
lost due to reduction in biomass growth” (p. 1). The indirect costs of salmon lice, as per Berle 
and Rim (2018), varies by geography but is 16,09% and 4,51% of the expected revenues in 
South Norway and North Norway, respectively, whereas the direct costs are 18,86% and 
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7,52% of total revenues in South Norway and North Norway, respectively (Berle & Rim, 
2018). The variation in costs is due to differences in farm densities, temperature, and farm 
sizes (Berle & Rim, 2018). Given the magnitude of costs, it can be seen that salmon lice pose 
a major threat to salmon farming.  
The regulatory authorities, particularly in the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands closely 
monitor sea lice levels. Sea lice levels beyond certain levels could result in the regulators 
reducing the allowed biomass in any given area (for instance, Norway has developed a traffic-
light system which determines whether production can be increased or can stay constant or 
must be decreased based on sea lice levels)8. Therefore, sea lice are the single largest health 
challenge to all salmon farmers.  
¨ Environment & Climate 
Given that salmon is strongly dependent on its environment, the need for stable and favourable 
environmental conditions cannot be stressed upon enough. The environmental challenges 
impact all major KPIs including “… mortality, growth, yield per smolt … feed conversion 
ratio, cost of … treatment and required fallowing time between generations for sites …” 
(Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 67). Hence, stable, and conducive environment is necessary for salmon 
growth and health and hence, climate change poses a challenge. 
¨ Escapes 
Escape of fish from their cages can lead to several problems and challenges. 
The loss of fish will cause immediate financial loss. However, for Bakkafrost this is expected 
to be limited since its farming sites are geographically diversified and hence, loss from any 
single site will cause limited direct financial loss.  Greater than the direct financial losses, the 
major problem of fish escapes stems from the fact that it can lead to spreading of diseases and 
inbreeding with wild salmon, which will have negative impact on wild salmon (which could 
ultimately lead to public opposition to salmon farming). Moreover, because of the escapes, the 
company might be reprimanded by the government and the public (Bakkafrost, 2020, p. 64). 
Thus, fish escapes is a significant problem because it can result not only in financial losses 
and financial penalties but can also fuel anti-salmon farming sentiment in society. 
 
8 Details covered (and sources given) in PESTEL analysis. 
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¨ Fish Feed 
Bakkafrost is self-sufficient in feed production (Bakkafrost, 2021). Fish feed costs are perhaps 
the single largest cost in salmon farming. Fish feed are also responsible for 95% of carbon 
footprint and emissions in salmon farming (EY, 2021, p. 52). The major challenges in FOF 
(Fish Oil & Feed) segment stem from the fact that fish feed requires pelagic fish as raw 
material and the supply of raw material can experience “… shortfalls … due to limited catch 
volumes …” (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 68), which would translate to lower feed production and 
can force Bakkafrost to source the feed externally and can even adversely impact fish harvest. 
Even though all salmon farmers are exposed to similar risks, the risk of FOF raw materials 
being unavailable is mitigated for farmers who purchase feed externally because the “… risk 
is normally mitigated contractually through replacement obligations from third party” 
(Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 68). 
3.5 Governance & Shareholding 
A study by Matsunaga and Park (2001) finds that CEOs are penalized in their bonuses if they 
miss quarterly expectations or if performance for any quarter is less than the performance for 
the same quarter in the previous year (Matsunaga & Park, 2001). This could create agency 
problems where CEOs want to focus on short-term profitability rather than long-term 
profitability and sustainability. 
Bakkafrost was initially established as a family business and even today, the family that 
established Bakkafrost has significant shareholdings in the company. The CEO, Johan Regin 
Jacobsen, belongs to the founding family and has been at the helm since 1989. He currently 
holds 7,80% of the outstanding shares (Bakkafrost, n.d.-c). His mother, Oddvør Marita 
Jacobsen holds 7,77% of the outstanding shares (Bakkafrost, n.d.-c). The single largest 
shareholder is “Folketrygfondet” with stake of 9,09%, and all other major shareholders have 
an ownership stake that is significantly less than the CEO’s stake of 7,80% (Bakkafrost, n.d.-
c). A strong internal shareholding could help Bakkafrost reduce agency problems and follow 
policies which are in the long-term interests of the company, rather than focusing on quarterly 
earnings. 
 26
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has summarized Bakkafrost and its operations. The company operates 3 
segments: Fresh Fish, Value Added Products, and Fish Oil & Feed. The largest market for 
Bakkafrost is the EU, followed by North America and Eastern Europe (including Russia). 
Japan, despite being a major importer of salmon globally, is not a major market of Bakkafrost. 
The company has consolidated its operations vertically over the years and the primary 
operational challenge identified is sea lice. Moreover, Bakkafrost has made significant 
investments in recent years and the returns are expected in the near future. Furthermore, 
Bakkafrost has a strong internal shareholding which could help the company have a long term 
view rather than focusing on quarterly benchmarks. 
In the following chapter, strategic analysis of Bakkafrost and the salmon farming industry has 
been conducted, and the information introduced in chapters 2 and 3 help understand the 
strategic analysis better. 
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4. Strategic Analysis 
The strategic analysis below is meant to explore the industry structure, macro-level factors 
impacting the industry, and Bakkafrost’s position in the industry. Strategic analysis helps 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the industry and the company. It is important to 
understand the strategic environment within and without the company to better understand the 
business environment a company operates in, since no company operates in isolation and is 
influenced by both internal and external factors. Moreover, the understanding derived by the 
strategic analysis will form an integral part of the financial forecasting. Schill (2016) 
recommends “grounding business forecasts in the reality of the industry and the 
macroenvironment” (p. 5). He particularly recommends using Porter’s 5 Forces to look at the 
micro-economic and industry-level forces (p. 5). Foley and Khavkin (2019) state that “… a 
great forecast reflects the firm’s industry context” (p. 3) and accounts for the competitive 
forces that any firm faces (Foley & Khavkin, 2019). 
Strategic analysis has been divided into different sections. Firstly, the forces shaping salmon 
farming industry are analysed using Porter’s 5 Forces Framework – this analysis helps the 
reader understand the structure and profitability of the industry. Afterwards, macro-
environment factors relevant to the salmon farming industry are analysed using PESTEL 
framework, this helps the reader understand whether salmon farming is well suited to the 
greater macro trends or not. Thereafter, Bakkafrost’s key internal resources are analysed to 
see whether it enjoys competitive advantage, both in the short and long run, this helps 
understand whether Bakkafrost has the resources required to develop a competitive advantage. 
Lastly, the Strategic Analysis is synthesized using SWOT framework – SWOT analysis 
essentially brings the entire strategic analysis under one single umbrella. A brief introduction 
of each of these frameworks has been provided at the start of each section. 
4.1 Industry Analysis 
The common method to conduct strategic analysis is to first analyse the macro-environment, 
followed by industry analysis and finally conduct an internal resource analysis. However, due 
to less known nature of the salmon farming industry, the author believes that it is better to 
conduct industry analysis before macro analysis, as it would allow the reader to form 
comprehensive understanding of the industry. To do so, Porter’s 5 Forces framework has been 
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used. It is essential to conduct an industry-level analysis because it allows one to understand 
the competitive pressures that an organization faces. 
4.1.1 Porter’s 5 Forces 
In 1979, Michael Porter published what could perhaps be termed his most influential paper 
titled “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy”. Porter argued that there are 5 forces that 
form the structure of an industry and “… determine the profitability of an industry …” (Porter, 
2008, p. 3). The structure of the industry will impact the attractiveness of the industry from 
profitability point of view. Porter argued that competitive forces in an industry are not only 
shaped by the incumbents, but players external to the industry – including substitutes, 
suppliers, and potential entrants – directly shape the profit potential of any given industry 
(1979). Porter argues these forces determine who will capture what amount of the value 
generated by the industry, and further argues that these forces explain why industries have 
different average returns in the long run (Porter, 2007). The forces shaping any industry are 
shown in the Figure 4 below (recreated by the author). 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Porter’s 5-Forces; Source: (Porter, 2008, p. 4) 
The 5 Forces Analysis below is conducted while keeping the major salmon farming companies 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange as players since these players are relevant for Bakkafrost. 
These players are: Bakkafrost, SalMar, Mowi, Lerøy, Greig, and Norway Royal Salmon. 
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5 Forces: Supplier Power 
Porter (2007) argues that if suppliers have sufficient power, they can influence the industry 
players and capture more value than they would have been able to if they did not have 
significant bargaining power vis-à-vis the industry players. Porter further explains the industry 
characteristics which could lead to suppliers attaining relatively more power than the industry 
players, however, the discussion below will be restricted to the relevant dimensions for the 
salmon farming industry. 
The suppliers of the salmon farming industry can be subdivided into different categories. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis, the subdivision will be into two categories, in what 
the EY calls “technical solutions suppliers” and “biotechnology suppliers” (EY, 2020, p. 26). 
The technical solutions providers supply the solutions, services, and equipment necessary for 
operations of salmon farming companies, e.g., cages, vessels, software, sensors, etc (EY, 
2020). EY’s (2020) report states that even though the segment has witnessed increased M&A 
activity since 2016, it remains fragmented (EY, 2020). The solutions providers are also 
unlikely to integrate forward due to the differences in nature of business activities (EY, 2020). 
Therefore, technical solution providers have lower bargaining power relative to the industry 
players. However, what strengthens the hand of solutions providers is that with regards to 
some of the systems, the salmon farmers might have to incur switching costs because of 
retraining of employees (Marketline, 2020). 
Another group of major suppliers is the providers of biotechnology (EY, 2020). This segment 
includes the feed providers and providers of pharmaceutical products (EY, 2020). The feed 
subsegment is concentrated (EY, 2020). The feed represents almost 50% of the total 
production costs (EY, 2020, p. 42). Mowi states that fish feed is “… approximately 40%...” of 
their “… cost in box per kg in 2020” (Mowi, 2021, p. 267)9. The fact that most of the feed 
contracts are cost plus (Mowi ASA, 2020), only strengthens the position of feed suppliers. 
However, in recent years, all major fish farming companies have integrated backwards in a 
bid to reduce the power of feed suppliers and achieve synergies. In the 5 years ending 2019, 
 
9 It is worth mentioning here that as per the author’s discussion with an industry expert, feed accounts for 30% of the 
production costs. Keeping the industry expert’s opinion in view along with the report by EY (50% of production.costs) and 
Mowi’s report (40% of production costs), the author believes that the feed costs lie between 30% to 50% of total production 
costs and could vary depending on different factors, including the content of the feed. 
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the leading 4 companies generated 80% to 90% of the revenues in this subsegment (EY, 2020, 
p. 42). What is interesting to note, however, is that in 2018, 2 of the 4 leading companies were 
subsidiaries of SalMar ASA and Mowi ASA (EY, 2020, p. 42). Apart from feed providers, the 
other subsegment within the biotechnology providers is of suppliers of pharmaceutical 
products. However, the products offered by these companies are only marginally differentiated 
which reduces their bargaining position (Marketline, 2020). It is unlikely that aquaculture drug 
providers will integrate forwards, given the significant differences in salmon farming and 
pharmaceutical production. 
Overall, the author would classify supplier power as moderate, however, it is likely to weaken 
in the future as more and more salmon farmers become self-sufficient in fish feed. 
5 Forces: Buyer Power 
Like the suppliers, buyers can influence the industry players and force them to act in a manner 
which is in favour of the buyers. They can do so by demanding lower prices, higher quality or 
even playing “… competitors off against each other …” (2007, p. 5). Porter further explains 
several industry characteristics which could lead to high buyer power; however, the discussion 
below will be restricted to the relevant dimensions for the salmon farming industry. 
Buyers of fresh and value-added salmon consist of wholesalers, retailers, food processors, 
supermarkets, and hypermarkets (Marketline, 2020). This means there are many buyers of 
various sizes and hence, it is unlikely that any single buyer can influence the market.  
However, since salmon is considered a homogenous product, the buyers face low-switching 
costs which increases the bargaining power of the buyers (Marketline, 2020). 
Moreover, salmon is a perishable item. Therefore, with regards to the fresh salmon, salmon 
farming companies are primarily price-takers because they need to clear their inventory of 
fresh salmon on a regular (if not daily) basis due to its perishable nature. Within the value-
added category, however, the salmon is sold via long-term contracts (Bakkafrost, 2020). 
Whereas this does provide certainty of revenues to the incumbents, it also means that certain 
large buyers can carry significant power and hence, force the incumbents to drive their prices 
down. This is particularly true for Bakkafrost which sold 55% of its VAP to one single 
customer in 2019 (Bakkafrost, 2020). 
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Most of the above factors lead to high buyer power. However, what brings down the power of 
buyers is that they are very unlikely to be able to vertically integrate backwards and produce 
salmon themselves. This makes them “… dependent on players” (Marketline, 2020, p. 18). 
Furthermore, the demand of salmon is expected to increase by 8% between 2021-2025, and 
supply is expected to grow only by 5% during the same period; this would further weaken the 
power of buyers.   
Overall, the power of buyers is assessed to be moderate. 
5 Forces: Threat of New Entrants 
Porter argues that with new entrants, comes additional capacity in the industry (2007). If the 
industry is sufficiently attractive, new players will enter and try to gain market share, as a 
result of which, long-term profitability of the industry will suffer. Therefore, threat of new 
entrants limits the profit potential of any industry (2007). Porter argues that this threat can be 
assessed on two dimensions: barriers to entry and on the potential reaction from the 
incumbents towards the new entrant (2007). Porter further identifies the major barriers to 
entry; however, the discussion below will be restricted to the relevant barriers for the salmon 
farming industry.  
Salmon farming industry has grown considerably over the years and the high P/E ratios of 
almost all salmon farming companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange indicate that the 
industry is expected to grow. The industry has outperformed Oslo Benchmark Index. All in 
all, the industry could be deemed attractive for new players. The fact that the final product is 
essentially homogenous coupled with the availability of multiple suppliers and buyers 
available to any new entrant only makes the industry easier to enter (Marketline, 2020). 
However, there are multiple factors that could discourage new entrants. Firstly, the salmon 
farming industry has high CAPEX & OPEX requirements. The production cycle is roughly 3-
year long, which means that a high amount of investment will be tied in working capital. 
Moreover, salmon farming requires expensive specialized equipment, including ships, cages, 
and trained employees. All of this translates to high fixed costs and the need for economies of 
scale to be able to sustain operations. However, it must be noted that high CAPEX & OPEX 
requirements themselves do not promise that new entrants would not enter the market, since 
in efficient markets, capital can be raised for a business with positive NPV. Moreover, all 
leading salmon companies in Norway are heavily vertically integrated and as such, not only 
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enjoy cost synergies that come with integration but also quality control. Any new entrant 
(based on green field investment) will have to develop the entire value chain, which could be 
a challenging endeavour. Without developing a new value chain, the new entrant will be at a 
disadvantage as compared to the incumbents. Moreover, a new entrant might not have the 
same level of efficiencies as the incumbents because it might have to go through the learning 
curve. 
Apart from the barriers to entry identified above, the single most important factor limiting 
entry of new players is the licensing regime in each jurisdiction. The licenses which allow for 
farming of salmon are limited, expensive and governed by stringent environmental and health 
laws10. Furthermore, the fact that salmon requires very specific temperatures to be able to grow 
limits the areas where salmon production can take place. In recent years, however, there has 
been a growing interest in in-land farming, though its potential remains to be demonstrated. 
An equity research report by Handelsbanken’s Capital Market’s division recommends BUY 
on all salmon farming companies within its coverage11 citing “… low supply growth and 
strong demand” (Lye, 2017, p. 2); the low supply growth is inevitably a cause of limited 
licenses, and Handelsbanken’s recommendation shows how limited licenses work in favour 
of incumbents. 
Overall, the barriers to entry in the salmon farming industry are high, which consequently 
mean that threat of new entrants is low. 
5 Forces: Threat of Substitutes 
By definition, a substitute is a product that can replace another product by virtue of providing 
similar function. Porter argues that “substitutes are easy to overlook because they may look 
very different from the industry’s product” (2007, p. 6), but can limit profitability of an 
industry “by placing a ceiling on prices it can charge” (1979, subsection: “substitute 
products”). Porter argues that, once substitutes have been identified, it is important to 
understand their “… price-performance …” position vis-à-vis the industry’s products (1979, 
subsection: “substitute products”).  
 
10 Licenses and regulations are discussed in detail in the PESTEL section. 
11 The companies are: Bakkafrost, MHG (now called: Mowi), SalMar, Greig Seafood, Lerøy Seafood and Norway Royal 
Salmon – these are the same companies the author eventually uses for comparable valuation in chapter 11. 
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Farmed Atlantic salmon primarily serves the function of providing animal meat and protein. 
Therefore, other sources of animal meat and protein can be considered substitutes to farmed 
salmon. The three major dimensions on which salmon can be compared to its substitutes are 
price, quality (health benefits), and environmental impact. 
With regards to price, salmon is relatively more expensive than other meat proteins (Mowi 
ASA, 2020). In terms of quality, salmon is well-known for its health benefits and its 
superiority to other animal meat needs no explanation. Moreover, the salmon from the Faroe 
Islands is raised without use of any antibiotics which only adds to their attractiveness from a 
health/quality point of view. 
On the environmental front, salmon outperforms other meat proteins as well. The single most 
common method to understand the environmental impact of any product is by quantifying its 
CO2e emissions. Farmed salmon has CO2e emissions of 7.9 kg per kg of edible product (Mowi 
ASA, 2020, p. 32). In comparison, beef and pork stand at 39 kg and 12.2 kg of CO2e emissions 
per kg of edible product, respectively (Mowi ASA, 2020). However, poultry has CO2e 
emissions per kg of edible product of 6.2 kg, almost 20% less than salmon (Mowi ASA, 2020). 
Figure 5 below shows CO2e emissions of different meats. 
 
Figure 5: Representation of CO2 produced per kg of edible meat by different meats; Data Source: (Mowi ASA, 
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In terms of water usage, salmon significantly outperforms all other major sources of animal 
proteins, as shown in Figure 6 below. Hence, from an environmental and sustainability point 
of view, salmon outperforms all other meat proteins by a significant margin. 
 
Figure 6: Representation of water consumption per kg of edible meat by different meats; Data Source: (Mowi 
ASA, 2020, p. 22). 
Overall, the threat from substitutes is regarded as moderate. The threat would have been 
regarded as low had it not been for the fact that salmon is relatively pricier than other meat 
proteins. 
5 Forces: Rivalry  
Rivalry in an industry determines its profitability potential to a great extent. However, what is 
crucial with concept of rivalry is the basis on which it is done. The rivalry in an industry could 
be on multiple dimensions but is broadly in the form of price and performance. Porter (2008) 
states: “rivalry is especially destructive to profitability if it gravitates solely to price because 
price competition transfers profits directly from an industry to its customers” (2008, p. 9). 
Porter further provides the industry characteristics which determine the intensity of rivalry; 
however, the discussion below will be restricted to the relevant characteristics for the salmon 
farming industry. 
The players in the salmon farming industry are large groups, most of which are vertically 
integrated. They are unable to scale their output immediately due to long production cycles 
and at any given time, it is possible that they might have to fight for the market in case the 
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market in case of dwindling returns. Furthermore, salmon is regarded as a homogenous 
product and the buyers can switch from one player to another without any cost. All these 
factors contribute towards high rivalry. 
Nonetheless, the supply growth in the market is decelerating, with 4% supply growth expected 
in the coming years (Mowi, 2021a). The demand has increased over the years and the 
decelerating growth in supply is because of limited licenses, not because the demand is falling; 
in fact, between 2021-2025, demand is expected to rise by twice the supply (Mowi, 2021a) – 
this would ease competitive pressures. Moreover, the Chilean industry has historically used 
antibiotics and therefore, the US buyers have recently turned towards Norway for salmon, this 
has further eased the competitive pressures in the Norwegian market (Marketline, 2020). It 
would not be wrong to presume that the Faroese and Scottish farmers must have benefitted 
from the Chilean use of antibiotics as well. 
Overall, the degree of rivalry amongst the incumbents is classified as moderate. 
4.1.2 Summary of the Industry Analysis 
The salmon farming industry is dominated by a few large players, is highly integrated and is 
pushing the boundaries of efficiency. The socio-economic indicators point towards a growing 
demand for salmonoids. The industry requires specialized equipment, licenses, and has high 
CAPEX and OPEX requirements. 
Based on the forces identified in the 5 Forces Analysis, the threat of new entrants is regarded 
as low, because of high barriers to entry. Supplier and buyer powers are regarded as moderate 
because both these groups are unlikely to vertically integrate (forward and backwards, 
respectively) and hence, are dependent on players. Moreover, with rising populations and 
salmon supply constraints posed by limitations of licenses, it is likely that buyer power will 
further erode in the future. As more and more salmon farmers develop in-house fish feed 
production capacities, supplier power will also weaken. The threat of substitutes is also 
regarded as moderate because salmon is more expensive than other meat products (even 
though salmon outperforms them on quality-environmental impact matrix). All in all, the 
industry is considered attractive for incumbents and has moderate rivalry. 
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4.2 Macro Environment’s Analysis 
No industry is immune to the macro-level opportunities, threats, and trends. The macro-level 
factors always have significant impact on any given industry and business, and in extreme 
cases, could lead to complete closures of industries; for instance, the Paris Climate Agreement 
has put certain business models in jeopardy, e.g., coal-fired power plants are being shut down 
in many countries. Hence, it is essential to keep an eye on macro environment. 
4.2.1 PESTEL Analysis 
The most common tool for analysis of macro-level factors for any industry is the PESTEL 
framework. PESTEL “… framework categorises environmental influences into six main 
types: political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal” (Johnson et al., 
2009, p. 25). PESTEL allows analysis of the company’s macro environment (Johnson et al., 
2009, p. 26). 
The following analysis has been conducted while keeping salmon companies in Scotland, 
Norway, and the Faroe Islands as players. 
Below, each of the PESTEL factors is discussed in detail. 
PESTEL: Political 
Salmon companies based in Norway, the Faroe Islands and Scotland are governed by strict 
governmental regulations and export most of their output. The largest importer of salmon 
globally is the EU, which imported more than 43% of the global salmon imports in 2019 (FAO, 
2020c). Apart from the EU, the major salmon markets are Japan, Russia, China, and the US. 
Since most of global salmon production is exported, the major political challenge that the 
industry faces are global trade barriers and supply chain disruptions due to political, security 
and diplomatic reasons. Apart from diplomatic issues which can cause disruptions on the 
“demand side”, social and political opposition to salmon farming in countries of production 
could lead to disruptions on the “supply side”. Both demand and supply side political 
challenges are discussed below. 
¨ Political: Social & Political Acceptance 
Earlier this year, Canada announced that it would phase-out salmon farming in the Discovery 
Islands of British Columbia (Forrest, 2021; Larsen, 2020; Connelly, n.d.). The fish farming 
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operations in the Discovery Islands are to be disbanded by end-of-June 2022, and in the 
meantime, addition of new fish in these farms is not permitted (Forrest, 2021; Larsen, 2020; 
Connelly, n.d.). The decision has been made keeping in view the threats that mixing of farmed 
salmon with wild fish pose, which, according to the critics, leads “… to the collapse of wild 
Fraser River salmon stocks…” (Larsen, 2020, para. 7), and the decision has been strongly 
influenced by the First Nations who remain opposed to the fish farming in their waters because 
it impacts wild salmon (Larsen, 2020). 
The fact that the First Nations were able to convince the Canadian Government to phase-out 
the fish farms raises concerns that similar social action against fish farming could be witnessed 
in the Faroe Islands, Norway, and Scotland. However, the author believes that actions similar 
to the one in British Columbia are unlikely to happen in the 3-countries of interest, and the 
reasons are explained below. 
Jennifer Bailey from NTNU Trondheim and Sigrid Eggereide from Sentio Research 
Trondheim have recently studied the social acceptance of salmon farming in Norway and find 
that “… there does not seem to be enough explicit and concentrated opposition to threaten the 
industry’s social acceptance…” (Bailey & Eggereide, 2020, p. 14). Moreover, the Norwegian 
Government intends to increase Norway’s salmon and trout production to 5 million by 2050, 
which is roughly a 5 times higher volume than the 2017’s output of 1,2M (PwC, 2017, p.24). 
Such a huge increase in salmon production over the next 3 decades signifies that the 
Norwegian Government does not expect fish farms to be shut down in Norway. Moreover, in 
Norway aquaculture is often “… presented… in the national… interests…” (Bailey & 
Eggereide, 2020, p. 3). Hence, the author is of the view that it is unlikely that salmon farming 
industry would be rolled down in Norway, or that social acceptance of salmon farming in 
Norway would face similar challenges as those faced by the industry in Canada. Nonetheless, 
farmed salmon has had an adverse impact on the livelihoods of Sami people in Norway 
(Pedersen, 2012). Sami people have traditionally engaged in catching wild salmon for income; 
however, the money Sami farmers receive for their wild catch has not caught up with inflation. 
Pedersen (2012) states that the Sami farmer in 2011 was paid, in real terms, 1/7th of the money 
that the farmer received in 1970. Moreover, as per the “Norwegian Scientific Council for 
Salmon Management”, fish escapes and salmon lice from fish farms continue to be the “…two 
out of six of the most serious threats to the existence of wild salmon” (as cited in Pedersen, 
2012, p. 55). Hence, the possibilities of Sami communities protesting and resisting salmon 
farming industry cannot be ignored. However, the author does not view the risks to be 
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significant enough to threaten the entire Norwegian salmon farming industry, given the 
importance of salmon farming to Norway’s economy and the Norwegian Government’s long-
term plans to increase salmon output by almost 500% in next 30 years. 
Academic papers on the social acceptance of fish farming in the Faroe Islands are hard to find. 
However, the author hypothesizes that this is perhaps because of the overwhelming acceptance 
of fish farming in the Faroe Islands. Roughly 15% of the labour force in the Faroe Islands is 
employed in the fishing industry and between 90% to 95% of the country’s exports are related 
to aquaculture (Economy of the Faroe Islands, n.d.), with around 50% of the exports value 
being of “… farmed fish” (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-b, subsection: “A key player on the 
international market”). An official website of the Faroe Islands calls the Faroe Islands a “… 
proud fisheries nation…” (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-b, para. 2). For a country with such a strong 
tradition and dependence on aquaculture, it is unlikely to imagine that salmon farming in the 
Faroe Islands would be rolled back like in Canada. 
Unlike Norway and the Faroe Islands, the economy of Scotland is not heavily dependent on 
aquaculture. Nonetheless, salmon is the UK’s largest food export (Edwards, 2021) and is “… 
said to be worth more than £1bn…” annually to the UK’s economy (Adams, 2019, para. 3). 
Moreover, in the last decade, salmon companies in the Scotland have been given £20m in 
grants (Edwards, 2021), which shows the Government’s willingness to develop this sector. 
Nonetheless, there have been voices against public funding to salmon farming industry and 
critics have argued that the salmon farming practices being used in Scotland are not 
environmentally friendly (Edwards, 2021). However, the pressure seems to be to force the 
salmon companies in Scotland to be more sustainable and environmentally friendly, rather 
than shut down the operations in entirety. Moreover, Scotland does not have indigenous 
peoples like Norway and Canada. Keeping the above in view, it is deduced by the author that 
salmon farming in Scotland would not have the same social challenges as it did in Canada. 
Nonetheless, the political and social acceptance of salmon farming in Scotland does seem to 
be less than its acceptance in Norway and the Faroe Islands. 
¨ Political: Diplomatic Upheavals & Trade Barriers 
The EU is the major export partner of salmon farming companies in the Faroe Islands, Norway 
and Scotland. Apart from the EU, other major salmon buying countries include the US, Japan, 
Russia and China. It is noteworthy here that Norway/Faroe Islands/Scotland have reasonably 
good relationship with all the major salmon importers, except for Russia & China.  
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Hence, the challenge with regards to the diplomatic relations is in the Russian and the Chinese 
markets. In 2010, a critic of the Chinese Government, Liu Xiaobo, was awarded Nobel Peace 
Prize by the Oslo-based Centre for Nobel Peace Prize. This strained relations between Beijing 
and Oslo, and it took 6 years for relations to improve (Reuters, 2016). In 2010, Norway’s 
market share of imported salmon in China was 92%, by first half of 2011 it had fallen to 29% 
(Milne, 2013), because of the strained relations. At the same time, the market share of the 
salmon exporters from the Faroe Islands and the UK increased significantly (Milne, 2013). 
This shows the impact deterioration of foreign relations has on salmon exports. 
With regards to the Russian market, the EU has had thorny relationship with Russia in recent 
years. In 2014, the Russian Military annexed Crimea. As a result, the EU introduced sanctions 
against the Russian government. In retaliation, Russia imposed sanctions on the EU and its 
closest allies, including Norway. Consequently, the export of salmon from Norway and the 
UK to Russia stalled and fish farmers from the Faroe Islands filled in the gap (Moore, 2018). 
However, Russia has intermittently banned imports of salmon from the Faroe Islands on two 
occasions, once in 2018 (Witzøe, 2018) and then again in 2020 (McDonagh, 2020a) citing 
product safety reasons. 
To sum up, all producers in the Faroe Islands, Scotland and Norway face negligible political 
and diplomatic risks in their EU markets. However, the producers from these countries face 
different level of risks in Russian and Chinese markets. In case the EU’s (or NATO’s) relations 
with China/Russia deteriorates, producers from non-EU/non-NATO countries, for example 
Bakkafrost (from the Faroe Islands) will benefit, as has been seen in the last decade. 
¨ Political: Brexit 
A major threat to stable political conditions in the salmon markets is Brexit. The UK has exited 
the EU in December 2020, and because of that, Scottish salmon farmers suffered losses of 
11M pounds in the first 2 months of 2021, largely due to confusion regarding paperwork 
(Scottish Salmon, 2021a). However, as everyone gets accustomed to the new rules, the 
challenges will reduce. In fact, in the first quarter of 2021, salmon exports to the EU from 
Scotland increased by 74% (in tonnes) as compared to the same quarter in 2020 (Scottish 
Salmon, 2021b), which could be an indication that the initial paperwork related problems 
caused by Brexit have now been overcome. Given the general friendliness between the UK 
and the EU, the author does not expect further adverse diplomatic fallout of Brexit, at least not 
to the extent which could lead to trade sanctions and barriers. 
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PESTEL: Economic 
Several economic challenges and opportunities directly relevant to salmon farming companies 
are discussed below. 
¨ Economic: COVID-19 
2020 was an unprecedented year, and the global economy contracted by 3,3% in terms of real 
GDP (IMF, n.d.). IMF and World Bank both have expressed optimism about economic 
recovery and as of late January 2021, IMF expected the GDP growth in 2022 to be 4.1% 
globally (Amaro, 2021). For the Euro zone, the IMF does not expect the economy to reach 
2019 levels until at least the end of 2022 (Amaro, 2021). However, it must be kept in mind 
that despite the increasing availability of Covid-19 vaccinations, any prediction about how the 
pandemic situation will develop remains rooted in assumptions regarding efficacy of vaccines 
against the new variants of the virus. 
A major economic impact of the corona pandemic has been frequent lockdowns, curfews and 
ban on in-door gatherings. The current state of measures against the virus differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, however, much of the Europe remains locked down as of this 
writing (BBC News, 2021b). As a result of the lockdowns, salmon farming companies have 
suffered as demand in the HoReCa segment has dwindled (Bakkafrost, 2020). However, 
demand in the retail segment has remained strong throughout the corona crises (Bakkafrost, 
2020). 
The Covid-19 pandemic has also disrupted the supply chains. As a result of disruptions, the 
cost of freight increased as much as three times (Bakkafrost, 2020). In the long-run, however, 
Covid-19 will inevitably be defeated. 
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¨ Economic: Low Interest Rates 
Most of the major economies in the world are experiencing low interest/discount rates since 
several years now. In fact, since the recession of 2008, the global interest rates have been at 
historic lows (Chen & Estevez, 2020). Interest/discount rates, as set by the central banks, are 
the primarily tools of the central banks to set the monetary policy in any jurisdiction (Gerdes, 
2017). Other than the interest rates, central banks influence monetary policy via open market 
operations, reserve ratio requirements and interest on bank reserves (Gerdes, 2017). To avoid 
confusion between interest rates set by the central bank for borrowings and the interest rate 
that the central bank pays to commercial banks on its reserves, the author will use the term 
“policy rate” to refer to interest rates set by the central bank for borrowings as this “policy” 
rate has ripple effect throughout the economy. 
By setting low policy rate, the central bank makes borrowing more attractive 
(FocusEconomics, n.d.). In the Euro Zone and the US, the policy rates have been at historic 
lows in recent years. De Nederlandsche Bank expects the policy rates in the Euro Zone to 
remain low for foreseeable future (De Nederlandsche Bank, n.d.). 
As a result of low policy rates, the investments have become cheaper, and this allows salmon 
farming companies to take on more debt at low rates and incur CAPEX. Moreover, low interest 
rates not only allow for investments in the salmon industry but also tends to stimulate the 
economy, which in turn, would mean that the economy and people’s incomes would grow – 
this is particularly important for salmon industry because salmon is relatively more expensive 
than other types of meat. 
¨ Economic: Reducing Poverty, Rising Incomes & Economic Growth 
Earlier in 2021, China’s President Xi Jinping announced that China has successfully pulled 
almost 100 million people out of extreme poverty (BBC News, 2021). Whereas economic 
experts do question China’s definition of extreme poverty, it is nonetheless true that China has 
been able to achieve an unprecedented economic feat. Furthermore, even though China’s 
success is unparalleled, other countries have been able to achieve different levels of success 
in increasing incomes of their citizens and pulling them out of poverty. In 1990, 25% of the 
world’s population lived in extreme poverty, by 2018 the number had been brought down to 
11% (Woetzel et al., 2020). As of 2018, nearly half of those living in extreme poverty lived in 
just five countries of the sub-Saharan African (World Bank, n.d.). 
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Moreover, a high economic growth can be seen in the emerging economies. As per a report 
by Bain & Company, India has enjoyed a steady 7,5% annual GDP growth for the 13 years 
prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and had there been no Covid-19 pandemic (and GDP growth 
had continued at 7,5% annual rate), by 2030 1 in every 2 households in India would have 
belonged to high and upper-middle class, as compared to 1 in every 4 in 2018 (Ojha & 
Sridharan, 2019). Bain & Company also expected the consumption in the Indian market to 
quadruple between 2018-2030, from $1.5 trillion to $5.7-6 trillion, making India the 3rd largest 
consumer market in the world (Bain & Company, 2019). Whereas it is true that the crises and 
recession brought by the corona pandemic did force a decline in GDP growth, the numbers 
nonetheless show the potential of the emerging economies. Similar trends can be seen in other 
emerging economies as well. 
However, increase in GDP, rise in incomes and reduction in poverty does not mean that the 
growth in income is distributed evenly. Income inequality remains high in emerging 
economies. In fact, OECD finds that income inequality in the most unequal OECD countries 
is still lower than income inequality in emerging markets (Balestra et al., 2018). There are 
multiple ways to measure income inequality. The three most popular measures are Kuznet’s 
ratio, Gini coefficient, and Lorenz curve. The most common measure is the Gini coefficient, 
it measures the wealth distribution on a scale of 0-100%, with 100% being the highest level of 
income inequality (Investopedia, 2020). The Gini coefficient in Norway in 2019 was 29.22% 
(Statista, 2021a), while it was 46.5% in China (CEIC, 2020), 35.9% in India (Statista, 2021b), 
and 48% in the US (US Census Bureau, 2020) for the same period – hence, income inequality 
varies significantly amongst countries. 
Whereas a high-income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, does mean that not 
everyone is benefitting equally from growing prosperity. The fact, however, remains that 
emerging markets have a faster rate of GDP (and population) growth as opposed to the 
developed markets. Altogether, rising incomes, reducing poverty and economic growth 
provide an opportunity for growth for salmon farming companies. Since salmon is relatively 
more expensive than other meat proteins, higher incomes (both in developed and developing 
economies) could mean that people might be more willing to choose salmon rather than 
relatively cheaper meat proteins. 
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PESTEL: Social 
The salmon farming industry is well positioned to benefit from societal changes. Increasing 
and aging population that is conscious about sustainability and health offer growth 
opportunities. Relevant and specific social trends are discussed below. 
¨ Social: Demographic & Health Trends 
The United Nations expects the world’s population to grow by 2 billion in the next 30 years 
(UN DESA, 2019). However, most of the growth is expected in the emerging markets, 
including South Asia & Africa, whereas Europe and North America are expected to grow by 
2% between 2019-2050 (UN DESA, 2019). The increase in population translates into increase 
in demand for food. Given that wild catch is dwindling and that other sources of meat are 
excessively unsustainable due to their high CO2e emissions and water usage, the farmed 
fishing industry is well positioned to fill in the increased demand for food. Moreover, the 
emerging economies not only have the fastest growth in population, but these economies also 
have a rising middle-class (Mowi, 2020). This combination means that people in the emerging 
countries could be the next growth market for salmon farmers. 
Moreover, the world’s population, particularly in the developed countries, is ageing. World 
Health Organization predicts that the percentage of people over the age of 60 will increase 
from 12% of the global population in 2015 to 22% by 2050 (WHO, 2018). Moreover, the fact 
that salmon is recommended to counter risks of cardiovascular diseases, Alzheimer’s, arthritis, 
and dementia (WebMD, 2019), could lead to increase in salmon demand. However, warns 
Chand and Tung (2014), this could also mean that the labour markets would get less efficient 
with time12 (which could mean lower consumer spending power) and labour shortages could 
occur (Chand & Tung, 2014). Moreover, an ageing population could also result in “poverty 
among the elderly” as they tend to not work full-time (Chand & Tung, 2014, p. 411). However, 
despite the challenges that an aging population poses, business executives continue to see an 
aging population as an opportunity rather than as a problem (Chand & Tung, 2014). The fact 
that salmon is healthy and helps against certain diseases also fits well with an ageing 
population. 
 
12 With age, the efficiency declines. 
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¨ Social: Sustainability Conscious Consumers 
There is a growing trend amongst consumers to choose products which have been produced 
in an environmentally friendly and sustainable way. A research by PwC (2019) found that 
35% people globally prioritize products based on whether they are environmentally friendly 
or not (PwC, 2019). This trend of sustainability is not limited to consumer markets, rather 
financial institutions are following the trend as well by funding sustainable projects and 
companies (Fleming, 2020). Salmon farming is perhaps the most sustainable source of animal 
protein13, and hence, could be particularly attractive to sustainability conscious consumers and 
investors. 
Moreover, given the fact that respective governments of the Faroe Islands, Norway and 
Scotland have paid special attention to ensure that the salmon production in these jurisdictions 
is eco-friendly and sustainable, it could be presumed that salmon companies in these countries 
can position themselves to be attractive to sustainability conscious consumers more than 
producers from Chile. 
PESTEL: Technological 
As mentioned previously, Atlantic salmon requires specific temperatures and environment to 
be able to grow and combat disease. To stimulate growth, salmon farming companies are 
researching and developing new technologies and methodologies. Countries leading salmon 
aquaculture have also started issuing “development licenses”. However, given the 
unprecedented levels of innovation in every industry, it is extremely difficult to exactly 
pinpoint future developments. In fact, EY notes that “within 2040, we may very well witness 
technological disruptions [in salmon farming] that are unimaginable today” (EY, 2021, p. 20). 
The major technological trends in salmon farming are discussed below. 
¨ Technological: Land-based Farming 
As mentioned previously, Atlantic salmon requires certain environment and temperature to be 
able to grow and thrive. However, recently, there has been a growing interest in land-based 
salmon farming. The primary advantage of land-based farming is that it allows salmon to be 
farmed closer to the consumers (EY, 2020). The planned capacity of land-based farming has 
increased significantly over the years, with a total expected production from land-based farms 
 
13 Explained in detail in the environment section of PESTEL. 
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of 622 700 tons by 2022 (EY, 2020)14. As per the plans, only two companies, Atlantic Sapphire 
and Purse Salmon, alone will control almost 50% of the land-based farms (EY, 2020), which 
could provide them considerable bargaining power and economies of scale. The financing for 
land-based farms have also increased as compared to previous years. Whereas in 2015, DNB 
was unwilling to provide credit facilities to land-based farming companies, they have now 
changed course and started providing (albeit limited) funding to land-based farming 
companies (EY, 2020). What is interesting, however, is that equity investors have provided 
funding to several land-based farming companies, e.g., Atlantic Sapphire was valued at NOK 
7.6 bn as of September 2019, even though the company had not sold even a single salmon by 
then (EY, 2020)! Nevertheless, the growing interest in land-based farming remains a concern 
as it could not only lead to increased supply of salmon but due to its proximity to consumer 
markets, could lower costs (in terms of transportation and tolls). Environmentally, land-based 
farming is expected to have a carbon footprint nearly 28% higher than traditional salmon 
farming, however, with deployment of land-based farming and the learning curve that will 
accompany it, the environmental footprint might reduce (EY, 2020). Moreover, by virtue of 
its proximity to consumer markets, land-based farming could save on carbon emissions.  
Nonetheless, despite the increased interest in land-based farming, EY predicts that “it is highly 
unlikely that all these planned [in-land farming] projects will be realized…” (EY, 2021, p. 26). 
¨ Technological: Fish Feed 
Fish-feed is the single largest cost in salmon farming and has the largest carbon footprint in 
the entire value chain. Currently, the fish feed itself is made up of fish, i.e., the fish humans 
do not prefer to eat are used as feed for fish (Brady, 2021). Several companies are currently 
experimenting with plant-based and insect-based fish feed (Helmstetter, 2019). Once such 
company is the Netherlands based Protix. Protix has received approval from the EU to use 
their insect-based fish feed as an alternative to fish-based fish-feed (Brady, 2021). The CEO 
of Protix expects the industry to grow fast. However, it must be kept in mind that plant and 
insect-based elements can only be used to provide the required protein in the fish feed (Brady, 
 
14 To put this into perspective, Bakkafrost’s salmon farming operations in the Faroe Islands are expected to have 100,000 tons 
HOG by 2025 – and Bakkafrost is the largest salmon farmer in the Faroe Islands! 
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2021). The fish oils that go into fish feed cannot be completely replaced by other sources 
(Brady, 2021). 
Nonetheless, plant and insect-based fish feeds are considered environmentally more 
sustainable and are expected to become competitive in terms of price once their production is 
scaled up. Moreover, since plant and insect-based feed need not be located in coastal areas 
(since their primary raw material is not pelagic fish), they can be located closer to land-based 
sites, saving on transportation costs and carbon emissions (EY, 2021). 
¨ Technological: Genetically Modified Salmon 
In 2015, genetically modified salmon was approved for human consumption by the US and 
the same was approved in Canada in 2016 (Cutt et al., 2018). In fact, genetically modified 
salmon was the first modified animal approved for consumption in the US (Cutt et al., 2018). 
AquaBounty, the company that led the development of genetically modified salmon claimed 
that their salmon tastes the same as traditional salmon, has same nutritional value but requires 
25% less feed to grow and grows faster than traditional salmon (Cutt et al., 2018). 
Understandably, the salmon is patented and is currently not available for consumption 
(AquaBounty, n.d.). However, in the long run, the impact of genetically modified salmon 
remains to be seen. All in all, genetically modified salmon does NOT seem to pose any 
substantial threat to established salmon farming companies in the foreseeable future because 
even at full capacity, the impact of genetically modified salmon on global salmon harvest 
would be marginal. Nonetheless, as per the author’s discussions with an industry expert, it is 
found that genetically modified salmon’s primary attractiveness (or desirable trait) is in its 
potential to be immune to lice, which would consequently reduce the indirect and direct costs 
of salmon lice.  
PESTEL: Environmental 
Given that salmon farming is significantly dependent on the environment, there are significant 
environmental challenges (and opportunities) facing the salmon farming industry. The major 
challenges are discussed below. 
¨ Environmental: Climate Change  
Essentially, “… climate change presents a new, unprecedentedly disruptive, potentially 
cascading and profoundly uncertain type of change in organizational environments” (Winn et 
al, 2011, p. 169). It is impacting every country and the UN has declared “Climate Action” as 
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one of its 17 Sustainable Development Goals. 2019 was the warmest year of the previous 
decade, whereas the years 2010-19 marked the warmest decade on record (UN, n.d.). In fact, 
the impact of climate change is so pervasive that many of the UN SDGs are linked to 
combating climate change. 
Given that salmon is a cold-blooded animal and is dependent on the temperature of the 
environment to be able to grow and thrive, any changes in temperatures would have an adverse 
impact on salmon farming industry. Whereas the optimal temperatures for salmon growth is 
between 8 to 14 Celsius, “very cold temperatures could lead to massive mortality rates, and 
very warm temperatures could breed disease” (Bell & Johnson, 2016, p. 5). Such changes in 
temperature due to climate change are not unheard of, with Texas winter storms of early 2021 
being a case in point. 
Moreover, with climate change comes extreme weather events, e.g., hurricanes. These extreme 
weather events can lead to increased mortality in fish. One such instance happened in February 
2020 in the Faroe Islands where a storm led to loss of 1,2 M salmons from farms of Bakkafrost, 
thereby reducing Bakkafrost’s 2020’s harvest from expected 57 000 tons gutted weight15 (tgw) 
to 51 000 – 52 000 tgw (Bakkafrost, 2020, pp. 8-9). Given the increasing occurrences of 
extreme weather events across the globe, it would be naïve to presume that such events would 
not reoccur in the future at an increasing rate. Extreme weather events could also cause supply 
chain disruptions and such disruptions would have material adverse impact on salmon farming 
due to the perishable nature of food products, both as raw materials and as final product (i.e., 
salmon). 
There is a growing realization that the climate change needs to be minimized. In line with the 
Paris Climate Agreement, the Governments across the world are taking several initiatives, 
including taxing carbon emissions, providing incentives for Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS), 
reforestation, etc. Currently, only 5% of the oceans are used for food production even though 
seafood is amongst the most climate friendly ways of meeting global food requirements 
(Global Salmon Initiative, n.d.). Hence, there is an opportunity for salmon farmers to provide 
food that has a relatively low carbon footprint vis-à-vis other sources of food (particularly 
meat). This becomes increasingly important when taken within the context that currently more 
 
15 Same as HOG. 
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than 1/4th “… of the world’s GHG emissions come from agriculture, forestry, and land-use 
change” (Ahmed et al., 2020, p. 2). Moreover, as mentioned in the 5 Forces analysis, salmon 
farming has 7,9 kg of CO2e emissions/kg of edible meat, as opposed to 39 kg and 12,2 kg of 
CO2e / kg of edible meat for beef and pork, respectively (Mowi ASA, 2020). By replacing 
other sources of agriculture with salmon, the GHG emissions can be reduced. This is also in 
line with the broader consumer trends of sustainability. 
¨ Environmental: Water Scarcity 
Only 3% of the world’s water is suitable for human consumption (WWF, n.d.). Of this 3%, 
2/3rd is inaccessible due to being frozen in the form of glaciers (WWF, n.d.). Today, 1,1 billion 
people do not have access to water, whereas a total of 2,7 billion people face water scarcity at 
least one month every year (WWF, n.d.). The problem of water scarcity is a result of a number 
of factors, including pollution, climate change, and increasing population. 70% of the 
freshwater is consumed (and wasted) in agricultural activities (WWF, n.d.). 
Salmon has lowest water consumption per kg of edible meat when compared to chicken, pork, 
and beef (Mowi ASA, 2020). Salmon consumes only 2 000 litres of water/kg of edible meat 
as opposed to 4 300 and 15 400 litres/kg of edible meat for chicken and beef, respectively 
(Mowi ASA, 2020). Hence, salmon is well positioned to meet the world’s growing need for 
protein in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way.  
PESTEL: Legal 
Salmon farming is regulated in the Faroe Islands, Scotland, and Norway by their respective 
governments. The licenses that allow for salmon farming are limited and form the primary 
barrier to entry. A brief note on legal conditions surrounding salmon farming in each of these 
countries is presented below.  
¨ Legal: Norway 
The salmon farming industry in Norway is governed primarily by “The Aquaculture Act 
(2005)” and “The Food Safety Act 2003” (FAO, 2007). 
The Aquaculture Act has jurisdiction over both oceans based and land-based aquaculture and 
covers all aquatic life, “… from broodstock and hatchery production, to table fish production 
…” (FAO, 2007, para. 1). The Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs enforces 
the Aquaculture Act (FAO, 2007). The Act has established a licensing system and no 
aquaculture activity is permitted without licenses (FAO, 2007). The said licenses are limited 
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and are issued/renewed based on several factors, primarily related to environment and 
sustainability and the concerned ministry reserves the right to revoke and amend licenses as it 
sees fit (FAO, 2007). Since 1982, the issuance of new licenses has been done “… only in 
certain years” (Mowi ASA, 2020, p. 81). The licenses can be transferred from one party to 
another and leasing of licenses in certain situations can be permitted, pending approval from 
the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. Moreover, the licenses can be pledged as 
mortgage. However, the Act does not allow any single entity to “… control more than 25 
percent of the total licensed biomass” (FAO, 2007, subsection: “Transfer of licences/changes 
in ownership”). Production is limited by “Maximum Allowed Bio-Mass”, which is the 
maximum weight of fish any given company can hold in sea at any given time (Mowi ASA, 
2020). A single license allows for MAB of 780 tons (FAO, 2007). Moreover, each site has its 
own MAB and the aggregate of fish at a given site cannot exceed the MAB for that particular 
site (Mowi ASA, 2020). Furthermore, the Norwegian coast has been divided into 13 regions 
and whether MAB in any of these regions is asked to decrease, asked to hold constant or 
allowed to increase is based on the presence of sea lice in the region, this is also known as 
traffic light system (Mowi ASA, 2020). 
The Food Safety Act (2003) regulates, as the name goes, the safety of the food (including 
Animal health) and covers production and processing of the fish, amongst other items of food 
(FAO, 2007). Furthermore, the Norwegian Government has recently also started issuing 
“development licenses” with the aim of stimulating growth in the Norwegian salmon farming 
industry. 
Moreover, given the fact that salmon farming in Norway is dependent on the natural resources 
(fjords, favourable water temperatures, etc.), the Norwegian Ministry of Finance of established 
a commission in 2018 to evaluate how the use of Norwegian sea and coastal area can be taxed 
so that it better serves “... the common interests” (Government Drops ‘Salmon Tax’ Plan, 
2020, para: 3). The committee recommended a 40% tax rate, arguing that this is the same rate 
paid by the power industry (McDonagh, 2020b). However, amidst strong political opposition, 
the recommendations were not implemented. Alternatively, the Government recommended 
and adopted a production tax of NOK 0.40 per kg of salmon produced, starting January 2021 
(Holland, 2020; Poulsen, 2020).  
Furthermore, Norway, while not being a member of the EU, does belong to the European 
Economic Area, but fisheries and its management are not included in the EEA agreement. As 
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such, the Norwegian salmon exports to the EU are taxed at 2% for fresh salmon and 13% for 
smoked salmon (Regjeringen, 2018).  However, the veterinary policies of Norway are fully 
aligned with that of the EU and hence, all seafood products from Norway can enter the EU 
without border control (Regjeringen, 2018). 
¨ Legal: Faroe Islands 
The Faroe Islands are located West of Norway, about halfway between Norway and Iceland. 
It is a territory within the Kingdom of Denmark but enjoys significant autonomy. The island 
has its own Parliament and elects its own Prime Minister. However, the Faroe Islands do have 
representation in the Danish Parliament. It is not a part of the European Union (even though 
Denmark is a part of the EU). Faroe Islands are not a part of the EU Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA); however, the Faroese Government has entered several FTAs, including with Norway 
(The Government of the Faroe Islands, n.d.). 
Like Norway, salmon farming in the Faroe Islands is strictly regulated and is subject to license 
approval by the Faroese Government. The three most pertinent legislative documents 
regulating salmon farming in the Faroe Islands are the Aquaculture Act (2009), the 
Environment Act (1988) and the Food Safety Act (2010) (Mowi ASA, 2020). As a result of 
stringent regulatory requirements regarding fish health, today no farmed salmon in the Faroe 
Islands is treated with antibiotics (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-c). Unlike Norway, the production is 
not governed by maximum allowed biomass (MAB) and each site in the Faroe Islands has 
production between 1200 tons and 5800 tons per year “… depending on site characteristics 
and the geographic location of the individual farm”. (Mowi ASA, 2020, p. 89). The 
Aquaculture Act of the Faroe Islands allow any single company to hold a maximum of 50% 
of total sea licenses (Mowi ASA, 2020, p. 89). 
Like Norway, the licenses in the Faroe Islands can be transferred and pledged and the 
Government reserves the right to revoke or amend any license as it sees fit (Mowi ASA, 2020, 
p. 90). Each license in the Faroe Islands is issued for 12 years and is presumed to be renewable 
indefinitely (Bakkafrost, 2020). Like the recently introduced production tax on salmon 
production in Norway, the companies in the Faroe Islands have to pay a harvesting fee based 
on the volume it harvests in any given year (Mowi ASA, 2020)16. The revenue tax in the Faroe 
Islands is applied as a percentage of price of salmon rather than a fixed price and is generally 
 
16 Details of revenue tax rate is provided in the forecasting chapter. 
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higher than the revenue tax in Norway, which is fixed at NOK 0,40 per kg harvested. 
Furthermore, like Norway, the Faroese Government has started issuing development licenses 
to stimulate development in the salmon farming industry. 
Moreover, like Norway and the UK, the Faroe Islands veterinary laws are in tandem with that 
of the EU, and the Islands are part of the EU’s internal veterinarian zone, which means that 
farmed salmon from the Faroe Islands are exported to the EU without any further border 
checks (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-a). 
The salmon farming industry in the Faroe Islands has consolidated recently in line with the 
global trends. From 69 salmon farming companies at one point in time, the industry now has 
a total of 3 players (Holland, 2018), Bakkafrost being the largest. The legislation governing 
salmon farming consists of an “… all in, all out…” system (Faroese Seafood, n.d.-a, 
subsection: ‘The “all in - all out” strategy’). This means that at any given farming location, 
only one generation of fish can be farmed and after harvesting, the area must remain fallow 
for 2-3 months (Holland, 2018).  
¨ Legal: Scotland 
Salmon farming in Scotland, just like the Faroe Islands and Norway, is regulated. However, 
in Scotland, the regulation is not in terms of formal licenses (Mowi ASA, 2020). Rather, 
permissions from relevant Government organizations are necessary to establish a farming site 
(Mowi ASA, 2020). MAB in Scotland varies from site to site and renewal of the permission 
for farming from the concerned organizations is presumed indefinitely. 
As opposed to the Faroe Islands and Norway, Scotland belonged to the EU until December 
2020. With the UK’s accession from the EU, salmon farming industry in Scotland is said to 
have suffered losses, primarily due to paperwork, as was mentioned in the “Brexit” sub-section 
of political analysis. Moving forward, the extent of damage on the salmon farming industry in 
Scotland due to the UK exiting the Single Market remains to be seen. However, the author 




4.2.2 Summary of Macro Analysis 
The PESTEL analysis has revealed that the macro-environmental forces around the salmon 
farming industries in Norway, Scotland and the Faroe Islands are well-suited for the 
incumbents17. The reason these countries have been selected for analysis is because they are 
directly related to the author’s company of interest, i.e., the Bakkafrost Group. 
Politically, all the 3 countries in question have stable internal political environment and salmon 
farming have relatively high social acceptance in all 3 countries (particularly in the Faroe 
Islands and Norway). The relationship of these countries with the EU, the single largest salmon 
importer in the world, is also cordial. However, their relationship with Russia and China varies 
and, in the past, each country has had various levels of successes in the Russian and Chinese 
markets. The threat of deterioration in diplomatic relationship with China and Russia remains. 
Any deterioration in relations of China & Russia with the EU (and Norway) could play in 
Bakkafrost’s favour since the company is primarily based in the Faroe Islands and hence, is 
not grouped together with EU/NATO countries when trade sanctions are imposed. Another 
major salmon market is Japan and given Japan’s strong alliance with the EU and NATO 
countries, threat of diplomatic breakdowns between the EU/Norway and Japan seems 
negligible. It is important to mention here that despite being a major salmon importer, Japan 
is not a major market of Bakkafrost. Economically, the combination of rising middle class 
along with economic recovery as a result Covid-19 vaccination are promising for the long-
term growth of the industry. Social changes, such as aging population and consumer demand 
for more healthier and sustainable products provides an opportunity for the industry, whereas 
technological progress in the field of fish feed, land-based farming, and improved methods to 
combat sea lice offer opportunities for increased production and cost savings. Technological 
progress is essential as the industry seems to be pushing its biological and efficiency limits. 
Genetically modified fish is also worth keeping an eye on, however, threat from this area 
seems negligible for the foreseeable future. Within the dimension of environment and 
sustainability, salmon farming is well-suited to provide protein to a growing population in the 
most sustainable manner as opposed to other sources of animal meat, and strict regulatory 
 
17 This is not meant to say that other salmon producing countries, including Chile, the UK, Canada, and others are not well-
suited for salmon production. 
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requirements and licensing requirements keep the barriers to entry high for the industry, 
protecting the profit potential and competitive structure of the industry. 
4.3 Internal Resource Analysis 
Until now, factors external to Bakkafrost have been analysed. In this section, factors internal 
to Bakkafrost and how those factors could or could not lead to competitive advantage will be 
analysed. 
Traditionally, the overarching view in strategy was that some firms outperformed others due 
to imperfections in product markets. However, in the 1980’s an alternative view started 
gaining traction when Wernerfelt (1984), as per Crook et al. (2008), argued that “… firms can 
be viewed as collection of resources and [Wenerfelt] suggested that resources enable effective 
product market strategies” (Crook et al, 2008, p. 1143). In 1986, Barney introduced the 
concept of “strategic factor markets” and argued that if the markets for strategic resources 
become perfect, all profits will be competed away (Barney, 1986). He concluded that the 
reason why some firms outperform others is because they are either lucky or have superior 
information with regards to the factors available in strategic factor markets (or both) (Barney, 
1986). If they have superior information, Barney (1986) argued, they could acquire the 
strategic factors and generate economic profits. However, since superior information about 
external environment is difficult to achieve, Barney argued that the company’s internal skills, 
capabilities and competencies can provide superior information/expectations to companies. In 
1989, in what could be termed a critique of Barney’s 1986 paper, Derickx and Cool (1989) 
argued that the factors that could be bought and sold in strategic factor markets are, by 
themselves, not sufficient to create competitive advantage primarily because others can buy 
them too. Moreover, Derickx and Cool (1989) argued that “… it is not clear that all resources 
are actually bought and sold” (p. 1505). Therefore, Derickx and Cool (1989) conclude that 
when all factors are unavailable in the factor markets, they ought to be developed internally. 
They further argue that these assets can neither be developed in an instant nor can their stocks 
be adjusted at whim. Given this, how easily can (or cannot) these non-tradeable assets be 
imitated by competitors is what determines a company’s competitive position, argue Derickx 
and Cool (1989). 
Below, the internal factors of Bakkafrost will be discussed and analysed in the backdrop of 
above arguments by Barney (1986), and Derickx and Cool (1989). 
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4.3.1 VRIO Framework 
VRIO framework allows for evaluation of the resources a company has and helps answer the 
question of whether those resources can offer sustainable competitive advantage to the 
company or not. The framework aims to answer the following questions (Barney, 1995): (1) 
are the resources valuable? (2) are the resources rare? (3) are the resources imitable? (4) are 
the resources organized? 
Whereas all the questions are self-explanatory, it is important to note here that value of 
resources can change with the change in environment (Barney, 1995). Similarly, a resource 
which is valuable but not rare, is a source of “… competitive parity” and not a source of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1995, p. 52). In a similar vein, a resource that is imitable will 
provide competitive advantage in the short-term whereas an inimitable resource will provide 
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1995). Finally, it is important for the company to 
be organized in a manner that allows for exploitation of resources, this includes corporate 
governance, reporting mechanisms, etc (Barney, 1995). 
Major resources of Bakkafrost are discussed below, followed by answer to the question of 
whether the company is organized enough to exploit these resources. 
Resource 1: Integrated Value Chain 
Bakkafrost’s distinguishing factor as compared to other players in the industry is its vertically 
integrated value chain. Bakkafrost controls the entire value chain from broodstock and 
hatcheries to fish harvesting, processing, and selling. 
The integrated value chain allows Bakkafrost to not only keep track of every step of salmon 
production & processing, but also allows for quality control and cost synergies. The 
significance of integrated value chain is particularly important in the FOF segment since feed 
costs are not only the single largest expense in salmon farming but also because feed producers 
are few and concentrated, which allows them to have significant power vis-à-vis non-
integrated salmon farming companies. By having its own FOF production, the company is not 
only able to control costs but is also able to ensure a constant and sufficient supply of high-
quality fish feed. Since it controls its fish feed, the company ensures that the salmon’s diet is 
“…as close as possible to the natural diet of the wild salmon…” and uses only “… sustainably 
certified…” raw materials in feed production (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 25). It is due to its control 
over the entire value chain, but particularly due to control over its feed production, that 
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Bakkafrost is able to enter into long-term contracts without being dependent on external 
providers. Moreover, as mentioned previously, feed is the primary factor that determines 
salmon quality. By making its own feed, Bakkafrost has control over fish quality. 
The company has recently taken over Faroese broodstock program and has the right to genome 
sequence of the broodstock. This broodstock program is meant to help develop roe which will 
be more resistant to diseases (Bakkafrost, 2021), thereby reducing fish mortality. Moreover, 
the group also has its own broodstock program in Scotland. The Scottish broodstock program 
allows for farming for Scottish Island salmon, which is stronger, leaner and “… noticeably 
firmer salmon than other Atlantic salmon” (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 26).  
The in-house processing and packaging facilities allow Bakkafrost to serve both the fresh fish 
segment and the VAP segment. The long-term aim of Bakkafrost is to utilize its in-housing 
processing facilities to increase its VAP sales, which would allow Bakkafrost to minimize the 
price risk that accompanies the fresh fish segment. The processing facilities also allow 
Bakkafrost to divert its salmon from fresh salmon market to VAP market if the situation 
requires, as it was able to do so in 2020 when Covid-19 pandemic reduced demand in the fresh 
fish segment (Bakkafrost, 2021). 
The value of having an integrated chain is indisputable. However, other salmon producers 
have also started integrating vertically (some are already well integrated). In the long-run, it 
is likely that having a vertically integrated value-chain will become a necessity rather than a 
competitive advantage. But for the time being, it continues to provide Bakkafrost with a 
competitive edge. Building a vertically integrated value chain and developing knowledge (for 
example genome rights for broodstock program) cannot be done at a whim and requires a long 
period of time, just as Derickx and Cool (1989) argued. It also allows for synergies, cost 
savings and quality control. 
Resource 2: Faroese Roots 
Bakkafrost’s fish farming operations are spread in 2 countries (Faroe Islands and Scotland), 
with its HQ based in the Faroe Islands. This allows Bakkafrost a competitive advantage that 
most of its competitors do not enjoy: the Faroe Islands is considered a neutral territory and as 
such, is not grouped together with either the EU or the NATO countries – and hence, 
Bakkafrost is able to avoid the fallout of breakdown of international diplomatic relations. For 
instance, when in 2010, Norwegian salmon exports to China dwindled due to diplomatic 
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upheaval between the two countries, farmers from the Faroe Islands filled in (explained in 
detail in PESTEL analysis above). Similar event transpired in Russia after salmon exports 
from the EU to Russia dwindled in face of Russian aggression in Crimea. Moreover, the Faroe 
Islands enjoy extremely good relations with the EU and the Faroese salmon can be imported 
to the EU without border checkpoints. Therefore, Bakkafrost enjoys the advantages that its 
competitors based out of Norway, or the UK (or Scotland) are unable to, i.e., protection from 
diplomatic upheavals, while enjoying the upside of good relations with the EU. 
Given the fact that there are only 3 salmon companies in the Faroe Islands (coupled with a 
limited number of licenses), it is safe to say that Bakkafrost enjoys a rare and an inimitable 
resource in the shape of its Faroese roots and licenses. Whereas it is true that salmon producers 
in the UK and Norway also enjoy favourable environment for salmon growth, they lack the 
political (diplomatic) neutrality that Bakkafrost enjoys due to its Faroese roots. This is, 
naturally, a rare resource since the number of licenses available for farming in the Faroe 
Islands are restricted. 
Furthermore, Bakkafrost has recently established its own Biogas plant in the Faroe Islands. 
The plant does not only “recycle” the biological waste and turn it into fertilizer which is then 
given to farmers for free but also produces electricity, which is added to the Faroese national 
electricity grid (Bakkafrost, 2021). Biogas plant will save 11 000 tons of CO2e emissions 
(Bakkafrost, 2021). Biogas plant shows Bakkafrost’s close collaboration with the Government 
and the local community in which it operates, hence, adding to Bakkafrost’s social and 
political acceptance. 
Resource 3: Strong Internal Shareholding 
The CEO of Bakkafrost and his mother own significant share in the company. The CEO 
roughly owns a little more than 7,8% of the outstanding shares whereas his mother owns 
another 7,7% (Bakkafrost, n.d.-c). This could allow alignment between company insiders and 
outsiders and prevent agency problems. The fact that the CEO and his family have significant 
shareholding in the company could also add trust in the company from investor’s point of 
view, since the family has its fortunes tied to the fortunes of Bakkafrost. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, due to strong internal shareholdings, it is probable that the CEO would 
focus on long-term growth rather than quarterly earnings. 
 57 
However, this is not a rare resource since other salmon farming companies do also have 
relatively consolidated shareholdings, e.g., 53,2% shared are owned by the Chairperson in 
Greig Seafood (GSG, 2021, p. 202), and President & CEO of SalMar owns 93,02% shares of 
a holding company that in turn holds 52,46% of SalMar ASA (SalMar, 2021, p. 59). However, 
Mowi’s internal shareholding is limited, with the insiders holding only 0,30% of outstanding 
shares (Mowi, 2021b, p. 223). Nonetheless, it seems that strong internal shareholding is not 
unique to Bakkafrost amongst major salmon producers. However, internal shareholding could 
prevent agency problems and avoid excessive focus on quarterly results, thereby, leading to 
decisions which are in long-term interests of the company. 
Are the resources organized? 
In terms of being organized, it is undisputed that Bakkafrost is well organized and well 
positioned to be able to take advantage of the resources mentioned previously. It is the business 
acumen of Bakkafrost’s management which has allowed the company to conduct multiple 
acquisitions successfully since its listing on Oslo Børs in 2007. In 2015, the company was 
awarded the title of “company of the year” by the Faroese House of Industry (faroeislands.fo, 
2015), and the same year the company was awarded “Stockman Prize 2015” by “The 
Norwegian Society of Financial Analysts” (Bakkafrost, 2015), and in 2021 the company’s 
CEO has been awarded Edie “Business Leader of the Year” award18 (Market Screener, 2021); 
these awards serve to show that Bakkafrost is a well-organized company. Moreover, the 
company has long history of collaboration with the Government and the locals, which allows 
it to have legitimacy in the local community. 
All in all, Bakkafrost is well-organized to exploit the resources it possesses. 
4.3.2 Summary of Internal Resource Analysis 
The internal resource analysis has revealed that Bakkafrost possesses resources which allow 
it to have competitive advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. Firstly, the resource of integrated 
value chain allows Bakkafrost to control quality of salmon and achieve cost synergies; this 
resource is not entirely rare to Bakkafrost since salmon farming, generally, is dominated by 
vertically integrated companies. Nonetheless, an integrated value chain could further increase 
 
18 The contestants included Nestle, Vodafone, and PepsiCo (amongst others). 
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the barriers to entry in the industry since developing integrated value chains for new players 
is very challenging. Secondly, the Faroese roots allows the company to avoid diplomatic 
challenges which salmon farmers in the EU and Norway face – Faroese licenses and roots are 
rare and sustainable resources. Thirdly, strong internal shareholding could allow the company 
to focus on long-term value creation rather than short-term earnings benchmarks; however, 
this resource is not specific to Bakkafrost alone and several competitors do also have strong 
internal shareholding. 
All in all, Bakkafrost does have several resources which differentiates it from the competitors, 
however, only the Faroese roots seem to be the resource that can be considered rare in the 
long-term. 
4.4 Fusion of Internal & External Analysis 
Until now, this chapter has analysed the salmon farming’s industry structure, which was 
followed by macro-level analysis. The analysis of the industry and macro-environment 
focused on factors external to the company and were followed by internal resource analysis of 
Bakkafrost. This section aims to analyse the learnings from internal and external analysis 
together with the help of SWOT analysis. Very limited new information is introduced in this 
section. 
4.4.1 SWOT Analysis 
SWOT framework helps synthesize the learnings from external environment and internal 
resource analysis (Johnson et al., 2009). Strengths & Weaknesses are internal to the company 
whereas Opportunities & Threats are from the external environment (Johnson et al., 2009). 
Hence, SWOT framework is an excellent way to fuse internal and external analysis. 
Strengths 
The major strengths Bakkafrost enjoys are its vertically integrated value chain and the Faroese 
roots. The vertically integrated value chain allows for control over quality and costs, whereas 
the Faroese roots allow it to avoid the diplomatic upheavals which are common between the 
EU and China/Russia. Furthermore, Bakkafrost’s primary operations are in the Faroe Islands 
and in the Islands, antibiotics are not used. This provides Bakkafrost and other salmon farming 
companies from Norway and the Faroe Islands a unique selling point. In fact, due to use of 
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antibiotics in Chile, North American salmon importers have by and large shifted to salmon 
farmers in Norway and surrounding countries. 
Moreover, due to its control over the value chain (and broodstock program), Bakkafrost is well 
on its way to increase the size of smolt in the Faroe Islands to 500g by 2025 in the Faroe 
Islands. In Scotland, the company is replacing 11 old hatcheries with 3 RAS-based hatcheries, 
like those in the Faroe Islands, this would allow for 500g smolts in Scotland (Bakkafrost, 2021, 
p. 9). This would help reduce mortality and increase total harvests, since the higher the weight 
of smolt at the time of transfer to sea, the more resilient it is to diseases (thereby, reducing 
biological risk) and the less time it needs to spend in the sea (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 4). 
Lastly, strong internal shareholding could allow Bakkafrost to reduce agency problems and 
enable the company’s management to focus on long-term metrics rather than quarterly 
reporting. 
Weaknesses 
A significant weakness of Bakkafrost seems to be in its limited geographical diversification. 
The company, until recently, had operations only in the Faroe Islands, which meant that the 
company was “over-dependent” on one single country for its operations. With the acquisition 
of SSC in Scotland, the risk has arguably been diversified. Nonetheless, the company is still 
not as geographically diversified as other major salmon farmers, e.g., Mowi & Grieg Seafood. 
Geographic diversification would not only allow risks to be diversified but could also perhaps 
help reduce transportation costs. If processing plants/factories are established in relatively 
cheaper countries, perhaps costs of producing value-added products could be reduced as well. 
Moreover, apart from relatively low geographic diversification, Bakkafrost also has low 
diversification in its VAP segment, with 52% and 52% of VAP sales going to one single 
customer in 2020 and 2019, respectively (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 100). 
All in all, however, Bakkafrost does not seem to have any major weaknesses. 
Opportunities 
The global population is increasing, disposable incomes are rising and with the vaccination 
campaign in full swing, the global economy is set to grow by more than 4% in 2022. Moreover, 
there is rising health consciousness amongst consumers and an increasing care for the 
environment. All of these provide opportunities to not only Bakkafrost but also to salmon 
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farming companies all over the world as the demand for healthy and environmentally friendly 
protein is set to increase. Salmon, being one of the most eco-friendly and healthiest meat 
products, is well suited to capitalize on these macro-trends. Rising incomes could allow 
consumers to buy salmon, which is relatively more expensive (and healthier) than other 
sources of animal protein. 
There is also rising interest of investors and farmers alike in land-based salmon farming. 
Bakkafrost’s current portfolio does not have land-based farming, however, the company has 
applied for off-shore farming licenses in the Faroe Islands (Bakkafrost, 2021). Hence, even 
though the company does not have in-land farming in its portfolio, it is expanding its 
production by moving into off-shore farming. Nonetheless, land-based farming could be an 
area of opportunity. 
Threats 
The primary threat to all salmon farmers is salmon lice. The direct and indirect costs salmon 
lice impose on salmon farmers are significant and were mentioned in detail earlier. Bakkafrost 
is making significant investments to produce smolt of higher weight as the company sees it as 
a way of not only increasing capacity but also reducing risk of diseases. Nonetheless, Scotland 
has recently suffered high lice levels, which is a source of concern. In 2019, Mowi’s operations 
in Scotland suffered a hit in earnings because of rising lice and mortality (BBC News, 2020). 
Mowi also had to use antibiotic in its operations in Scotland (BBC News, 2002). Given that 
Bakkafrost also has operations in Scotland since 4th quarter of 2019, it is probable that 
Bakkafrost could also suffer from the aforementioned problems. If Bakkafrost also has to use 
antibiotics to combat sea lice, this could impact brand equity, since its entire salmon 
production in the Faroe Islands’ is antibiotics free. 
Another threat that Bakkafrost and all other industry players face is that of climate change. 
Salmon is a cold-blooded animal and requires a certain range of temperatures to be able to 
grow and avoid diseases. With rising global temperatures and extreme weather events, salmon 
farming is facing unprecedented challenges, e.g., Bakkafrost’s lost 1,2 M salmons in the Faroe 
Islands in early 2020 because of a “severe storm” (Bakkafrost, 2020, p. 6). 
Moreover, there is rising opposition to salmon farming in various countries. The opposition in 
Norway and the Faroe Islands is not deemed significant, primarily because salmon farming is 
a major economic activity in these countries. Scotland, however, is not economically 
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dependent on salmon farming and hence, threats remain that salmon farming licenses might 
be withdrawn sometime in the future due to political and social opposition; for now, however, 
this threat is not significant in Scotland either. 
4.4.2 Summary: Internal & External Analysis Synthesized 
This section has brought together the different elements of the strategic analysis with the help 
of the SWOT framework. The framework allows to look at the opportunities and threats in the 
external environment from the perspective of the company, i.e., it allows for analysis of 
external environment while keeping the company’s strengths and weakness in view and helps 
point out the threats and opportunities in the environment (Johnson et al., 2009). Through the 
SWOT analysis, it has been observed that the integrated value chain and the Faroese roots 
remain Bakkafrost’s major strengths. However, as the Faroese roots bring significant 
diplomatic and political advantages (e.g., wide political acceptance of salmon farming) to the 
company, the concentration of operations in the Faroe Islands and Scotland also exposes 
company to the threats posed by little geographical diversification (as compared to other major 
salmon farmers). The opportunities lie in the fact that demand for salmon is expected to 
increase globally amidst rising incomes, aging & growing populations, and greater consumer 
concerns about sustainability & health. Salmon lice remain the biggest threat to the industry 
and the company and continues to impose direct and indirect costs. 
4.5 Summary of Strategic Analysis 
To summarize, salmon farming industry is well-suited to the rising consumer trends. The 
industry is consolidated, vertically integrated, and protected by high barriers to entry. There 
seems to be a consensus that increase in demand will outstrip the increase in supply in the 
foreseeable future (Mowi, 2021a). There also seems to be no major political or social threats 
to salmon farming in Norway, the Faroe Islands and Scotland. Salmon lice remains the single 
biggest challenge to salmon production. Limited availability of licenses, coupled with 
stringent regulations, also place a limit on the supply growth of salmon. 
Based on strategic analysis alone, the author concludes that salmon farming is certainly an 
attractive investment. Bakkafrost’s position within the industry is strong and it enjoys all the 
resources necessary for successful salmon operations, i.e., favourable climate, good relations 
with all the salmon importing nations/economic blocks, and social acceptance of salmon 
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farming in the countries it farms salmon in. Therefore, Bakkafrost, as per strategic analysis, 
seems to be an attractive investment. 
The following chapter analyses Bakkafrost’s financial health, as well as explores the industry’s 
and Bakkafrost’s capital structure. 
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5. Financial Health & Capital Structure 
This chapter has been divided into two sections. In the first section, the financial health of 
Bakkafrost has been evaluated, with the primary goal of examining whether the company faces 
any liquidity and solvency challenges. In the second section, capital structure theories have 
been introduced and the capital structure of Bakkafrost has been analysed, with the aim to see 
why the company has the capital structure that it has and how the capital structure could 
influence the company’s strategy. 
5.1 Financial Health 
Ratio analysis is a common tool to learn about a company’s financial health. It allows to see 
historic trends and to get insights into the company’s operational and financial activities 
(Young, 2013). It is also important to conduct ratio analysis to be able to understand the trends 
in any industry. There are 4 major categories of financial ratios: liquidity, profitability, 
solvency, and efficiency. 
The ratio analysis below has been conducted primarily with the aim of understanding the 
industry’s financial architecture and to understand Bakkafrost’s financial performance over 
the years, particularly its liquidity position, since liquidity is one of the most important 
elements in any financial analysis. All the averages have been calculated excluding Bakkafrost 
because the sample is small and including Bakkafrost will bias the result in its favour. It is 
worth mentioning here that the financial trends in sub-section 5.1.1 below give only a 
“snapshot” at a particular point in time, which is followed by Bakkafrost’s analysis over time 
in sub-section 5.1.2. 
5.1.1 Industry’s Financial Trends 
It can be seen in Table 1 below19 that there is significant variation in financial ratios within 
the major salmon farming companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. All the salmon 
farming companies have lower volatility as compared to the market since all salmon farming 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange have beta less than 1. It is observable that the 
 
19 To ensure consistency and comparability, all ratios in sub-section 5.1.1 have been taken from WSJ and all Beta’s from 
Yahoo Finance, with the implicit assumption that the publishers have ensured consistency in computing respective ratios. 
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salmon farming industry has different levels of leverage. However, despite variations in 
leverage, almost all salmon companies enjoy a healthy interest coverage ratio, with an average 
of 9,13.  
 
Table 1: Summary of key financial ratios of Bakkafrost & competitors; Data Source: Yahoo Finance & Wall 
Street Journal, Dated 17th May 2021 
In comparison to peers, Bakkafrost is significantly less leveraged, with Bakkafrost’s leverage, 
as measured by Total Debt/Total Equity of 0,29, against the industry average of 0,65. 
Bakkafrost’s cash ratio is roughly 2,3x higher than the industry average and the company also 
enjoys an interest coverage ratio that is on par with the industry. However, the industry’s 
interest coverage ratio is significantly influenced by SalMar’s high interest coverage ratio; 
when SalMar’s interest coverage ratio is excluded from the analysis, the industry’s interest 
coverage ratio falls to a mere 6,6, against Bakkafrost’s 9,03. A high interest coverage ratio 
ensures that, despite high leverage, a corporation will not face liquidity crisis. The industry 
has an average Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) of 4,61%, against Bakkafrost’s 4,42%. 
SalMar and Grieg Seafood are outliers in ROIC, and when adjusted for them, the industry’s 
ROIC falls to a mere 2,73%, which is significantly less than the ROIC of Bakkafrost. 
All in all, it does seem that, as per the data available on 17th May 2021, Bakkafrost outperforms 
most of its peers in terms of solvency, liquidity and return on invested capital. However, the 
limitation remains that this analysis is restricted to a certain point in time, i.e., 17th May – and 
as of this date, not all peer companies had issued their latest quarterly reports and by restricting 
to only one point in time, it is not possible to see the trend over the years. 
  
Company Beta
Total Debt to 
Total Equity





Return on Invested 
Capital
Grieg Seafood 0,43 95,30% 39,11% 0,37% 1,74 -0,05%
Lerøy Seafoods Group 0,55 45,03% 25,02% 0,69% 8,06 3,53%
Mowi 0,67 75,98% 35,90% 0,15% 7,66 2,66%
Norway Royal Salmon -0,11 51,93% 27,61% 0,04% 9,30 2,01%
SalMar 0,22 61,36% 27,50% 0,05% 18,89 14,91%
Average (excluding Bakkafrost) 0,352 65,92% 31,03% 0,26% 9,13 4,61%
Bakkafrost 0,38 29,97% 19,81% 0,61% 9,03 4,42%
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5.1.2 Bakkafrost’s Financial Trends 
For the following analysis, the author has calculated the ratios himself rather than relying on 
WSJ or Yahoo Finance; by calculating the ratio himself, the author ensures that the definition 
of each ratio remains consistent for the period of analysis, which consequently, allows for 
comparability across the years. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Bakkafrost’s ratios over the years; Data Source: Annual Reports 
Based on the ratios calculated in Table 2, one can see that the revenue of Bakkafrost has grown 
over the years. However, there was a decline in revenues in 2018. The decrease in revenues in 
2018 was primarily due to a significant decrease in production. There was also a ban by 
Russian Government to import Bakkafrost’s salmon in quarter 4 of 2018 due to health risks, 
the ban was later lifted in quarter 1 of 2019 (Bakkafrost, 2019), and the ban contributed to 
decline in revenues in 2018. One of the reasons for decline in margins in 2018 was the shift 
from medicinal treatment of sea lice to mechanical treatment, which forced the company to go 
on a learning curve and face initial losses. The company has also faced decreasing asset 
turnover ratio; however, this seems to be primarily because of the fact the company has been 
expanding (both organically and inorganically), thereby, increasing the asset base whereas the 
higher revenues from this expansion are expected to flow in the future. The decline in ROE 
can be, in part, attributed to the fact that equity has grown over the years due to increase in 
retained earnings. However, a significant decline in ROE can be witnessed in 2020, primarily 
because of the issuance of new equity in Q4 of 2019 to fund acquisition of Scottish Salmon 
Company (SSC). 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Revenue Growth 6% 12% 18% -16% 42% 3%
EBITDA Margin 39% 41% 41% 40% 36% 23%
NP Margin 28% 42% 14% 30% 18% 10%
ROE 35% 44% 14% 7% 13% 5%
Asset Turnover 77% 69% 71% 58% 48% 35%
Current Ratio 4,74 7,22 3,54 6,35 4,79 5,17
Cash to Current Debt 0,25 0,60 0,51 0,84 1,42 0,61
CFO / Current Liabilities Ratio 1,85 2,15 2,42 2,41 1,12 0,62
Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0,34 0,34 0,30 0,30 0,35 0,34
Times Interest Covered (Op. EBITDA/Interest) 45,03 49,96 59,22 102,34 95,55 29,41
Net Financial Expenses Coverage 258,61 31,68 61,90 104,69 43,84 16,39
Debt to Equity Ratio 0,52 0,53 0,42 0,42 0,54 0,51
Equity/Debt and Equity Ratio 0,66 0,66 0,70 0,70 0,65 0,66
CFO / Total Debt 0,57 0,45 0,95 0,53 0,23 0,11




Liquidity refers to a company’s ability to meet all its near-term cash obligations (Berman et 
al, 2005). The liquidity position of Bakkafrost is strong, even though it has fluctuated over the 
years. Its current ratio is currently more than 5 for the year 2020, and even though one might 
argue that a current ratio of 5 is unreasonably high, it is in part because Bakkafrost has a high 
amount of “biological assets” which are classified as current assets. The cash to current debt 
has fallen below 1 in 2020, signifying that the if all current liabilities were to fall due on 31st 
December 2020, the company would not be able to meet it with the cash on hand. However, 
given that salmon is a commodity and that the cash is generated on a regular basis, it can be 
deduced that the cash to current debt ratio of less than 1 is not an issue. Another important 
measure for liquidity is Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) to Current Liabilities ratio, and it 
measures how many times can all the current liabilities be paid off solely by the year’s 
operational cash flow. Bakkafrost’s CFO to Current Liabilities ratio has fluctuated within the 
range of 0,62 and 2,42 in past 6 years (and has decreased over the years); it is currently at its 
lowest of 0,62. This signifies that the operational cash flow alone cannot cover all the current 
liabilities. 
Solvency refers to a company’s ability to meet all its financial obligations, both current and 
non-current (Hayes, 2021). Bakkafrost’s solvency, based on CFO to Total Debt ratio has 
decreased in past two years, this could be due to two reasons: i.  In 2019, IFRS-16 was 
implemented which required operational leases to be accounted for as debt, hence, increasing 
the debt on balance sheet; ii. New debt was issued for acquisition of Scottish Salmon Company 
(SSC) in 2019, this significantly increased the debt Bakkafrost holds (acquisition was financed 
by a mixture of equity and debt). However, CFO/Total Debt is not the most important measure 
of liquidity and solvency since paying off the entire company’s debt by a single year’s CFO 
is not something that a “going concern” company does. A better measure is times interest 
covered20 ratio, which remains, as mentioned previously, higher than the industry average and 
was over 29 for the year ended 2020. Moreover, since the financial expenses include expenses 
other than purely interest charges, the author has calculated the ratio of Net Financial 
Expenses/EBITDA, and this ratio – despite a decrease over the years – is over 16 for the year 
 
20 The interest coverage ratio (or times interest covered) in this section (5.1.2) does not match the same ratio in sub-section 
5.1.2. This is because there can be multiple variations in how the ratio has been calculated. In this sub-section, all ratios have 
been calculated by the author whereas in section 5.1.1 all ratios have been taken from Wall Street Journal – nonetheless, since 
the ratios are NOT being compared across the sections, they can be used without worrying about challenges of consistency 
and comparability. 
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2020; this means that EBITDA alone can cover the net financial expenses of Bakkafrost over 
16 times, hence signifying that Bakkafrost can comfortably fulfil its interest (and financial) 
obligations. Debt to Total Assets has remained relatively stable over the years, indicating that 
the company continues to finance its assets (and growth) with a relatively stable percentage of 
debt. 
5.1.3 Summary of Analysis of Financial Health 
All in all, the author would classify Bakkafrost’s financial position as solid, not least because 
it has a high interest coverage ratio and a relatively stable current ratio. The leverage position 
has remained relatively stable over the years, even as Bakkafrost has increased its capital 
outlay. In addition, the company has been able to achieve top line growth almost every year, 
and has liquidity, solvency and ROIC position that is superior to its peers. 
5.2 Capital Structure & Company Strategy 
In this section, capital structure of salmon farming industry will be discussed in light of 
literature from strategy as well as finance. However, it must be noted that optimal capital 
structure varies from industry to industry. The purpose of this section is not to comment on 
what would be the optimal capital structure for salmon farming companies and Bakkafrost, 
rather the aim is to explore the capital structure and try to understand the reasons for it – this 
is not exactly an empirical or scientific exercise and hence, the interpretation of the capital 
structure in light of theories mentioned below could vary from person to person. This section 
does not contribute to the valuation of Bakkafrost, nonetheless, it helps understand how the 
industry’s (and Bakkafrost’s) capital structure is and what could be the reasons for that. 
5.2.1 Capital Structure in Finance 
One of the earliest concepts that every student of financial economics is taught is Modigliani 
and Miller’s proposition from the 1950s that in perfect capital markets, the capital structure of 
the corporation is irrelevant. In practice, no corporation operates in a perfect capital market. 
However, “M&M’s basic insight is important not only for understanding determinants of 
optimal capital structure but also for other corporate financial policies” (Luehrman, 2016, p. 
3). As a result of the insights provided by M&M, several capital structure theories have 
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emerged. These theories explain how corporations determine their optimal capital structure 
while trying to balance (often conflicting) imperfections present in the markets. 
One of the most well-known capital structure theories is the pecking order theory. This theory 
is grounded in the problem of asymmetric information between company insiders and 
outsiders. The theory argues that corporations prefer to fund projects using internal funds, if 
internal funds are unavailable then they prefer to use debt financing and fund their 
operations/projects from equity issuance only if the two other options are unavailable (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2013, p. 570). In cases where corporations do go for equity issuance, they try to 
time the market and issue more equity only when some favourable news has been announced, 
in a bid to reduce information asymmetries (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013, p. 571). 
Another widely known capital structure theory is the trade-off theory. By definition, this 
theory stipulates that corporations try to balance the trade-off between the benefits and side-
effects of leverage (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013, p. 550). The benefit of debt arises from the interest 
tax shield that it provides whereas the side-effects are the direct and indirect costs of financial 
distress. 
5.2.2 Capital Structure in Strategy 
A corporation’s capital structure will have an impact on its strategy as well. In this sub-section, 
impact of capital structure on product-market behaviour and alliances will be discussed briefly. 
Parsons and Titman (2008) find that a corporation’s capital structure impacts the relationship 
the corporation has with its non-financial stakeholders and competitors. As per Parsons and 
Titman (2008), the non-financial stakeholders will also suffer if the corporation goes out of 
business.  Hence, they argue, that a corporation’s capital structure will reflect its relationship 
with customers, partners, and competitors. For instance, corporations following 
“differentiation” strategies rather than “low-cost” strategies in their product market behaviour 
are more likely to use equity finance rather than debt finance (Parsons & Titman, 2008). They 
argue this is because of multiple reasons. Firstly, customers of a company following 
differentiation strategy have higher stakes than customers of a company following low-cost 
strategy21, hence, due to the higher stakes of customers, the indirect bankruptcy costs for the 
 
21 A company following differentiation strategy will most likely impose switching costs on its suppliers and customers in case 
it goes bankrupt (Parsons & Titman, 2008). 
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corporation following differentiation strategy increases. Secondly, Parsons and Titman (2008) 
argue, companies following differentiation strategy are likely to have high-quality products 
and demand for these products is usually cyclical, increasing the cash flow risks. They also 
argue that “… debt magnifies the effects of economic downturns and predation …” (Parsons 
& Titman, 2008. p. 231), and economic downturns tend to hurt cyclical products more. 
Zambuto et al. (2014) find that corporations prefer to form alliances with companies with a 
capital structure similar to their own (in terms of leverage) in order to minimize costs ex post. 
They also suggest that corporations maintain a low-leverage ratio on purpose to attract alliance 
partners. They demonstrate that use of equity in alliance agreements increase as a 
corporation’s “… leverage increases and as the difference in leverage across the alliance 
partners increases” (Zambuto et al., 2014, p. 150), the use of equity here refers to structuring 
the alliance as a Joint Venture, i.e., if the capital structure is not similar across alliance partners, 
then they tend to involve equity financing to structure alliance as a JV. 
5.2.3 Application of Capital Structure Theories on Industry & Bakkafrost 
Industry Level Analysis 
While looking at the capital structure of salmon farming companies listed on the Oslo Børs, 
one can see in Table 1 above that the average of total debt to total equity (excluding 
Bakkafrost) is 0,59 (it rises to 0,65 when Bakkafrost is excluded); however, variations in the 
structure are visible with Bakkafrost’s total debt to total equity under 0,30 and Greig Seafood’s 
total debt to total equity above 0,95. Nonetheless, with an average of 0,59 of total debt to 
equity, the capital structure cannot be considered highly leveraged, rather the author would 
classify it as moderately leveraged. This could be due to multiple factors. To begin with, 
salmon is a commodity and its prices have fluctuated significantly over the years. Fluctuations 
in prices, coupled with fluctuations in salmon harvests (due to fish health, diseases, extreme 
weather events, etc.), could lead to significant fluctuations in cash flows. Therefore, it could 
be the case that salmon farming companies avoid a highly leveraged capital structure to avoid 
liquidity problems due to unforeseen challenges. Secondly, salmon, as compared to other meat 
proteins, is relatively expensive. This could imply that salmon sales could be cyclical (the 
argument being that salmon is a more premium and differentiated meat protein as opposed to 
other meats), and hence, an economic downturn could magnify the challenges to salmon 
farmers, in line with the arguments of Parsons and Titman (2008) mentioned in section 5.2.2. 
above. Nonetheless, a review of leverage ratios by industry shows that the “agricultural 
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production livestock and animal specialties” industry had median total debt to equity ratio of 
a mere 0,04 in 2020 (ReadyRatios, n.d.). Salmon farming industry, with its average debt to 
equity of 0,59 (as calculated in Table 1 above) is highly leveraged vis-à-vis the industry, and 
as per the author’s discussion with an industry expert, this is because the production of salmon 
is more industrialized and intensive than other agricultural products, and consequently, 
requires more capital. 
Company-specific Analysis 
Bakkafrost had total debt to total equity ratio (as of 6th March 2021) of approximately 0,30 
(refer to Table 1 above), which is significantly lower than the industry average total debt to 
total equity of 0,65. Bakkafrost’s equity ratio for the past six years has remained within the 
range of 0,66 to 0,70. One reason why Bakkafrost has maintained low leverage as opposed to 
the industry average could be that within the salmon industry, Bakkafrost’s products are 
premium (in VAP segment) and superior (in fresh fish segment)22, and hence, due to its 
relatively “differentiated strategy” vis-à-vis other players, Bakkafrost might have preferred 
maintaining low leverage in line with the argument of Parsons and Titman (2008) that 
companies with more differentiated products tend to maintain low leverage. However, this 
could not be the only reason for why Bakkafrost has low leverage because other salmon 
farmers also have premium and superior salmon products. 
Moreover, despite its relatively less-leveraged capital structure vis-à-vis the industry average, 
the company remains open to adding debt to its capital structure. In fact, the internal financial 
policy of Bakkafrost allows for equity ratio of as low as 0,35, with interest coverage ratio of 
just 2x (Bakkafrost, n.d.-a); the interest coverage currently is over 9x (refer to Table 1 above). 
This shows that the company is willing to increase debt. The willingness to add debt could be 
the result of multiple reasons. Firstly, given its strong liquidity and solvency position vis-à-vis 
the industry average, Bakkafrost can afford to add more debt without creating liquidity and 
solvency challenges for itself. Secondly, given that all other comparable companies have 
higher debt ratios than Bakkafrost, Bakkafrost’s willingness to acquire more debt would not 
make it an outlier, therefore, whatever the negative effects of debt maybe in terms of alliance 
formation [as mentioned by Zambuto et al. (2014)], Bakkafrost would not suffer since other 
 
22 Premium & Superior are the highest qualities globally. 
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salmon farmers have higher leverage than Bakkafrost. Finally, the company has numerous 
capital expenditures planned both in the Faroe Islands and in Scotland, and hence, the 
willingness to take more debt is absolutely in line with the pecking order theory, as Bakkafrost 
might be more interested in taking debt rather than issuing equity to finance its planned capital 
investments. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that this leverage ratio is based on book values of debt and 
equity and have been taken from the Wall Street Journal (to ensure consistency across 
companies, it is presumed that WSJ would calculate these ratios in similar manner across 
companies). If the same ratios are calculated with market values of debt and equity, it is likely 
that leverage will fall significantly because the stock prices (and P/E ratios) are very high 
(discussed further in multiple’s valuation chapter). Nonetheless, for the purposes of liquidity 
and solvency, it is not uncommon to use book values for analysis rather than market values. 
5.2.4 Summary of Capital Structure & Company Strategy 
In the capital structure section, it has been seen that Bakkafrost’s debt and leverage ratios are 
significantly lower than the industry averages. The company is willing to take more debt, 
however, its current policy is not to have total debt to total equity ratio higher than 0,65 – this 
is in line with the industry average. 
The reasons for moderate level of leverage in the industry (as opposed to the economy) could 
be multiple; to begin with, the industry is cyclical (and produces meat which is relatively more 
expensive than other types of meat) and hence, to avoid the magnification effects of debt, the 
incumbents might avoid high leverage in its capital structure (as cyclical products are more 
likely to cause cash flow issues when the economy is not doing so well). Secondly, the industry 
is capital intensive and growing, which would mean that a low leverage of debt is difficult as 
debt is needed to fund capital intensive projects (primarily in line with the pecking order 
theory). The fact that the salmon farming industry is capital intensive is also the reason why 
leverage in salmon farming industry is significantly higher than “agriculture production 
livestock and animal specialties” sector, as per the author’s discussion with an industry expert. 
Moreover, debt provides interest tax shield. Consequently, the incumbents avoid extreme ends 
of debt ratios vis-à-vis the general economy and maintain debt levels which can be considered 
moderate vis-à-vis the general economy. Furthermore, now that moderate level of debt in the 
industry has become norm, it is likely that the individual players would not want to diverge 
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significantly from the mean because it could lead to challenges in forming alliances, in line 
with Zambuto et al.’s (2014) arguments that companies tend to form alliances with companies 
having a similar capital structure. 
5.3 Summary of Financial Health & Capital Structure 
In this chapter, the financial trends of salmon farming industry and Bakkafrost’s position 
within the industry were discussed. The industry has lower volatility than the market (as 
measured by beta) and, in general, has relatively high interest coverage ratios (as per ratios 
given by WSJ). Bakkafrost’s position within the industry is strong and its financial health is 
sound. It has lower than industry’s average leverage and higher than industry’s average interest 
coverage ratio. Over the years, Bakkafrost has been able to achieve top-line growth and the 
company achieved higher ROIC than most of its peers (except for SalMar) as per the data 
available on 17th May 2021. 
All in all, the company is characterized by strong liquidity, solvency and profitability positions 
and its capital structure is less leveraged than its peers. 
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6. Review & Selection of Valuation Framework 
As suggested by Hitchner (2017), there are two major approaches to value companies and/or 
projects: income approach and market (also known as multiples) approach. The market 
approach uses comparable assets to value the company's assets. The income approach 
calculates the company's value by using the future stream of cash flows the company will 
generate. The income approach is discussed in this chapter, while the market approach is 
covered in chapter 11. 
However, before delving deeper into the frameworks of the income approach, it is important 
to mention that the challenge with all financial valuation models is that they require certain 
assumptions and understanding not only about the company/project under consideration but, 
in most cases, also about factors exogenous to the company. These models require that the 
person conducting valuation understand not only financial theory but also understand other 
business areas. This creates a challenge: most of the information that must be considered for 
valuation is qualitative rather than quantitative. How that qualitative information is quantified 
requires business judgement – this judgement, needless to say, differs from person to person. 
Schill (2017) warns that “… valuations are rarely identical across analysts” (p. 1); and this is 
starkly visible in the case of Bakkafrost, e.g., as of 18th May 2021, out of the 8 institutional 
analysts covering Bakkafrost, 4 recommended “HOLD” position, 3 recommended “BUY” 
position, and 1 recommended “SELL” position. This shows the difference of opinion amongst 
the most experienced and professional analysts. 
The main models under the umbrella of income-based approach are listed and discussed 
below, followed by a discussion of why the author has chosen FCFF-based DCF model to 
value Bakkafrost. The main models are: 
1. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
2. Economic Value-Added (EVA) 
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6.1 Discounted Cash Flow 
The most popular method under the income approach is the Discounted Cash Flow method. 
The DCF method essentially states that the present value for any project/company/security 
should equal all the future net cash flows from that company, discounted at a rate appropriate 
to the risk of the company.  
Within the discounted cash flow method, there are different variants and if applied correctly, 
these variants must yield the same result. Which variant from within the category of discounted 
cash flow methods is used depends primarily on a company’s capital structure (and expected 
changes), the available discount rate, and the insights the analyst is seeking – since some 
valuation variants can offer more insights than others. The discount rate used also changes 
from variant to variant. The three variants are: 
a. Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 
b. Free Cash Flow to the Equity (FCFE) 
c. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
 
All DCF methods require a significant number of assumptions and therefore, it is 
recommended to do DCF valuation using a range of assumptions (Lerner & Willinge, 2011). 
Schill (2017) also warns that, due to the assumptions involved, “… virtually every number 
used in a DCF valuation is…” erroneous (p. 11). Hence, the author considers it appropriate to 
apply a 10% confidence interval, i.e., as long as the estimated price of the stock is within +/- 
10% of the market price (as of 17th May), the final recommendation would be to “HOLD” the 
stock.  
The different variants in the DCF approach are discussed below. 
6.1.1 Free Cash Flow to the Firm  
The DCF method gained prominence in the 1970s and within the DCF method, valuation 
model based on FCFF became “… the standard…” (Leuhrman, 1997a, p. 3). The FCFF variant 
of DCF method discounts the future FCFF at weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)23. The 
 
23 By definition, WACC is computed as a weighted average of cost of debt and cost of equity to the company. A detailed 
discussion on calculation of WACC is carried out later in this chapter. 
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resulting value from the above model provides the enterprise value of the company, which is 
a measure of a company’s “total value” (Fernando & Kindness, 2021, subsection: “Key 
Takeaways”). Therefore, to calculate value of the company to only equity holders (as is the 
aim in this thesis), net debt must be deducted from the enterprise value24. The resulting value 
is the value of company to its equity holders. If this resulting value is divided by number of 
total undiluted shares outstanding, the resulting figure is price per share (Koller et al., 2015)  
The calculation of the FCFF itself is complicated and has been dealt with separately later. 
However, for a clearer understanding of FCFF method, it must be noted here that FCFF does 
not account for debt payments and therefore, FCFF is also called unlevered cash flow (Mitra, 
2010). In FCFF method, any benefits of tax (due to interest tax shield) are accounted for in the 
cost of capital, i.e., in WACC (Mitra, 2010). 
FCFF model is best suited when the company’s leverage ratio is relatively stable (Koller et 
al., 2015). Limitations of FCFF model stem from the fact that it uses a single WACC to 
discount the cash flows. A fluctuating leverage ratio would lead to changes in the weights 
assigned to cost of debt and cost of equity (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). Any increase in leverage 
would lead to an increase in cost of equity – since the cash flow available to equity providers 
will be riskier because the debt holders will have a preferential right to cash flows – and 
therefore, if a firm does not have a stable debt to equity ratio, its WACC will fluctuate every 
time the capital structure is changed (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). It is possible to use different 
WACC for different periods if the company is unlikely to keep its leverage ratio stable, 
however, that would be complicated and in such a scenario, use of APV method is 
recommended (Koller et al., 2015). 
6.1.2 Free Cash Flow to Equity 
As explained earlier, FCFF takes CF available to all the investors of the firm (both debt and 
equity) and discounts it at WACC. FCFE method differs from the FCFF method in two ways: 
1. The free cash flow that is discounted in FCFE approach are the cash flows available to 
equity investors only, i.e., FCFE is calculated from FCFF by deducting interest 
 
24 Net Debt = Short- & Long-Term Debt less Excess Cash & Equivalents 
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expense25 and debt repayments (in other words, adjusting FCFF for transactions with 
debt holders) (Mitra, 2010). This cash flow is also called levered cash flow (Mitra, 
2010). Koller et al. (2015) provide an alternative method of calculating FCFE as “… 
dividends plus share repurchases minus new equity issues” (Koller et al., 2015, p. 159).  
 
2. The discount rate used in FCFE based valuation is not WACC but is rather the cost of 
equity. 
 
The resulting valuation figure from FCFE method is the company’s value to equity investors 
only. This equity value can then be divided by number of outstanding shares to find price per 
share. 
6.1.3 Adjusted Present Value Method 
Modigliani and Miller, in their well-known paper “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment” have argued that in a perfect capital market, capital structure 
is irrelevant (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). APV method is, essentially, a practical 
manifestation of M&M’s proposition. It was developed by Stewart Myers in 1974 (as cited in 
Luehrman, 1994) and divides a company’s cash flows into 2 streams based on their nature. 
Myers stated that there were two types of cash flows related to any project: “real” cash flows, 
i.e., the cash flows of operations; and “side effects” related to its capital structure, and Myers 
suggested that two cash flows be evaluated separately (Myers as cited in Luehrman, 1997a), 
and this is what APV approach does.  
The advantage of dividing the cash flow of any project in two different categories is that the 
analysis conducted on these cash flows allow the managers to see how the value is divided 
(Luehrman, 1997a). Luehrman has taken the APV approach recommended by Myers even 
further and recommended a “modified APV” approach where the cash flows are not only 
divided into “real” and “financial side-effects” but also incorporate growth options (1994). 
Luehrman argues that, apart from the managerial insight APV offers, APV approach is 
superior to WACC-based approach because it “… works when WACC does, and sometimes 
 
25 FCFF is unlevered CF whereas FCFE is the levered cash flow as it accounts for payment of financial obligations. 
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when WACC doesn’t…” (Luehrman, 1997a, p.3). APV method is a preferred method of 
valuation when the leverage ratio or effective tax rate is changing (Lerner & Willinge, 2011). 
This is because APV separates operating cash flows from financing “side-effects” and values 
both separately and then adds them up to reach a final value (Lerner & Willinge, 2011). 
However, the WACC-based FCFF approach remains widely used. 
6.2 Economic Value Added (EVA) 
Apart from discounted cash flow, economic value added is another major method of valuation 
within the category of income approach. 
It is similar to the DCF method except for the way the company's operations are valued. Here, 
free cash flows are replaced with future economic profits. Economic profits are defined as the 
difference in the after-tax profits of the company and the cost of capital being employed to 
generate these profits (Desai & Ferri, 2006). A company might have accounting profits on its 
income statement; however, those profits could be less than what the investors were expecting 
or promised; EVA method helps see whether this is the case or not, and whether the company 
has generated value. The formula to calculate economic profits is as follows: 
 
The economic profits are then discounted using the relevant discount factors to calculate total 
present value of economic profits. This method could make managers more efficient by 
promoting efficient allocation of capital (Desai & Ferri, 2006). With a constant capital 
structure, both DCF and EVA will yield the same results – and hence, can be used to ensure 
that the calculations are correct (Koller et al., 2015). 
It is worth noting here that the assumptions that are taken for implementation of EVA method 
are the same as the ones taken for the DCF method. 
Economic profits = NOPLAT – (Invested capital x WACC) 
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6.3 Selection of Method 
The method used for fundamental valuation in this thesis is the DCF. As discussed above, 
DCF method has 3 major variations, however, all lead to the same value. In this thesis, FCFF 
method would be used rather than APV or FCFE method. The reason for choosing FCFF 
method stems from its ease of use along with the constraints posed by non-FCFF methods due 
to limited availability of data.  
Whereas APV method is the recommended method when capital structure and/or tax rates are 
fluctuating, and it is also true that the use of APV method would allow greater control over 
tax shields and help see how much value is generated by the operations and how much value 
is generated by “side-effects”, the problem however remains that the value of future debt is 
unknown. Since the exact levels of debt for the future remain unknown, assumption is that that 
the debt-to-equity ratio would remain constant (this does not mean that debt in DKK terms 
would remain the same)26. Since a fixed debt to equity percentage is being assumed, the use 
of FCFF/WACC based calculation makes the most sense since WACC is determined by 
leverage ratio rather than the amount of debt in DKK (or any other currency); APV method 
would require debt to be reported in DKK for calculation of tax shields and DKK values of 
debt cannot be forecasted with certainty. Moreover, since the debt levels in DKK are not 
known, the transactions with debt holders cannot be estimated, thereby ruling out FCFE 
approach. Consequently, FCFF method will be used. 
Along with the FCFF based DCF method, multiples-based valuation will be carried out. 
Furthermore, since Bakkafrost has had historically paid dividends, Dividend Discount Model 
(DDM) could be used as well. However, since companies tend not to pay 100% of their 
earnings as dividends, the dividend-based valuation will understate the true value of the 
company and hence, this approach will not be used (and has consequently, not been discussed 
in detail in this chapter). 
Economic Value Added (EVA) approach could be conducted as well along with DCF 
approach, however, since the EVA approach will result in same valuation as DCF approach, 
 
26 The reasons for presuming constant debt-to-equity ratio are discussed in chapter 8. 
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the author does not consider it of any added value and will consequently, not use EVA 
approach. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, different valuation methods have been reviewed, and the author has decided to 
use FCFF based DCF method for valuation of Bakkafrost, with a 10% confidence interval. 
Moreover, the author has decided not to use the EVA approach because it adds little value 
since it would give the same estimate of share price as the DCF approach. Nonetheless, the 
DCF method will be complimented by multiples-based valuation. 
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7. Financial Statements Normalization, 
Reorganization and Analysis 
In the last chapter, several methods of valuation were discussed. However, how the cash flows 
– both historical and future – are determined was not deliberated upon. In this chapter, the 
focus will be on the normalization and reorganization of historic financial statements of 
Bakkafrost. Based on the normalized and reorganized financial statements, the relationships 
between different line items in the financial statements will be discerned, which will be 
instrumental for forecasting in the next chapter. The reorganization of financial statements will 
also allow for calculation of Invested Capital and NOPLAT, both of which later feed into 
FCFF and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) calculation. 
7.1 Selection of Time Period for Analysis 
The primary purpose of historic financial statements analyses is to uncover underlying trends, 
which will then be used for forecasting. However, an underlying assumption here is that past 
trends are a good proxy for future. This raises a fundamental question: how further back in the 
past one must go for financial statement analyses (Koller et al., 2015)? If one goes too far in 
the past, there is a risk that past trends which are no longer relevant might influence 
forecasting, this could be due to M&A’s, restructuring, a general change in the competitive 
environmental or a change in the economy (the list is not exhaustive). However, by focusing 
only on recent years, one runs the risk of biasing their analysis due to one-off events (for 
instance, by focusing only on recent years, financial analysis of most companies is likely to be 
distorted by US-China trade war and Covid-19 pandemic, amongst other factors). 
Keeping the above in view, one must decide how far back to conduct financial analysis for 
Bakkafrost. Koller et al. (2015) recommend going as far back as possible, but at least 10 years. 
However, the author has decided to go 5 years back, from 2016-2020 (both years inclusive) 
for Bakkafrost27. The reason for doing so stems from the fact that Bakkafrost was listed on the 
stock exchange in 2010 and since then has underwent several acquisitions, with the last one 
being in the fourth quarter of 2019. In 2011, Fish Oil & Feed was added to the value chain and 
 
27 In addition, accounts of 2015 have been provided because the closing figures of 2015 will be opening figures of 2016 and 
hence, are important. 
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in 2014, a new hatchery was built, and in the same year a packaging facility was built. Since 
all of these are essential part of value chain of Bakkafrost of today and of future, it makes little 
sense to conduct analysis of years prior to 2015 because what are now major components of 
Bakkafrost’s business model were missing then. Post 2015, Bakkafrost has conducted further 
acquisitions and investments, including establishment of a Biogas plant in 2020 and 
acquisition of the Scottish Salmon Company in 2019. This could be used as an argument to 
not use the period of 2016-2019 for analysis and rather focus only on 2020 since the acquisition 
of SSC has materially changed Bakkafrost’s operations (and since no major acquisitions in the 
future seems to be planned). It is certainly tempting to follow this argument and use figures of 
2020 alone; however, due to Covid-19, significant historical fluctuations in prices of salmon, 
dependence of salmon quality & output on environmental conditions which can fluctuate from 
one year to the next, and little knowledge of potential synergies of recent acquisitions, using 
only one year’s financial statements could lead to misleading results. Therefore, for this thesis, 
2016-2020 years will be used for analysis. 
7.2 Normalization & Reorganization of Financial 
Statements 
The financial statements which are published by listed companies (including Bakkafrost) on 
quarterly and annual basis are prepared in line with either IFRS or US GAAP accounting 
principles, with minor adjustments for national accounting regulations. Bakkafrost uses IFRS. 
These financial standards rest on several principles and these principles shape the nature and 
quality of information available in the published financial statements. IFRS is a principles-
based method, and is based on accounting’s conceptual framework (Deloitte, n.d.), which 
allows for consistency and reliability in accounting information within and across companies 
(Palmer & Scott, 2021). However, the published financial statements are not well suited for 
valuation as they mix operating and non-operating items (Koller et al., 2015). Koller et al. 
(2015) recommend reorganizing the items in the financial statements into three streams: 
operating items, nonoperating items, and sources of financing (p. 165). This requires intricate 
knowledge of the financial standards which the company have used, as the notes to the 
accounts need to be read in conjunction with the concerned financial standards. Moreover, the 
categorization of line items into operating, nonoperating and financing items require 
judgement as companies do not explicitly divide them (Koller et al., 2015). 
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In this chapter, financial statements have been normalized & reorganized, and based on them, 
NOPLAT and Invested Capital has been calculated, which serves as an input for FCFF 
calculation. Details of normalization, reorganization, NOPLAT calculation, and Invested 
Capital calculation are presented later in this chapter. However, it must be kept in mind that 
reorganization of the financial statements has been done while keeping the concept of 
materiality in view for valuation, whereas an item is considered material if “… it would affect 
or influence the decision of a reasonable individual …” (Accounting Principles, n.d., 
subsection: “Materiality principle”). In cases where an item has been determined to be 
immaterial, little effort has been made to analyse it in detail. 
7.2.1 Bakkafrost’s Reorganized Income Statement & Statement of 
Financial Position 
Bakkafrost’s Income Statement & Statement of Financial Position have been reorganized into 
operating and non-operating items while keeping in view the recommendations of Koller et 
al. (2015) and are presented in Tables 3 and 4 below, respectively. 
Detailed explanations for classifying items as operational and non-operational are provided 
after the presentation of reorganized financial statements. The reorganized statements are later 
used to calculate NOPLAT and Invested Capital.  
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Table 3: Historic reorganized Income Statement of Bakkafrost; Data Source: Annual Reports; All figures in 
DKK 1000s. 
Reorganized Income Statement
All figures in 1000s DKK
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operating Revenue 2 850 363 3 202 686 3 770 049 3 177 422 4 511 107 4 651 892
Purchase of goods -992 497 -920 148 -883 871 -1 074 645 -1 354 921 -2 358 623
Gross Profit 1 857 866 2 282 538 2 886 178 2 102 777 3 156 186 2 293 269
Change in inventory and biological assets 215 432 58 874 -141 406 199 696 -29 423 401 679
Salary and personnel expenses -281 085 -327 825 -400 267 -353 756 -512 762 -608 347
Other Operating Expenses -683 532 -715 372 -783 268 -674 907 -978 788 -1 062 719
Total Operating Expenses -749 185 -984 323 -1 324 941 -828 967 -1 520 973 -1 269 387
Other Income 2 0 0 0 0 0 44 041
Operational EBITDA 1 108 681 1 298 215 1 561 237 1 273 810 1 635 213 1 067 923
Depreciation & Amortization -108 098 -133 261 -183 590 -198 898 -310 115 -446 765
1 000 583 1 164 954 1 377 647 1 074 912 1 325 098 621 158
Revenue Tax 4 0 -108 450 -119 681 -95 867 -99 128 -53 584
Operational EBIT 1 000 583 1 056 504 1 257 966 979 045 1 225 970 567 574
Non-Operational Items
Fair value adjustments of biological assets 5 -27 578 608 195 -693 540 195 819 -220 567 118 003
Income from associates 6 757 14 821 17 302 9 369 13 812 5 546
Onerous Contracts 6 -51 004 -16 372 67 376 0 0 0
-71 825 606 644 -608 862 205 188 -206 755 123 549
(Badwill) 0 10 440 0 0 0 0
Total Non-Operational Items -71 825 617 084 -608 862 205 188 -206 755 123 549
EBIT 928 758 1 673 588 649 104 1 184 233 1 019 215 691 123
Financial Items
Financial income 10 3 599 1 524 1 395 2 651 4 996 1 399
Net interest expenses 10 -24 622 -25 983 -26 365 -12 477 -17 114 -36 317
Net currency effects 6 23 350 -12 355 4 173 1 419 -12 670 -13 096
Other financial expenses 10 -6 614 -4 159 -4 423 -3 760 -12 513 -17 125
Net Financial Income (Expenses) -4 287 -40 973 -25 220 -12 167 -37 301 -65 139
EBT 924 471 1 632 615 623 884 1 172 066 981 914 625 984
Tax -114 296 -293 727 -112 482 -211 774 -180 031 -163 139
Profit (Loss) from Continuing Operations 810 175 1 338 888 511 402 960 292 801 883 462 845
Profit or loss for the year attributable to:
Non-controlling interests 0 0 0 0 -8 382 0
Owners of P/F Bakkafrost 810 175 1 338 887 511 402 960 292 810 267 462 845





Reorganized Statement of Financial Position
All values in 1000s DKK 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Assets
Operating Current Assets
Total Inventory 1 482 239 2 214 039 1 402 509 1 797 309 2 450 237 2 893 056
Accounts Receivables 199 263 292 009 262 493 269 348 625 993 490 075
Tax Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 72 143
Total Other Receivables 9 26 883 51 520 72 526 22 935 45 520 61 431
Cash & Cash Equivalent 1 39 192 46 565 99 147 111 341 175 211 171 535
Operating Current Assets 1 747 577 2 604 133 1 836 675 2 200 933 3 296 961 3 688 240
Non-Operating Current Assets
Excess Cash 1 62 660 188 431 210 404 205 553 1 134 335 295 404
Total Other Receivables 9 153 089 58 340 84 630 0 0 0
Non-Operating Current Assets 215 749 246 771 295 034 205 553 1 134 335 295 404
Total Current Assets 1 963 326 2 850 904 2 131 709 2 406 486 4 431 296 3 983 644
Non-Current Assets
Land buildings & other real estate 585 740 874 907 1 148 571 994 353 1 174 428 1 555 019
Plant machinery & other operating equipment 797 449 906 045 957 857 926 334 1 420 379 1 703 233
Other operating equipment 44 095 59 001 97 654 160 063 210 749 242 147
Vessels 0 278 518 366 347 356 514 341 259 332 254
Prepayments for purchase of PPE 104 208 0 0 447 059 633 684 387 946
Leased Assets 3 0 0 0 0 332 824 353 192
Total Tangible Assets 1 531 492 2 118 471 2 570 429 2 884 323 4 113 323 4 573 791
Intangible Assets
Licenses 7 290 138 372 138 372 138 372 138 3 720 158 3 720 158
Total Operational Non-Current Assets 1 821 630 2 490 609 2 942 567 3 256 461 7 833 481 8 293 949
Goodwill 7 4 537 4 537 4 537 17 607 567 129 664 837
Brands 7 0 0 0 0 108 400 108 400
Total Goodwill & Brands 4 537 4 537 4 537 17 607 675 529 773 237
Non-Current Financial Assets
Investments in Associates 10 105 785 34 111 51 406 57 497 63 766 67 141
Investments in stocks & shares 10 25 108 25 296 25 296 55 269 55 318 55 318
Long-term Receivables 0 12 660 0 9 200 4 422 8 101
Deffered Tax Assets 0 0 0 0 37 593 26 934
Non-Current Financial Assets 130 893 72 067 76 702 121 966 161 099 157 494
Total Non-Current Assets 1 957 060 2 567 213 3 023 806 3 396 034 8 670 109 9 224 680
Total Assets 3 920 386 5 418 117 5 155 515 5 802 520 13 101 405 13 208 324
Liabilities & Equity
Operating Current Liabilities
Short-term interest bearing debt 0 0 378 300 0 0 0
Trade Payables 195 223 138 873 189 548 204 500 584 435 563 857
Current Tax Liabilities 155 359 142 016 198 141 152 655 195 484 37 422
Short-term Debt Liabilities (Leasing) 0 0 0 0 107 808 131 336
Other Current Liabilities 12 409 46 513 33 699 21 536 23 732 27 885
362 991 327 402 799 688 378 691 911 459 760 500
Non-Op Current Liabilities
Financial Derivatives 6 0 0 127 255 320 13 493 9 710
Provisions for onerous contracts 6 51 004 67 378 0 0 0 0
51 004 67 378 127 255 320 13 493 9 710
Total Current Liabilities 413 995 394 780 926 943 379 011 924 952 770 210
Non-Current Liabilities
Deferred Taxes 349 546 545 699 455 448 534 430 1 123 796 1 222 222
Long-term interest-bearing debt 10 447 559 827 146 146 696 812 053 2 328 231 2 219 690
Long-term leasing debt 0 0 0 0 225 585 265 235
Additional Debt Taken
Derivatives 6 128 804 101 456 0 0 1 966 1 480
Total Non-Current Liabilities 925 909 1 474 301 602 144 1 346 483 3 679 578 3 708 627
Total Liabilities 1 339 904 1 869 081 1 529 087 1 725 494 4 604 530 4 478 837
Equity 2 580 482 3 549 035 3 626 429 4 077 029 8 496 875 8 729 487
Total Liabilities & Equity 3 920 386 5 418 116 5 155 516 5 802 523 13 101 405 13 208 324
Explanatory 
Note
Table 4: Historic reorganized Statement of Financial Position of Bakkafrost;  Data Source: Annual Reports.
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7.2.2 Explanatory Notes: Division into Operating, Non-Operating & 
Financing Items 
As mentioned previously, reorganization of financial statements requires business judgment. 
In the case of Bakkafrost, fortunately, this is relatively easy since the company’s portfolio is 
limited. Each of the major line items that has been reorganized (or has not been reorganized 
due to lack of materiality) is discussed in detail below. 
¨ Explanation 1: Excess Cash 
Koller et al. (2015) recommend a rule of thumb that only 2% of cash and cash equivalents be 
treated as operational. Damodaran (n.d.-a) also states that defining operating cash as a 
percentage of revenue is an accepted convention/method. Opler et al (1998), however, provide 
more detailed insights into a corporation’s cash holdings. Opler et al. (1998) find that growing 
firms and firms with relatively “… riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash to total 
non-cash assets” (p. 1), whereas the opposite is true for corporations with high credit ratings 
and access to capital markets (Opler et al., 1998). They suggest that a corporation’s optimal 
cash holding is the equilibrium between cost of cash shortage and opportunity cost of holding 
cash. The opportunity cost of holding cash is presumed to be constant whereas the cost of 
shortage has positive convexity, i.e., the cost of cash shortage decreases as the amount of cash 
held by the company increases, as shown in Figure 7 below (Opler et al., 1998, p. 8). Whereas 
it is relatively simple to grasp the argument of equilibrium between cost of cash shortage and 
marginal cost of holding cash, it is much harder in practice since quantifying several 
qualitative costs associated with cash shortage is extremely difficult, not least because Opler 
et al. (1998) do not provide a framework to do so. 
                                  
Figure 7: Illustration of marginal cost of cash shortage against opportunity cost of holding cash; Figure taken 
from: (Opler et al., 1998, p. 8) 
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Furthermore, Bates et al. (2009) show that between 1980 and 2006, the cash holdings of the 
US-based corporations, as measured by cash-to-assets, have more than doubled from 10,5% 
to 23,2% - with an almost linear increase of 0,46% annually. As per traditional financial 
theory, large cash holdings could be a sign of agency problems and entrenched management. 
However, Bates et al. (2009) show that the increase in cash holdings is due to the “… 
precautionary motive for cash holdings…” (p. 1985) as the cash flows have become more 
volatile and they “… find no consistent evidence that agency conflicts contribute to the 
increase” (p. 1). Given the improvements in derivative markets, they propose that the 
precautionary demand for cash should have decreased, rather than increased over the years. 
However, since the opposite has happened, they suggest that the increase in cash holdings is 
due to “… a higher volatility in unhedgeable risks…” (p. 1980). 
Fresard (2010) has explored the link between a corporation’s cash holdings and its product 
market behaviour and strategies, he argues that “… cash holdings strategically influence 
product market outcomes” (p. 1119) and has competitive value. He also argues that the cash 
holdings are influenced by competitor’s “… financial status and competitive position…” (p. 
1119). 
Keeping the above in view, the author does not consider it appropriate to use Koller et al.’s 
(2015) 2% rule of thumb, not least because salmon farming’s cash flows are open to 
fluctuations due to diseases, weather events & salmon prices. Therefore, the author has used 
the cash in bank to revenue ratio of Mowi Group28 as a proxy for what should be considered 
operational cash for Bakkafrost, with 1% addition to compensate for Bakkafrost’s relatively 
smaller size vis-à-vis Mowi Group. The reason for this is relatively straight forward: Mowi 
Group is the largest salmon producer in the world, and as such, it has easy access to capital 
markets and has a strong competitive position. Therefore, as opposed to other smaller players, 
it is less likely to hold excess cash as it can raise cash relatively easily due to its competitive 
position. Bakkafrost, on the other hand, due to its relatively smaller size and arguably weaker 
 
28 Mowi Group is used as a proxy because it is presumed it has easier access to capital and money markets by virtue of its 
position as market leader. The calculated cash in bank to revenues percentage of Mowi Group is then increased by 1% to 
adjust for Bakkafrost’s size, and the adjusted rate is presumed to be Bakkafrost’s operational cash as a percentage of revenue 
for that year. 
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position than Mowi Group, is likely to hold excess cash. Hence, cash ratio of Mowi Group has 
been used as a proxy for operating cash. 
Table 5 below shows the calculation of operating cash to revenue ratio for years 2015-2020.  
Table 5: Operating Cash as a percentage of Revenue calculation of Mowi & Bakkafrost Group; Data Source: 
Annual Reports. 
¨ Explanation 2: Other Income 
Between 2015-2020, other income was reported only once, and the amount was only DKK 
44041. Therefore, the treatment of other income will not have any material impact on past 
trend analysis and forecasting. However, since the company itself has regarded “other income” 
as operating, the author has done the same. 
¨ Explanation 3: Operating Leases 
Until 2018, IAS 17 governed the treatment of leases (IFRS, n.d.). For the lessee, IAS 17 
allowed for leases to be classified either as operating or financing, based on certain criteria. 
For finance leases, at the beginning of the lease, lease liability and its corresponding assets 
were recognized on the statement of financial position. However, the operating leases were 
expensed as incurred, with no recognition of liability. 
Liability is defined as “a present obligation of an entity to transfer an economic resource as a 
result of past events” (IFRS, 2018a, p.8). Operating lease did create a liability in spirit; 
however, under IAS 17 this liability was not mentioned on the balance sheet, leading to off-
balance sheet financing. If operating leases were listed as a liability, the capital structure of 
the corporation would have changed (become more leveraged) and thereby, impacted WACC. 
Keeping this in view, Koller et al. (2015) recommend combing through the notes for operating 
leases, discounting the operating leases at the company’s incremental cost of borrowing, and 
adding the discounted value to the liabilities of the company (Koller et al., 2015; PwC, 2016). 
The difference between the actual lease payments and the interest charged on these operating 
Operating & Excess Cash
All figures in 1000s EUR 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Cash Ratio - Mowi ASA
Revenue 3 093 400 3 502 800 3 626 100 3 749 800 4 074 200 3 732 200
Cash in Bank 11 600 15 900 59 100 93 900 117 500 100 300
Restricted Cash 60 100 88 000 12 600 11 400 1 100 6 900
Total Cash 71 700 103 900 71 700 105 300 118 600 107 200
Mowi's Cash in Bank to Revenue % 0,37% 0,45% 1,63% 2,50% 2,88% 2,69%
Add: 1% to adjust for size 1,00% 1,00% 1,00% 1,00% 1,00% 1,00%
Bakkafrost's Cash Ratio (as a % of Revenue) 1,37% 1,45% 2,63% 3,50% 3,88% 3,69%
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leases as calculated by the company’s incremental cost of borrowing is to be treated as 
depreciation (Koller et al., 2015). 
In 2019, however, IAS 17 was superseded by IFRS 16. The latter abolished the concept of 
operational leases and since then all leases are treated as finance leases, and the depreciation 
of formerly finance leases are now properly stated in the accounts of the lessee. Keeping this 
in view, Bakkafrost’s financial statements for the years ending 2019 and 2020 need not be 
restated for operational leases since they are already made in line with IFRS 16.  Prior to 2019, 
the author has not converted operational leases into finance leases because the capital structure 
and cost of capital that will be used for valuation is of 2020, and hence, the operating leases 
of 2018 will have no impact on the valuation. However, prior to 2018, the operating leases 
will nonetheless understate the depreciation and overstate the ROIC, but the author views their 
impact to not be material enough to set the valuation off-course. 
¨ Explanation 4: Revenue Tax 
Since this tax is directly applied on the revenue of the company and is a tax-deductible 
expense, the author considers revenue tax to be operational. It must be noted here that there is 
no revenue tax on Scottish operations29. 
¨ Explanation 5: Fair Value Adjustments on Biological Assets 
A relatively less known line item that exists in Bakkafrost’s income statement is “fair value 
adjustments on biological assets”. Biological assets are governed by IAS 41 which requires 
these assets to be reported at their net fair market value (Bakkafrost, 2021). Bakkafrost’s 
biological assets include salmon in different lifecycle stages. 
Fair value adjustments on biological assets, in line with IAS 41, are considered non-
operational. The company itself also classifies these adjustments to be non-operational.   
¨ Explanation 6: Derivatives, Currency Effects, Onerous Contracts & Pension 
Assets/Liabilities 
All derivatives and currency effects have been treated as non-operating. This follows the 
argument that currency movements and derivatives gains & losses are not related to the core 
operations of a salmon farming company. 
 
29 Revenue tax was explained in the PESTEL analysis. 
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Onerous contracts are not considered operational. This is based on the definition of onerous 
contracts, which are defined as contracts in which costs exceed the expected economic benefits 
(IFRS, 2018b). Onerous contracts can happen due to several reasons, but primarily happen for 
Bakkafrost when the price of fulfilling the contract exceeds the revenue from it. Since this has 
nothing to do with the core operations, it is regarded as non-operational expense. It is 
interesting to note, however, that in the last 3 years, Bakkafrost has had no onerous contract. 
Moreover, the group does not have any liabilities or assets in its pensions plan.  
¨ Explanation 7: Intangible Assets 
Bakkafrost has 3 categories of intangible assets: goodwill, licenses, and brands. Of these 3 
intangible assets, the only asset that has been impaired in Bakkafrost’s history is goodwill, 
which was impaired in 2018, 2019 and 2020. Accumulated impairment for goodwill is DKK 
2 113 000 as of 31st December 2020. 
Licenses are treated as operational assets because they give the right to conduct fish farming. 
Goodwill and Brands, however, are not core operational intangible assets. 
It is recommended to compute invested capital twice, once with and once without goodwill 
[and brands] (Koller et al., 2015). Computation of invested capital without goodwill and 
acquired intangibles allow for computation of ROIC that explores the corporation’s 
operational performance, whereas the calculation of invested capital with goodwill and 
acquired intangibles “… measures the competitiveness of the underlying business” (Koller et 
al., 2015, p. 175). 
It is worth mentioning here that for the purposes of ROIC calculations, licenses are treated the 
same was as PPE because without the licenses, fish farming operations cannot be conducted. 
However, brands and goodwill are treated as “intangibles”. 
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¨ Explanation 8: Operating Tax (Cash & Accruals Basis) 
The determination of operating tax, both on accruals and cash basis, is one of the crucial inputs 
for a good valuation (Koller et al., 2015). However, Koller et al. (2015) warns that calculating 
operating cash tax is tricky, not least because of limited information that is disclosed by the 
companies. The tax calculation below has been done in line with the suggestions of Koller et 
al. (2015) and is based on previous work done by Malin et al. (2016).  
Before delving deeper into the calculation, it is important to state that Bakkafrost provides 
details of different tax items in the tax related notes. In Table 6 below, all the information has 
been taken from the notes to the accounts, and the author has only classified the line items into 
operating and non-operating based on business judgement. 
 
Table 6: Division of temporary liabilities differences into operating & non-operating items; Data Source: 
Annual Reports; positive values mean liability and negative values mean assets. 
Moreover, each year’s deferred tax liability has also been provided in the notes. Since net 
deferred tax liability (DTL) and net specific temporary differences have been provided, the 
tax rate for each year’s temporary differences can be calculated as DTL divided by Net 
Specific Temporary Differences, as shown in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Calculation of tax rate on deferred taxes; All figures in DKK 1000s; Data Source: Annual Reports 
The calculation of operating tax every year is relatively straightforward as well. The company 
discloses each year’s effective tax rate in the notes. This effective tax rate can simply be 
Classification into Operating & Non-Operating Temporary Differences
All figures in 1000s DKK
Operating Net Specific Temporary Liabilities Differences 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Licenses 293 675 293 675 375 678 375 678 375 678 3 248 272 3 624 015
PPE 305 251 669 378 897 044 1 021 867 1 187 172 1 394 634 1 518 528
PPE (22,5%) 298 113 0 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass 1 013 958 1 065 828 1 858 433 1 096 667 1 358 472 1 728 203 1 308 942
Receivables -492 -54 006 -70 745 -2 644 -2 644 -156 1 318
Losses Carried Forward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 910 505 1 974 875 3 060 410 2 491 568 2 918 678 6 370 953 6 452 803
Non-Operating Net Specific Temporary Liabilities Differences
Financial Assets 10 553 16 620 26 972 44 572 50 556 67 927 78 742
Currency Effects 94 515 79 226 45 736 121 833 583 -1 534 0
Derivatives (Equity Posted) -116 929 -128 804 -101 456 -127 256 -317 3 733 147
Losses Carried Forward 0 0 0 -450 -444 49 0
Other Differences 0 0 0 0 0 0 510
-11 861 -32 958 -28 748 38 699 50 378 70 175 79 399
Total Net Temporary Differences: Liabilities (Assets) 1 898 644  1 941 917       3 031 662       2 530 267       2 969 056       6 441 128       6 532 202       
Calculation of Tax Rate on Deferred Taxes 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Net Defered Tax Liability (Asset) 414 014 349 546 545 699 455 448 534 430 1 086 203 1 195 289
Total Net Temporary Differences: Liabilities (Assets) 1 898 644 1 941 917 3 031 662 2 530 267 2 969 056 6 441 128 6 532 202
Tax Rate (Net DTL/Total Net Temporary Differences) 22% 18% 18% 18% 18% 17% 18%0
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multiplied with EBITA (operational) to get operating tax. The difference between total tax for 
the year and operating tax is, by definition, non-operating tax for the year, as shown in the 
Table 8 below. The total tax calculated in the table below matches the tax figures as reported 
in the income statements. 
 
Table 8: Calculation of operating tax on accruals basis; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
Conversion of operating tax into cash operating tax is shown in Table 9 below. Table 9 has 
operating deferred taxes (opening and closing); this is calculated by multiplying the deferred 
tax rate with operating temporary difference each year (calculated in Table 6 above). Once 
opening and closing DTL have been calculated, the cash operating tax is calculated by the 
logic of T-Accounts (with opening liability and year's tax expense being credit & closing 
liability being debit, with the difference going to cash), or as Koller et al. (2015) state, the 
operating DTL is calculated by “… subtract[ing] the increase in operating deferred-tax 
liabilities (net assets) from operating taxes” (p. 187). 
Table 9: Calculation of operating tax on cash basis; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
Based on all the calculations above, the next step in reorganizing the statement of financial 
position would be to remove the current and non-current liabilities mentioned in the balance 
sheet and replace those line items with the operating and non-operating DTL (the sum of 
operating and non-operating DTL calculated above equals current and non-current liabilities 
mentioned in the balance sheet). However, this division into current and non-current operating 
DTL is problematic because the above calculations have resulted in operating and non-
operating deferred taxes, along with operating cash taxes. However, it is not possible to further 
divide the given deferred taxes into “current” and “non-current” components, given the limited 
disclosures by the company. It would seem a reasonable assumption that all the operating 
deferred tax calculated above be classified as a current liability – however, the author does not 
agree with this assumption on the grounds that this would lead to current DTL figures which 
Calculation of Operating Tax (Accruals Basis) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operational EBITA 1 000 583 1 056 504 1 257 966 979 923 1 226 848 567 931
Effective Tax Rate (Given) 12% 18% 18% 18% 18% 26%
Operational Tax (Op EBITA*Effective Tax Rate) 123 672 189 854 226 811 177 072 224 881 148 003
Non-Op Tax (Total Tax - Op Tax) -9 376 103 492 -114 329 34 702 -44 850 15 136
Total Tax 114 296 293 346 112 482 211 774 180 031 163 139
Calculation of Operating Tax (Cash Basis) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Opening Operating DTL 416 600 355 478 550 874 448 482 525 362 1 074 369
Add: Year's Operating Tax 123 672 189 854 226 811 177 072 224 881 148 003
Less: Closing Operating DTL 355 478 550 874 448 482 525 362 1 074 369 1 180 760
Cash Tax 184 794 -5 541 329 203 100 192 -324 126 41 612
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are significantly and materially higher than current tax liability reported by the company in 
the annual report (e.g., the company reports current tax liability for the year ended 2020 at 
DKK 37 422 000, whereas the closing operating DTL as per the calculations above are DKK 
1 180 760 250). This would materially overstate current DTL and understate non-current DTL. 
Hence, the author has decided not to reclassify the current and non-current tax liabilities 
mentioned in the annual report and has let them remain as is on the reorganized statement of 
financial position. Nonetheless, the calculation of cash operating taxes will be used for historic 
NOPLAT calculation. 
¨ Explanation 9: Operating Current Assets & Operating Current Liabilities 
Operating capital is calculated as the net of current operating assets and current operating 
liabilities (Koller et al., 2015). 
Most of the assets listed under the head of current assets are considered operating assets. The 
contentious items in the current assets are the line items of “other receivables” and “cash”. 
Treatment of cash and cash equivalents was discussed in “Explanation 1” above. “Other 
receivables” has been broken down into its component parts, with some of the items 
considered as operational and some as non-operational. Specifically, “receivables from 
associate companies” and “deposit for interest and current swap” line items within other 
receivables are considered non-operating, with the rest being considered operating.  
All liabilities under the head of current liabilities are considered operating, except for 
derivatives and provisions for onerous contracts, as explained in explanation 6 above. 
Operating liabilities are deducted from operating assets to calculated working capital, which 
feeds into invested capital calculation and is also needed for FCFF calculation. 
¨ Explanation 10: Financial Investments, Non-Current Liabilities & Financial 
Expenses 
All financial expenses and non-current liabilities are treated as non-operational.  
Investments in financial assets are considered as non-operational assets and their incomes are 
considered as non-operating incomes. Detailed explanation of how financial investments are 
accounted for in valuation is provided in chapter 8. 
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7.3 NOPLAT 
NOPLAT is an acronym for Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Tax (Koller et al., 2015). As 
mentioned previously, NOPLAT feeds into the calculation of FCFF, which is then discounted 
by relevant cost of capital to reach enterprise value. Therefore, correct calculation of NOPLAT 
is necessary for correct calculation of FCFF.  
7.3.1 NOPLAT’s Calculation Framework 
As the name suggests, NOPLAT is calculated by deducting operating expenses from operating 
revenues and then deducting taxes related to operating profits only. Koller et al. (2015) 
recommend using cash operating tax rather than accruals based operating tax for NOPLAT’s 




As can be seen, the NOPLAT equation declares EBITA to be operating profit. Using EBITA 
as operating profit, consequently, means that depreciation is considered as an operating 
expense whereas amortization is not considered an operating expense. This raises two 
questions. 
i. Firstly, why not use EBITDA instead of EBITA as operating profit (Koller et al., 
2015)? This is because depreciation is a good proxy for the cost of using an asset30. 
Hence, by accounting for depreciation, the cost of using asset is accounted for. This 
is highly important in capital intensive industries, like salmon farming, because the 
cost of using equipment is one of the major costs. 
ii. Secondly, why not use EBIT instead of EBITA as operating profit (Koller et al., 
2015)? Koller et al. (2015) argue that, since IFRS does not allow for capitalization of 
internal intangibles (except for R&D and that too after commercial and technical 
 
30 By definition, depreciation is the cost of an asset spread over its useful life. 
EBITA = Net Operating Profit 
 
NOPLAT = EBITA less Operating Cash Taxes 
 where 
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feasibility has been established), the amortization is expensed in the period it was 
incurred; and even with acquired intangibles, any additions are expensed as incurred. 
Since the intangibles are expensed as incurred, rather than capitalized like PPE, using 
EBIT metric would understate NOPLAT since the intangibles have already been 
expensed when incurred. However, those intangible assets which are capitalized, such 
as licenses and computer software, are to be treated in a manner like PPE and their 
amortization needs to be deducted from NOPLAT. For Bakkafrost, licenses have not 
experienced any amortization historically and no software is reported as an intangible 
asset by the company. 
7.3.2 Bakkafrost’s Historic NOPLAT Calculation 
NOPLAT is calculated by first reorganizing the income statement into operating and non-
operating items (based on adjustments explained in notes above), and then deducting cash 
operating tax from operating EBITA. Calculation of operational EBIT has already been done 
in the reorganization of income statement. The operating cash tax for 2015 is inflated because 
the opening operating tax figure for 2015 is presumed zero. Details of calculation of historic 
NOPLAT is presented in Table 10 below.  
Table 10: Calculation of historic NOPLAT; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
7.3.3 Reconciliation of NOPLAT to Net Profit from Continuing 
Operations 
Koller et al. (2015, p. 188) recommend reconciling NOPLAT to net income to ensure that 
there has been any no error (p. 188). The reconciliation table (Table 11) is presented below 
and has been made in line with Koller et al.’s (2015) suggested methodology. The 
reconciliation for 2015 has been excluded because the reconciled profit does not match the 
profit from the income statement; this is because of missing 2014 figures. 
NOPLAT Calculation
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operational EBIT 1 000 583 1 056 504 1 257 966 979 045 1 225 970 567 574
Add: Amortization 0 0 0 878 878 357
Operational EBITA 1 000 583 1 056 504 1 257 966 979 923 1 226 848 567 931
Less: Operating Tax 184 794 -5 541 329 203 100 192 -324 126 41 612
NOPLAT 815 789 1 062 045 928 763 879 731 1 550 974 526 319
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It is worth re-mentioning here that for the purposes of analysis, 5-year period is being used, 
i.e., 2016-2020, and the figures for 2015 were taken so that opening figures for 2016 would 
be available. 
Table 11: Reconciliation of NOPLAT with Operating Profit; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
7.4 Invested Capital 
For a company to generate value, the return on invested capital (ROIC) needs to be greater 
than the cost of capital (Koller et al., 2015, p. 17). For the purposes of valuation, however, 
invested capital constitutes only of those assets and liabilities which are essential for “core” 
operations of the company (Koller et al., 2015). As mentioned previously, the invested capital 
presented in financial statements do not differentiate between core and non-core assets & 
liabilities and therefore, to be able to separate them one needs to go through the notes to the 
accounts. An important point to mention here is that the FCFF is the cash flow available to all 
investors, i.e., both equity and credit investors, and the invested capital should include only 
those liabilities which are relevant for core operations – the remaining liabilities are considered 
part of financing category (Koller et al., 2015). 
7.4.1 Invested Capital’s Framework 
The invested capital includes summation of operating working capital, fixed assets, net other 
long-term operating assets “… and, when appropriate, intangible assets…”31 (p. 172). 
 
31 Discussion on intangible asset is presented below. 
NOPLAT Reconciliation with Operating Profit
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 1 062 045 928 763 879 731 1 550 974 526 319
Less: Amortization 0 0 878 878 357
1 062 045 928 763 878 853 1 550 096 525 962
Add: Decrease (Increase) in Operating DTL -195 395 102 391 -76 880 -549 007 -106 391 
866 650 1 031 155 801 973 1 001 089 419 571
Add: Total Non-Operational Items 617 084 -608 862 205 188 -206 755 123 549
1 483 734 422 293 1 007 161 794 334 543 120
Add: Net Financial Income (Expenses) -40 973 -25 220 -12 167 -37 301 -65 139 
1 442 761 397 073 994 994 757 033 477 981
Less: Non-Op. Tax for the year 103 492 -114 329 34 702 -44 850 15 136
Net Profit for the Year 1 339 269 511 402 960 292 801 883 462 845
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The sum of working capital & operating long-term assets lead to invested capital. The sum of 
invested capital and nonoperating assets results in total funds invested in any corporation 
(Koller et al., 2015, p. 176).  Mathematically: 
 
 
7.4.2 Bakkafrost’s Invested Capital 
Detailed explanations of “contentious” individual line items have been provided in section 
7.2.2., along with the arguments for why an item has been classified as operating, non-
operating, and financing. Brief explanation for items which are deemed not contentious is 
provided in the paragraph below in this section, followed by calculation of Bakkafrost’s 
invested capital. 
All interest-bearing liabilities have been considered non-operational, in line with 
recommendations of Koller et al. (2015, p. 172).  Moreover, all long-term tangible assets have 
been regarded as operating, in line with recommendations of Koller et al. (2015, p. 174). 
Licenses have been treated like tangible assets because they are at the core of salmon farming 
and are central to operations, unlike goodwill. Intangibles other than licenses have been treated 
with care – and invested capital has been calculated twice, once with and once without 
goodwill. Calculation of invested capital in two different methods is recommended because it 
allows one to see the operational performance as well as the performance of the entire business 
– this is explained in detail in “Explanation 7 – Intangible Assets” earlier. Associate 
companies, joint ventures and other equity investments have been treated as non-operating 
assets as per Koller et al.’s recommendations (Koller et al., 2015). For Bakkafrost, no hybrid 
securities and no pension liabilities (underfunded or otherwise) exist, hence, no adjustment 
Invested Capital = Working Capital + Long-Term Operating Assets + Intangibles 
 
Working Capital = Operating Current Assets – Operating Current Liabilities 
 
where 
Total Funds Invested = Invested Capital + Non-Operating Long-Term Assets + 
Non-Operating Current Assets 
 
 97 
need to be made for those. Moreover, no adjustment has been made for leases prior to 2019, 
as explained in section 7.2.2. Non-operational current liabilities, all non-current liabilities and 
equity are considered financing items and are together called “liabilities & equity”. 




Table 12A: Calculation of Invested Capital; Data Source: Annual Reports; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
Invested Capital Calculation
All figures in 1000s DKK 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Operating Current Assets
Total Inventory 1 482 239 2 214 039 1 402 509 1 797 309 2 450 237 2 893 056
Accounts Receivables 199 263 292 009 262 493 269 348 625 993 490 075
Tax Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 72 143
Total Other Receivables 9 26 883 51 520 72 526 22 935 45 520 61 431
Cash & Cash Equivalent 1 39 192 46 565 99 147 111 341 175 211 171 535
Operating Current Assets 1 747 577 2 604 133 1 836 675 2 200 933 3 296 961 3 688 240
Operating Current Liabilities
Short-term interest bearing debt 0 0 378 300 0 0 0
Trade Payables 195 223 138 873 189 548 204 500 584 435 563 857
Current Tax Liabilities 155 359 142 016 198 141 152 655 195 484 37 422
Short-term Debt Liabilities (Leasing) 0 0 0 0 107 808 131 336
Other Current Liabilities 12 409 46 513 33 699 21 536 23 732 27 885
Operating Current Liabilities 362 991 327 402 799 688 378 691 911 459 760 500
Working capital 1 384 586 2 276 731 1 036 987 1 822 242 2 385 502 2 927 740
Non-Current Assets
Land buildings & other real estate 585 740 874 907 1 148 571 994 353 1 174 428 1 555 019
Plant machinery & other operating equipment 797 449 906 045 957 857 926 334 1 420 379 1 703 233
Other operating equipment 44 095 59 001 97 654 160 063 210 749 242 147
Vessels 0 278 518 366 347 356 514 341 259 332 254
Prepayments for purchase of PPE 104 208 0 0 447 059 633 684 387 946
Leased Assets 3 0 0 0 0 332 824 353 192
Total Tangible Assets 1 531 492 2 118 471 2 570 429 2 884 323 4 113 323 4 573 791
Intangible Assets
Licenses 7 290 138 372 138 372 138 372 138 3 720 158 3 720 158
Total Operational Non-Current Assets 1 821 630 2 490 609 2 942 567 3 256 461 7 833 481 8 293 949
Goodwill 7 4 537 4 537 4 537 17 607 567 129 664 837
Brands 7 0 0 0 0 108 400 108 400
Totall Goodwill & Brands 4 537 4 537 4 537 17 607 675 529 773 237
Total Non-Current Assets (Except Financial Assets) 1 826 167 2 495 146 2 947 104 3 274 068 8 509 010 9 067 186
Working capital 1 384 586 2 276 731 1 036 987 1 822 242 2 385 502 2 927 740
Invested Capital (with Intangibles) 3 210 753 4 771 877 3 984 091 5 096 310 10 894 512 11 994 926
Invested Capital (without Goodwill & Brands) 3 206 216 4 767 340 3 979 554 5 078 703 10 218 983 11 221 689
Non-Operating Current Assets
Excess Cash 1 62 660 188 431 210 404 205 553 1 134 335 295 404
Total Other Receivables 9 153 089 58 340 84 630 0 0 0
Non-Operating Current Assets 215 749 246 771 295 034 205 553 1 134 335 295 404
Non-Current Financial Assets
Investments in Associates 10 105 785 34 111 51 406 57 497 63 766 67 141
Investments in stocks & shares 10 25 108 25 296 25 296 55 269 55 318 55 318
Long-term Receivables 0 12 660 0 9 200 4 422 8 101
Deffered Tax Assets 0 0 0 0 37 593 26 934
Non-Current Financial Assets 130 893 72 067 76 702 121 966 161 099 157 494
Total Funds Invested 3 557 395 5 090 715 4 355 827 5 423 829 12 189 946 12 447 824
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Table 12B: Calculation of Invested Capital (Liabilities & Equity section, also called “financing items”); Data 
Source: Annual Reports; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
  
Liabilities & Equity
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Non-Op Current Liabilities
Financial Derivatives 6 0 0 127 255 320 13 493 9 710
Provisions for onerous contracts 6 51 004 67 378 0 0 0 0
51 004 67 378 127 255 320 13 493 9 710
Non-Current Liabilities
Deferred Taxes 349 546 545 699 455 448 534 430 1 123 796 1 222 222
Long-term interest-bearing debt 10 447 559 827 146 146 696 812 053 2 328 231 2 219 690
Long-term leasing debt 0 0 0 0 225 585 265 235
Additional Debt Taken 0 0 0 0 0 0
Derivatives 6 128 804 101 456 0 0 1 966 1 480
Total Non-Current Liabilities 925 909 1 474 301 602 144 1 346 483 3 679 578 3 708 627
Total Liabilities 976 913 1 541 679 729 399 1 346 803 3 693 071 3 718 337
Equity 2 580 482 3 549 035 3 626 429 4 077 029 8 496 875 8 729 487
Total Liabilities & Equity 3 557 395 5 090 714 4 355 828 5 423 832 12 189 946 12 447 824
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7.5 FCFF 
FCFF is the cash flow that is available to all the investors of any company, both debt and 
equity. 
7.5.1 FCFF’s Calculation Framework 
In traditional corporate finance courses, free cash flow is calculated as: 
 
 
However, for valuation it is preferred that operating and non-operating assets be valued 
separately, hence, the use of traditional FCF calculation methodology is not well-suited to this 
thesis. Furthermore, the FCFF figure provided by the company in its annual report is of little 
use for precisely the same reason – it mixes operating and non-operating items. 
For the purposes of FCFF calculation for valuation purposes, Koller et al. (2015) provide a 
different framework. They recommend using the following formula: 
 
 




They argue that FCF calculation for valuation should begin with NOPLAT rather than EBIT, 
followed by addition of noncash operating expenses and deduction of investments in invested 
capital; where non-cash operating expenses are depreciation and amortization related to 
operations, and investments in invested capital is the change in net invested capital from one 
year to the next. Calculation of net capital expenditures, however, is tricky (Koller et al., 2015). 
FCFF = NOPLAT + Non-Cash Expenses – Increase in Invested Capital 
FCFF = NOPLAT + Non-Cash Expenses - Increases in Net Working Capital – 
CAPEX 
 
Increase in Invested Capital = Increases in Net Working Capital + CAPEX 
 





Assistant Professor of Finance, Dr. Howard Keen, at Temple University, USA points out that, 
despite the widespread use of FCFF in valuation, there is confusion with regards to how capital 
expenditure and depreciation are to be accounted for (Keen, n.d.). He points out that this 
confusion is due to “… the widespread failure to define capital expenditure…” (Keen, n.d., p. 
2). Specifically, he points out that the confusion stems from whether capital expenditure is to 
be taken at its net value or its gross value (Keen, n.d.). 
To clear up this conclusion, Keen (n.d.) differentiates between gross and net investment in 
PPE. He clarifies that if Gross Increase in PPE is being treated as CAPEX then depreciation 
needs to be added back only once, however, if Net Increase in PPE is being treated as CAPEX 
then depreciation needs to be added back twice. In the latter, one might mistakenly think that 
depreciation is being added twice, however, Keen (n.d.) clarifies that since the Net PPE figure 
already includes depreciation expense, the depreciation is being added 2nd time to cancel out 
the effect of depreciation in Net PPE, while it was added the first time because it is a non-cash 
expense (Keen, n.d.). 
7.5.2 Bakkafrost’s Historic FCFF Calculation 
In line with the above framework, Bakkafrost’s historic FCFF for 5 years ending 2020 has 
been calculated. Moreover, there are 2 non-cash items in Bakkafrost’s accounts which have 
not been adjusted in the FCFF calculation above. These adjustments are: 
i. Fair Value Adjustments on Biological Assets: This is a non-cash line item. 
However, since the author classifies it as non-operational, it has not been accounted 
for when calculating NOPLAT and consequently, there is no need for adjustment. 
ii. Changes in Inventory & Biological Assets: This is an operational item and hence, 
impacts NOPLAT. However, the author has decided this account need not be 
adjusted in FCFF calculation. The reason for this is two-fold: Firstly, since this is 
an inventory account, it would be adjusted automatically by change in inventory as 
part of working capital, hence, adjusting it separately would lead to double-
adjustment; secondly, the company itself does not adjust this account when 
calculating CFO in its cash flow statement, this confirms the author’s assumption 
that changes in inventory & biological assets flow through changes in inventory 
and need not be adjusted separately. 
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It is worth noting here that depreciation of leased assets has been deducted from the 
depreciation reported in the income statement because the depreciation of leased assets is a 
cash expense that is paid out to the lessor; if the depreciation of leased assets is treated like 
depreciation of assets that the company owns, it would lead to overstatement of FCFF. 
Moreover, total non-cash depreciation has been added twice because the change in invested 
capital is calculated at its net value (and not at gross value), as explained in detailed discussion 
above. The calculation of historic FCFF is shown in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13: Historic FCFF Calculation; All figures in DKK 1000s. 
  
Historic FCFF Calculation
All values in 1000s DKK 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 1 062 045 928 763 879 731 1 550 974 526 319
Depreciation & Amortization
Depreciation & Amortization 133 261 183 590 198 898 310 115 446 765
Less: Depreciation of Leased Assets 0 0 0 41 405 118 066
Add: Total Non-Cash Depreciation 133 261 183 590 198 898 268 710 328 699
CAPEX & Working Capital
Increase in Working Capital 892 144 -1 239 744 785 255 563 260 542 237
Increases in Tangible Assets (including Licenses) 668 979 451 958 313 894 4 577 020 460 468
1 561 123 -787 786 1 099 149 5 140 280 1 002 705
Total Non-Cash Depreciation 133 261 183 590 198 898 268 710 328 699
Less: Total investments in CAPEX & Working Capital 1 427 862 -971 376 900 251 4 871 570 674 006
FCFF before Intangibles -232 556 2 083 729 178 377 -3 051 887 181 012
Less: Increase in Intangible Assets 0 0 13 070 657 922 97 708
Free Cash Flow to the Firm -232 556 2 083 729 165 307 -3 709 809 83 304
 103 
7.6 ROIC Trend 
In the ROIC graph (Figure 8) below, it can be seen that ROIC has decreased over the years. 
However, despite the overall decrease in ROIC, until 2019, the ROIC was well above the 
company reported pre-tax WACC of 7,2%. ROIC of more than 7,2% means that the operations 
have been generating value. 
Moreover, ROIC with and without intangibles have a very small spread, this is because 
Goodwill & Brands are a very small percentage of total invested capital. It is worth re-
mentioning here that the licenses have been treated as part of tangible assets (i.e., invested 
capital without intangibles includes licenses) because of their importance to salmon farming 
operations. 
 










2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
ROIC
ROIC (with Intangibles) ROIC (w/ out Intangibles)
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ROIC has been further broken down into asset turnover and EBITA margin to observe what 
has been driving the changes in ROIC. In Figure 9 below, it can be seen that the decline in 
ROIC is governed largely by decline in asset turnover.  
 
Figure 9: Plot of Bakkafrost’s historic EBITA Margin and Asset Turnover (with and without intangibles). 
 
The significant decline in ROIC (driven largely by decline in asset turnover) from 2018 to 
2019 could largely be attributed to the increase in assets because of acquisition of Scottish 
Salmon Company (as the assets were recorded in full at the year end, the income was recorded 
only for the 4th quarter). Moreover, apart from investment in SSC, in recent years, Bakkafrost 
has made investments in smolt factories, Biogas plant and the Faroese Broodstock Program, 
all of these have increased the assets employed in operations, and their impact on the top line 
will be evident from 2021 onwards. 
The significant decline in ROIC in 2020 is driven largely by decline in EBITA margin and can 
be attributed to the decline in spot prices of salmon from annual average of over NOK 59/kg 
in 2019 to annual average of NOK 55,48/kg in 2020. Furthermore, in 2020 1,2 M fish were 
lost because of a storm in the Faroe Islands, which reduced the harvests, thereby reducing the 
revenues, even though significant costs had been incurred. This would have had further 
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Asset Turnover (w/ Intangibles)
Asset Turnover (w/ out Intangibles)
Operational EBITA Margin
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, Bakkafrost’s historical financial statements have been reorganized based on 
operational, non-operational, and financing nature of individual line items. Based on the 
reorganized statements, NOPLAT and FCFF have been calculated. The historic trend in ROIC 
has been observed and brief comments have been made as to what has driven the ROIC’s 
decline over the years. 
The author has, on purpose, conducted only limited analysis of historic trends in this chapter 
because the capital structure and financial health of Bakkafrost have been discussed in detail 
in chapter 5. The primary purpose of this chapter was to divide line items into operational, 
non-operational, and financing categories, so that forecasting of each of the three categories 
can be done in the following chapter. 
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8. Forecasting 
In this chapter, the financial statements of Bakkafrost have been forecasted. The forecasted 
statements are needed to calculate NOPLAT, invested capital and cash flows of the company 
(Koller et al., 2015). Forecasting needs to be carried out not only for operational items but also 
for non-operational and financial items because all three are necessary to calculate the equity 
value of the company and to balance the statement of financial position. The inputs from 
strategic and financial statement analysis carried out earlier are essential for forecasting as 
they allow the forecast to be grounded into not only company and industry level realities but 
also in macro-level trends and challenges. It must be noted that the following forecasting is 
done considering Bakkafrost a “going concern”. 
For forecasting, Koller et al. (2015, pp. 224-225) recommend the following steps (copied 
verbatim): 
1. “Prepare and analyze historical financials”. 
2. “Build the revenue forecast”. 
3. “Forecast the income statement”. 
4. “Forecast the balance sheet: invested capital and nonoperating assets”. 
5. “Reconcile the balance sheet with investor funds”. 
6. “Calculate ROIC and FCF”. 
8.1 Forecast Length, Accuracy and Detail 
Two major decisions with regards to forecasting involve how detailed forecasts need to be and 
how far into the future they must go (Koller et al., 2015). Another important concern is the 
accuracy of forecasts; Koller et al. (2015) recommend that forecasts be divided into 2 time-
periods; for the first few years, the accounts are forecasted in detail and later, Koller et al. 
(2015) recommend valuing “… the remaining years by using a perpetuity formula…” (p. 221). 
The argument behind this is twofold: firstly, in the short-term, it is possible to forecast 
accounts in detail, whereas in the long-run forecasting individual line items becomes virtually 
impossible because of the assumptions and uncertainties involved; and secondly, it is assumed 
that in the longer run, the industry and the company becomes stable and hence, using a terminal 
rate is justified (Koller et al., 2015). Schill (2016) argues that super normal profits tend to be 
unsustainable and in the long run, the performance of individual companies tend to converge 
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to the mean of that industry (p. 7). The initial few years of forecast are termed “explicit 
forecast” by Koller et al. (2015) and they argue that “the explicit forecast period should be 
long enough that the company’s growth rate is less than or equal to that of the economy” 
(Koller et al, p. 222).  
Professor Lipson (2019a) from University of Virginia suggests that one must also keep in mind 
the reason behind forecasting, as “… the [need for] detail and accuracy …” of forecasting 
individual line items varies significantly based on this (p. 4). He comments that a forecast for 
valuation purposes “… require little detail and, improving its accuracy is likely to make little 
difference” (p. 4). However, he argues, if the forecasting is for managing working capital or 
cash then significantly higher accuracy and detail would be needed (Lipson, 2019a). 
Furthermore, Lipson (2019a) informs that forecasting rarely involves “… assumptions about 
individual line items…” and mostly are based on relationships “… between a line item and 
the ultimate driver of that line item…”, which mostly is either revenue or COGS (p. 2). Schill 
(2016) recommends using financial ratios because they “… capture relationships across 
financial statement line items that tend to be preserved over time” (p. 5). Hence, the forecasting 
in this thesis will rely heavily on past financial and operational ratios and their relationships. 
8.2 Forecasting Revenues 
Since most of the line items are forecasted as a ratio of revenues, it makes sense to forecast 
revenues first. By definition, revenues are a function of price and volume. Mathematically: 
 
Therefore, any framework that is used to forecast revenues must account for both the volume 
and the price. 
Koller et al. (2015) recommend two methods to forecast the revenues, dubbed as the top-down 
and bottom-up methods. The top-down method looks at the entire industry and its growth rates 
and forecasts revenues based on the concerned company’s market position, i.e., how much of 
the total market can be captured by the company in question (Koller et al., 2015). On the 
contrary, the bottom-up forecast focuses more on the company itself – for instance, it could be 
built using the information about upcoming orders or upcoming capacity enhancements or 
even marketing campaigns (Koller et al., 2015). Since the focus of the bottom-up forecasts is 
Revenues = Price x Volume 
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on the company itself rather than the general economy, such forecasts are reliable for industries 
and companies that are not yet mature. Moreover, due to the focus on company, coupled with 
the fact that it is difficult for companies to predict far in the future, bottom-up forecasts are 
reliable only for forecasting in the near future. On the contrary, top-down forecasts are 
preferable when the company and the industry are more mature and, in such cases, Koller et 
al. (2015) recommend relying “… on professional forecasts of the aggregate market and focus 
your own efforts on forecasting market share by competitor” (p. 227). 
Another important question is regarding the decision of defining the market. For instance, 
should a company’s market be disaggregated as per the geographical areas it serves? Should 
it be divided into product categories? Or should the disaggregation be based on something 
else? Barnett (1988) recommends making “… each category small and homogenous enough 
so that the drivers of demand will apply consistently across its various elements; [and making] 
… each large enough so that the analysis will be worth the effort” (p. 5). 
8.2.1 Bakkafrost’s Revenue Forecasting 
Earlier in the strategic analysis, it was established that salmon farming is well-suited to the 
growing macro trends of sustainability, health, and rising incomes. It was also explained that 
salmon farming is a highly regulated industry and has high barriers to entry, primarily due to 
limitation of salmon farming licenses. This does imply that, at least in the foreseeable future, 
the demand of salmon is set to increase whereas the supply might be constrained – in fact, 
supply shocks are not uncommon in the industry because of diseases and extreme weather 
events. Mowi Group, the world’s largest salmon producer, expects the industry’s demand to 
grow by nearly twice as that of the supply for the next 5 years! Between 2020 and 2025, Mowi 
expects demand to grow by 8% annually with supply increasing by only 4% (Mowi, 2021a). 
Given this, it would be reasonable to presume that Bakkafrost would be able to sell all its 
production. Hence, with regards to revenue forecasting, there is little need to conduct top-
down market growth analysis. Instead, what needs to be analysed is Bakkafrost’s internal goals 
with regards to capacity enhancements and operational improvements. Bakkafrost does 
provide basics of its strategy for the next 5 years. However, for production capacity beyond 5 
years, the only information provided is that post-2025, the company intends to find 
opportunities to increase capacity by being more active in “offshore farming”. 
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Moreover, Bakkafrost divides its revenue into 4 segments for the purposes of reporting: Fresh 
Fish Faroe Islands, Value-Added Products (VAP), Fish Oil and Feed (FOF) and Fresh Fish 
Scotland. Bakkafrost provides revenue breakdown by geographies as well. However, it is not 
possible to disaggregate revenues by the geographies and segments simultaneously because 
Bakkafrost does not provide disaggregation on both the dimensions simultaneously. 
Moreover, whereas Bakkafrost does provide revenues by segment, the costs of each segment 
are not provided in same detail as they are provided at group level, hence calculation of key 
ratios, such as Gross Profit Margin, becomes impossible at segment level. In addition, the costs 
disclosed at segment level do not eliminate intragroup transactions. Since intragroup 
transactions are not always at an arm’s length, including costs provided in the segment 
reporting for financial analysis will distort the financial analysis and thereby, forecasting. 
Therefore, all the income statement line items which are pegged to revenue will have to be 
pegged with group revenues, rather than segment revenues. 
In the sub-segments below, estimations have been made about future production of Bakkafrost 
(in volume) and estimated future prices for Bakkafrost’s products. 
Calculation of Historic Premium for Each Segment 
Bakkafrost claims that its salmon fetches “premium”32 prices, however, no details have been 
provided about the magnitude of this premium. One can calculate this premium in different 
ways. One approach, as used by Larsen and Mustorp (2018), is to see the prices of salmon of 
different weights. Since Bakkafrost’s average salmon weight in the Faroe Islands is over 6 
kgs, Larsen and Mustorp (2018) calculate the premium by comparing the price of salmon over 
6 kgs with price of salmon below 5 kgs, the difference being classified as premium (Larsen & 
Mustorp, 2018). However, the author does not agree with this approach because salmon price 
is not solely a function of its weight and hence, the author has used an alternative approach; a 
similar approach has been used by Malin et al. (2016). 
  
 
32Here the premium refers to the difference between what Bakkafrost earns per kg of salmon and what the annual average 
price of salmon is as per the fish pool. This premium is not to confused with premium quality value-added salmon. 
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To estimate the premium that Bakkafrost earns in each segment, Bakkafrost’s revenue per kg 
of salmon sold (for any given segment) is calculated, and the difference between Bakkafrost’s 
average revenue per kg (for the given segment) and the average price per kg for fresh salmon 
(from fish pool) for the respective year is estimated to be that year’s premium. The historical 
premium for each segment is illustrated in Table 14 below. Interestingly, in the Faroe Islands, 
the premium in fresh fish segment is higher than VAP33. The historic exchange rates are taken 
from OFX (n.d.). 
 
Table 14: Calculation of historic premium in each segment; Revenue figures in 1000s, Volume in tons. 
One of the segments that Bakkafrost currently operates is its Fish Oil and Feed (FOF) segment. 
However, the external sales of FOF segment have decreased over the years and it is presumed 
that all sales will be internal from 2022 and beyond. This is presumed because in 2021 the 
external contracts for procurement of fish feed in Scotland are due to expire and hence, the 
little amount of feed that is currently sold externally will be utilized internally, as per the 
company (Bakkafrost, 2021). For 2021, nonetheless, the revenues from FOF are presumed to 
 
33 This is not entirely surprising because VAP segment for Bakkafrost has historically been less profitable than Fresh Fish 
segment. For example, in 2020 and 2019, VAP segment had EBIT/kg of DKK 5,84 and 3,82 respectively (Bakkafrost, 2021, 
p. 8); for the same years, the group’s total EBIT/kg from the farming operations (Fresh Fish + VAP) in the Faroe Islands was 
DKK 11,59 in 2020 and DKK 20,40 in 2019 (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 8). Given the stark difference between EBIT/kg of VAP 
and EBIT/kg of VAP and Fresh Fish combined, it can be inferred that fresh fish is significantly more profitable segment. 
Historic Premium Calculation by Segment
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Calculation of Fresh Fish/kg Price in DKK (NOK figures from Fish Pool)
NOK to DKK (Source: OFX) 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,7
Annual Price Per Kg Fresh Fish (Fish Pool) - NOK 42,09 63,13 60,88 60,76 59,15 55,48
Annual Price Per Kg Fresh Fish - DKK 35,14 50,57 48,56 47,15 44,85 38,62
Premium Calculation for Segment: Fresh Fish - Faroe Islands
Total External Revenue from Fresh Fish - Faroe Islands 1 763 498 1 973 720 2 150 939 2 226 118 2 501 646 1 548 623
Harvested Volume sold Externally (tons) 38 376 31 476 35 548 36 236 40 494 26 769
Year's Revenue/kg for Segment (DKK) 45,95 62,71 60,51 61,43 61,78 57,85
Less: Annual Price/kg Fresh Fish - DKK  (as converted from Fish Pool) 35,14 50,57 48,56 47,15 44,85 38,62
Premium per kg in Faroe Islands Fresh Fish - DKK 10,81 12,13 11,95 14,28 16,93 19,23
Premium Calculation for Segment: VAP - Faroe Islands
Total External Revnue from VAP Segment 736 657 880 945 998 778 364 827 964 484 1 116 216
VAP Sold Externally (tons) 18 195 18 120 19 067 8 355 16 690 23 931
Year's Revenue/kg for Segment (DKK) 40,49 48,62 52,38 43,67 57,79 46,64
Less: Annual Price/kg Fresh Fish - DKK  (as converted from Fish Pool) 35,14 50,57 48,56 47,15 44,85 38,62
Premium per kg in Faroe Islands VAP - DKK 5,35 -1,96 3,82 -3,48 12,94 8,02
Premium Calculation for Segment: Scotland EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR DKK
Total External Revenue from Fresh Fish - Scotland 100 360 109 921 150 946 180 125 111 804 1 595 561
Harvested Volume Sold Externally (tons) 25 569 24 342 25 272 29 913 18 463 34 986
Year's Revenue/kg for Segment (in EUR) 3,9 4,5 6,0 6,0 6,1 -
EUR to DKK (Source: OFX) 7,5 7,4 7,4 7,5 7,5 7,5
Year's Revenue/kg for Segment (DKK) 29,3 33,6 44,4 44,9 45,2 45,6
Less: Annual Price/kg Fresh Fish - DKK  (as converted from Fish Pool) 35,1 50,6 48,6 47,1 44,8 38,6
Premium per kg in Scotland Fresh Fish - DKK -5,86 -16,95 -4,13 -2,26 0,38 6,99
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be the same as 2020. However, due to internal sourcing of fish feed from 2022 and onwards, 
the company expects to have DKK 70 M savings annually (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 145), and the 
author has deducted this from ‘cost of products’ indefinitely from 2022 to account for the cost 
savings. 
Incorporating Growth due to M&A’s 
Another important aspect when forecasting is to differentiate between organic and inorganic 
growth. Organic growth is the growth because of a company’s natural growth whereas 
inorganic growth is the increase in revenues due to M&A’s. As mentioned previously, 
Bakkafrost has had numerous acquisitions since its listing on the Oslo stock exchange. 
However, going into the future, the assumption is that there would be no M&A’s. This 
assumption rests on multiple pillars: 
I. Bakkafrost has recently acquired Scottish Salmon Company and taken over the 
Faroese National Broodstock Program, and currently, the management’s plans are to 
make Scottish operations more efficient and increase the smolt size both in the Faroe 
Islands and Scotland. Therefore, for the next 5 years, it can be reasonably presumed 
that the management is pre-occupied with developing synergies and increasing 
operational performance rather than looking for growth by acquisitions. 
 
II. Beyond the next 5 years, the only information provided by the management is that it 
will look towards “offshore” farming for growth. No further details have been provided 
on this, except that the company has already applied for offshore farming licenses in 
the Faroe Islands. Moreover, Bakkafrost has already applied for off-shore farming 
licenses in the Faroe Islands, which could signify that the management plans to develop 
off-shore farming organically, rather than by acquisitions. That is not to say, however, 
that acquisitions (both for in-land and off-shore farming) cannot be considered – but 
no information has been provided. 
 
III. Whereas the above 2 points indicate that the management will not conduct another 
acquisition within the foreseeable future, it nonetheless remains true that corporations 
do conduct several M&A’s over their lives. However, in this case, the challenge is that 
acquisitions are difficult to predict since no plans have been disclosed by Bakkafrost.  
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Hence, the assumption for the purposes of this thesis is that Bakkafrost will not conduct further 
M&As. Consequently, it is also assumed that intangible assets which are only recognized upon 
recognition, e.g., brands & goodwill, will not increase. 
Forecast of Production (Volume) 
In this sub-section, forecast of Bakkafrost’s production volume has been made. 
An important consideration for forecasting suggested by Professor Michael Schill at 
University of Virginia (2016) is to recognize biases in human psyche (Schill, 2016, p. 9); and 
the two biases he particularly recommends looking out for are “… optimism bias and 
overconfidence bias” (p. 9). To adjust for these biases, the author has presumed that Bakkafrost 
will not be able to meet 100% of its production targets. A report by Kontali Analysis has found 
that companies tend to miss their harvest forecast by 3% to 10% every year (Nystøyl, 2021). 
Therefore, the author presumes that Bakkafrost will miss its targets in the Faroe Islands by 
6,5% (midway point)34. In Scotland, the volume has not been adjusted down for years 2022-
2030 because the growth in Scotland has not been provided by the company, rather the author 
has presumed it to be 4%, which is in line with expected global increase of 4% in volume. 
Nonetheless, since the company has given its production estimate in Scotland for 2021, the 
author has adjusted it downwards by 6,5%. 
The capacity in the Faroe Islands by 2025 is expected to be 100 000 tons HOG. The current 
capacity has not been provided, however, the expected salmon harvest in the Faroe Islands in 
2021 is 66 000 tons gutted (tgw) (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 10). Based on the expected volume for 
2021 and expected capacity of 2025 at 100 000 tons, the harvest (expected volumes) for years 
2022-2025 has been calculated with linear increase such that by 2025 the capacity is 100 000 
tons. The capacity enhancements in Scotland have not been given and the author presumes 
that capacity growth in Scotland until 2025 will be in line with expected global growth of 4%. 
For 2021, Scotland’s forecasted harvest has been provided at 40 000 tons gutted (tgw) by 
Bakkafrost (Bakkafrost, 2021, p. 10), and hence a downward adjustment of 6,5% has been 
done for Scotland’s production in 2021 keeping in line with the report of Kontali Analysis 
referred to above. Furthermore, beyond 5 years, the growth of the salmon market and 
 
34 For clarification: 6,5% downward adjustment has been made ONLY for the years in which the company has given its 
production targets. 
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Bakkafrost cannot be estimated with reasonable precision. Hence, it is assumed that between 
2026-2030 (both years inclusive), Bakkafrost’s volume will grow by 4% (this rate is equal to 
the growth rate Mowi predicts for salmon industry for 2020-2025). 
In the Faroe Islands, 45% of volume is presumed to be used for VAP production because the 
Group’s long-term strategy is to have 40% to 50% of its Faroe Islands’ sales in the VAP 
segment (Bakkafrost, 2021). The fish from Scotland are all sold as fresh fish. 
Keeping this in view, the expected volume (in tons) is calculated in Table 15 below35. 
 
Table 15: Forecasted Volume for each segment for 2021-2030. 
Estimation of Fresh Salmon Prices (2021-2030) 
Estimation of future salmon prices is done in Table 16 below (this is estimation for general 
level of fresh salmon prices, and not the prices for Bakkafrost). The prices of salmon (in NOK) 
for 2021-2023 are taken from salmon forwards from fish pool. For years beyond 2023, the 
forwards were unavailable, so 3-year moving average of price (NOK) is taken for each year 
between 2024-2030. Each year’s (2021-2030) NOK prices are then converted to DKK and 
adjusted for inflation. NOK to DKK conversion rate is presumed to stay constant at current 
level. Inflation rates until 2025 are taken from Statista. Beyond 2025, the rate of inflation has 
been presumed to stay at 2025 levels36. Note that no inflation adjustment has been made for 
 
35 The “expected volume” in the Faroe Islands (in 2026) and Scotland (in 2022) falls below the “expected volume” of 
preceding year because the growth rates have been applied on “Net Expected Production” of the previous year, i.e., after 
accounting for 6,5% downward adjustment for preceding year. Nonetheless, Net Expected Production every year is higher 
than Net Expected Production of the respective preceding year. 
36 Inflation predictions beyond 2025 were not reliably available. 
Forecasted Volume 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
All volume figures in tons
Faroe Islands
Growth Rate - 10,95% 10,95% 10,95% 10,95% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Expected Volume, Faroe Islands - (tons HOG) 66 000 73 227 81 245 90 142 100 000 97 240 101 130 105 175 109 382 113 757
Downward Adjustment 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Net Expected Production, Faroe Islands (tons HOG) 61710 68467 75964 84283 93500 97240 101130 105175 109382 113757
Faroe Islands - Fresh Fish (%) 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%
Faroe Islands - VAP (%) 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Faroe Islands - Distribution
Faroe Islands - Fresh Fish (tons HOG) 33 941 37 657 41 780 46 355 51 425 53 482 55 621 57 846 60 160 62 566
Faroe Islands - VAP  (tons) 27 770 30 810 34 184 37 927 42 075 43 758 45 508 47 329 49 222 51 191
Net Expected Production, Faroe Islands (tons HOG) 61 710 68 467 75 964 84 283 93 500 97 240 101 130 105 175 109 382 113 757
Scottish Operations 
Growth Rate - 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Expected Volume, Scotland (tons HOG) 40 000 38 896 40 452 42 070 43 753 45 503 47 323 49 216 51 184 53 232
Downward Adjustment 6,50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Expected Scottish Production (in tons HOG) 37400 38896 40452 42070 43753 45503 47323 49216 51184 53232
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2021-2023 because forward prices (NOK) were available. The results of estimated salmon 
prices (in DKK) are produced in Table 16 below. 
 
Table 16: Estimated Salmon Prices; Data Source: Fish Pool & Statista. 
Estimation of Bakkafrost’s Revenue 
After estimating the volume and prices, the total revenue expected between 2021-2030 is 
calculated and summarized in Table 17 below. Note that the prices in Table 16 above were 
only for fresh fish and were not particular to Bakkafrost. Hence, each segment’s historic 
premium (3-year average) has been added to the price forecasted in Table 16 above to estimate 
Bakkafrost’s revenue/kg for that segment.  
 
Table 17: Bakkafrost’s Forecasted Revenue for 2021-2030; All revenue figures in 1000s DKK; The historic 
premiums used are 3-year averages for year ending 2020. 
Moreover, the Faroe Island’s farming revenue has been presented separately as well because 
revenue tax needs to be applied on the farming revenues from the Faroe Islands.  
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Inflation in Norway (Statista) 3,30% 1,80% 1,90% 2% 2% - - - - -
Salmon Price Estimation
Salmon Price (NOK) 56,25 59,2 58,5 57,983 58,561 58,348 58,298 58,402 58,349 58,350
NOK to DKK 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Inflation adjustment 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Estimated Fresh Salmon Price (DKK) 39,16 41,21 40,72 41,17 41,58 41,43 41,39 41,47 41,43 41,43
Forecasted Revenue By Segment 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Currency:  DKK
Segment: Fresh Fish Faroe Islands
Faroe Islands, Fresh Fish Harvest (tons) 33 941 37 657 41 780 46 355 51 425 53 482 55 621 57 846 60 160 62 566
Estimated Fresh Salmon Price (DKK) 39,2 41,2 40,7 41,2 41,6 41,4 41,4 41,5 41,4 41,4
Add: Segment's Historic Premium per Kg (3-Yr Avg) 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82 16,82
Bakkafrost's Expected Revenue / Kg 55,97 58,02 57,54 57,98 58,40 58,24 58,21 58,28 58,24 58,25
Fresh Fish Revenue from Faroe Islands  (in 1000s) 1 899 688 2 185 032 2 403 935 2 687 914 3 002 972 3 115 004 3 237 605 3 371 411 3 504 006 3 644 183
Segment: VAP
Faroe Islands, VAP Harvest (tons) 27 770 30 810 34 184 37 927 42 075 43 758 45 508 47 329 49 222 51 191
Estimated Fresh Salmon Price (DKK) 39,16 41,21 40,72 41,17 41,58 41,43 41,39 41,47 41,43 41,43
Add: Segment's Historic Premium per Kg (3-Yr Avg) 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83 5,83
Bakkafrost's Expected Revenue / Kg 44,98 47,04 46,55 47,00 47,41 47,26 47,22 47,29 47,26 47,26
VAP Revenue - Faroe Islands (in 1000s) 1 249 136 1 449 185 1 591 214 1 782 428 1 994 622 2 067 791 2 148 867 2 238 341 2 326 024 2 419 079
Segment: Scotland
Scotland Harvest (tons) 37 400 38 896 40 452 42 070 43 753 45 503 47 323 49 216 51 184 53 232
Estimated Fresh Salmon Price (DKK) 39,16 41,21 40,72 41,17 41,58 41,43 41,39 41,47 41,43 41,43
Add: Segment's Historic Premium per Kg (3-Yr Avg) 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70 1,70
Bakkafrost's Expected Revenue / Kg 40,86 42,91 42,43 42,87 43,28 43,13 43,10 43,17 43,13 43,13
Revenue from Scotland (in 1000s) 1 528 120 1 669 118 1 716 171 1 803 648 1 893 743 1 962 613 2 039 416 2 124 653 2 207 715 2 296 038
Forecasted Group Revenues
Total Farming Revenues (Fresh Fish & VAP) 4 676 944 5 303 335 5 711 320 6 273 990 6 891 338 7 145 407 7 425 888 7 734 405 8 037 744 8 359 300
Revenue from Fish Oil & Feed 391 491 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Revenues (1000s DKK) 5 068 435 5 303 335 5 711 320 6 273 990 6 891 338 7 145 407 7 425 888 7 734 405 8 037 744 8 359 300
Faroe Islands Farming Revenue
Farming Revenue only from Faroe Islands (1000s DKK) 3 148 824 3 634 217 3 995 149 4 470 342 4 997 594 5 182 795 5 386 472 5 609 752 5 830 030 6 063 262
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Beyond 2030, the rate of growth of economy is presumed to be the terminal growth rate for 
Bakkafrost, i.e., 2%. 
8.3 Income Statement Forecasting 
The need and level of accuracy for forecasting have already been discussed. The forecasting 
process itself involves several steps, which primarily include exploring what drives individual 
line items (Koller et al., 2015). Koller et al. (2015) also state that most of the items in the 
income statement are driven by revenues (particularly operational items). Lipson (2019a) also 
states that most of the line items are either driven by revenue or cost of goods sold (p. 2). Once 
the relationship with the drivers have been established, the next step is to “estimate the forecast 
ratio” (Koller et al., 2015, p. 229) and finally, “multiply the forecast ratio by an estimate of its 
driver” (Koller et al, 2015, p. 229). 
Further explanation regarding individual line items have been provided later in this section. 
However, it is worth noting here that in cases where revenue is not stable, Koller et al (2015, 
p. 243) recommend using non-financial operating drivers; as an example, Koller et al. (2015) 
recommend using “… average salary per employee” (p. 243) if the technology is evolving or 
revenues are fluctuating. This could be critical for Bakkafrost because salmon farming is 
subject to frequent and significant price fluctuations, as already mentioned in industry 
introduction and strategic analysis. 
8.3.1 Forecast Assumptions: Income Statement 
Revenue forecast of Bakkafrost has been done earlier. Forecasting of most of the items of 
income statement are closely tied to the revenue forecast, as this is in line with 
recommendations of Koller et al. (2015) and Lipson (2019a). All line items of the income 
statement apart from revenue and other income relate to costs. Explanations for major line 
item assumptions are presented below, followed by presentation of all assumptions in a table. 
Forecast Assumptions: Operating Income Statement Items 
¨ Purchase of Goods 
The single largest line item on the cost side in the income statement is “purchase of goods”. 
The breakdown of this line item is not provided by the company; however, it can be reasonably 
presumed that it primarily consists of fish feed, raw materials for fish feed and eggs for 
fertilization/smolt production. To better understand what economic/operational relationship 
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drives this line item, analysis of cost of “purchase of goods as a percentage of revenue” as well 
as analysis of “cost of purchase of goods per kg of salmon harvested” has been carried out – 
both measures show significant fluctuations, but an upward trend can be seen, presented in 
Table 18 below. 
 
Table 18: Bakkafrost’s historic cost of “purchase of goods” as a % of revenue & as per kg harvest 
Given the information constraints, coupled with the fact that pelagic fish are a major input in 
fish feed, the author presumes that the cost of goods purchased will have a correlation with 
the price of salmon and therefore, for the purposes of forecasting, 3- year average of cost of 
purchase of goods to revenue of Bakkafrost will be used. 
¨ Depreciation & Amortization 
Another major line item for Bakkafrost is depreciation and amortization, not least because 
salmon farming is a capital-intensive industry. 
For depreciation forecasting, Koller et al. (2015) recommend 3 reasonable approaches (p. 
231): 
i. As a percentage of revenue or; 
ii. As a percentage of net tangible assets (also called PPE) or; 
iii. Use of internal information, such as depreciation schedules. 
 
The third approach can be dismissed, since this paper is based on publicly available 
information only. Remaining two approaches were considered, and their past trends are shown 
in Table 19 below. 
 
Table 19: Bakkafrost’s historic depreciation as a % of Revenues and as a % of PPE 
The depreciation has increased in year 2019 and 2020, both as a percentage of revenue and as 
a percentage of net PPE. The author has decided to use the ratio of depreciation to revenues 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Purchase of Goods as a % of Revenues 35% 29% 23% 34% 30% 51%
Purhcase of Goods/kg Salmon (DKK) 38,82 37,80 34,97 35,93 73,39 67,42
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Depreciation as % of Revenue 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 10%
Depreciation as % of Net PPE 7% 6% 7% 7% 8% 10%
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(3-year average) for forecasting. Koller et al. (2015) state that it does not matter whether 
depreciation is calculated as a percentage of revenue or net PPE if the capital expenditures are 
not lumpy (p. 231). 
Amortization is presumed to be zero for the forecasting period. This is due to two reasons: 
i. Amortization of acquired intangibles is done only after impairment testing; since 
the strategic analysis above has shown that salmon industry is well-suited to rising 
macro-trends and has high barriers to entry, the author finds it reasonable to 
presume that the acquired intangibles (i.e., goodwill and brands) will need not be 
amortized/impaired. 
ii. Apart from brands and goodwill, the third (and the largest) intangible asset is the 
salmon farming “licenses”. However, these licenses are presumed to be renewable 
and hence, no reasonable estimate can be made for their impairment or 
amortization. Moreover, it was also demonstrated in the PESTEL analysis that 
salmon farming continues to have high political acceptance in the Faroe Islands, 
and faces no major political challenges in Scotland. Hence, it is presumed that the 
licenses will not be withdrawn. 
 
It is worth noting here that, historically, Bakkafrost has never had a material write-
down/impairment/amortization charge of any intangible asset. 
Considering the above, amortization is presumed to be zero in the future. 
¨ Salary & Employee Expenses 
With regards to salaries and employee expenses, there could be two major approaches. Salary 
& employee expenses can be calculated as a percentage of revenue. Alternatively, salary 
expense per employee over the years can be calculated and its trend analysed – and salary 
expense can be predicted based on future number of employees by adjusting current cost per 
employee by inflation. The historic trends of both approaches are presented in Table 20 below. 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Salary & Personnel Expenses as % of Revenue 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 13%
Total No. of Employees 725 820 960 824 1534 1699
Salary & Personnel Expenses/Person (1000s DKK) 387 399 416 429 334 358
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Table 20: Bakkafrost’s historic employee expenses per person & as a % of Revenues 
The second approach is considerably more attractive (i.e., calculating historic average salary 
per person, and adjusting it by inflation for future). However, Bakkafrost is making its 
operations efficient and building smolt factories in Scotland; it has also applied for offshore 
farming licenses in the Faroe Islands. This could potentially mean that the size of the 
workforce would increase. This creates a challenge because in this lies the uncertainty about 
future employee numbers and efficiency/effectiveness/role of those employees. 
Keeping in view the challenges of salary per person forecasting method, the author has decided 
to forecast salary and employee expenses as a percentage of revenue (3-year average).  
¨ Other Income 
Analysis shows that between listing on Oslo Børs and 2020, other income has been non-zero 
for only one year. Therefore, other income is assumed to be a non-recurring item, and going 
forward, “other income” is presumed to be zero. 
¨ Change in Inventory and Biological Assets (at cost) 
This account has fluctuated significantly over the years. No details have been provided in the 
notes. However, given its significant materiality, presuming that this account would be zero 
in the future could lead to material undervaluation of the company. Therefore, this account is 
forecasted as a percentage of revenue (3-year average). The 6-year trend (as a percentage of 
revenue) is shown below in Figure 10:  
 












2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Change in inventory & Biological 
Assets to Revenue
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¨ Revenue Tax 
Similar to recently introduced revenue tax on salmon farming in Norway, salmon output in 
Faroe Islands is also taxed. No such tax exists in Scotland. The tax rates for the Faroe Islands 
are reproduced below in Table 21, recreated by the author based on data from KPMG (KPMG, 
2020, p. 22): 
 
Table 21: Revenue tax rates in the Faroe Islands; Data Source: (KPMG, 2020, p. 22) 
Since the expected average price per kilo in all segments is expected to be more than DKK 36, 
the revenue tax rate of 5% will be applied on Bakkafrost’s revenues from the Faroe Islands. 
¨ Effective Tax Rate 
The author has presumed that effective cash tax rate would equal marginal tax rate of 
Bakkafrost. As a corollary to this assumption, it is further presumed that there would be no 
increase or decrease in deferred tax liabilities or assets moving forward. It is worth noting here 
that, historically, Bakkafrost’s effective tax rate has been close to its marginal tax rate. The 
marginal tax rate is 18% in the Faroe Islands and 19% in Scotland; the marginal tax rate used 
by the author for valuation is 19%. 
Forecast Assumptions: Non-Operating Income Statement Items 
Earlier in this thesis when FCFF’s definition was introduced, it was stated that instead of the 
traditional “EBIT*(1-Tax Rate)” [also called NOPAT] measure, NOPLAT will be used to 
calculate FCFF. NOPLAT, by definition, incorporates only operational items. Consequently, 
the non-operating items will not impact FCFF calculation, and hence, will have no impact on 
final valuation. 
The non-operational items in Bakkafrost’s income statement are the following, and all (except 
for interest expense) have been presumed zero for the purposes of forecasting. 
  
For Avg. Price lower than DKK 32 0,50%
For Avg. Price b/w DKK 32 and DKK 36 2,50%
For Avg. Price  DKK 36 or higher 5,00%
Revenue Tax - Faroe Islands
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¨ Fair Value Adjustment on Biological Assets 
Given the challenges involved in predicting fair value movements, it has been presumed zero. 
¨ Income from Associates 
With regards to predicting income from associates, perhaps the best approach would be to 
evaluate each associated company separately and accordingly estimate Bakkafrost’s share. 
However, given the time constraint, it is not practical to value each associate separately. 
Therefore, it is presumed that associates – as reported in the 2020’s balance sheet – are valued 
fairly. The income from associates will be presumed zero in the future and the current value 
of associates as reported in the statement of financial position will be added to the calculated 
PV of Bakkafrost’s operations. 
¨ Badwill 
Badwill was recorded only once since Bakkafrost has been listed on Oslo Børs. Since it is a 
non-recurring item and is of non-operational nature (as reported by Bakkafrost itself), going 
forward, Badwill is presumed zero. 
¨ Interest Expense 
Koller et al. (2015, p. 233) recommend that interest expense be calculated directly from the 
liability that generates this expense. Hence, interest expense is calculated as a percentage of 
long-term interest-bearing debt. The rate that is used for calculation of interest expense is the 
company’s cost of debt (without interest tax shield), as later calculated in the WACC 
calculation. Nonetheless, interest expense remains non-operational and will have no impact 




Summary of Income Statement Assumptions 
All the income statement assumptions for 2021-2030 are summarized below in Table 22. 
Table 22: Income Statement Assumptions for 2021-2030 
  
Income Statement Assumptions
Line Item Nature Pegged to Rate
Purchase of Goods -38,19%
Depreciation & Amortization -7,58%
Salary & Employees Expenses -11,86%
Other Op. Expenses -21,93%
Change in Biological Assets 4,76%
Revenue Tax Statutory 5,00%
Effective Cash Tax Rate Equal to Marginal Tax Rate 19,00%
Fair Value Adjustments on Inventory Presumed Zero 0,00%
Income from Associates Presumed Zero 0,00%
Badwill Presumed Zero 0,00%
Interest Expense Kd calculated by the author (as part of WACC calculations) 3,60%
Other Financial Expenses As a % of Revenue, 3-Yr Avg. 0,25%
Net Currency Effects Presumed Zero 0,00%
Divident Payout Company Given Rate 40,00%
Operating
As a % of Revenue, 3-Yr Avg.
Non-Operating
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8.3.2 Forecasted Income Statement of Bakkafrost 
Based on the forecast assumptions above, Bakkafrost’s forecasted income statements are 
presented in the Table 23 below. It is worth mentioning here again that only operational items 
will flow into NOPLAT and FCFF calculation. All the non-operational sources of income (i.e., 
assets that generate these incomes) and non-operational liabilities (i.e., financial items)37 will 
be added/subtracted to/from the present value of operations later at the time of calculation of 
Enterprise Value. 
 
Table 23: Forecasted & Reorganized Income Statement (2021-2030). 
  
 
37 The assumption is that all non-operational assets in the statement of financial position at the year-end 2020 are valued fairly 
and hence, can be directly adjusted in the present value of operations. 
Foorecasted & Reorganized Income Statement
All figures in 1000s DKK
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Operating Revenue 5 068 435 5 303 335 5 711 320 6 273 990 6 891 338 7 145 407 7 425 888 7 734 405 8 037 744 8 359 300
Purchase of goods -1 935 449 -1 955 148 -2 110 943 -2 325 806 -2 561 548 -2 658 568 -2 765 673 -2 883 484 -2 999 319 -3 122 109
Gross Profit 3 132 986 3 348 187 3 600 377 3 948 185 4 329 790 4 486 839 4 660 215 4 850 920 5 038 426 5 237 191
Change in inventory and biological assets 241 044 252 215 271 618 298 377 327 737 339 820 353 159 367 832 382 258 397 550
Salary and personnel expenses -601 074 -628 931 -677 315 -744 043 -817 255 -847 386 -880 648 -917 236 -953 209 -991 343
Other Operating Expenses -1 111 388 -1 162 895 -1 252 357 -1 375 737 -1 511 107 -1 566 818 -1 628 321 -1 695 971 -1 762 487 -1 832 996
Total Operating Expenses -1 471 418 -1 539 612 -1 658 054 -1 821 403 -2 000 625 -2 074 384 -2 155 810 -2 245 375 -2 333 438 -2 426 789
Other Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operational EBITDA 1 661 569 1 808 575 1 942 324 2 126 782 2 329 165 2 412 456 2 504 405 2 605 545 2 704 988 2 810 402
Depreciation & Amortization -384 156 -401 960 -432 883 -475 530 -522 321 -541 578 -562 836 -586 220 -609 211 -633 583
1 277 413 1 406 615 1 509 441 1 651 252 1 806 844 1 870 878 1 941 568 2 019 325 2 095 776 2 176 819
Revenue Tax -157 441 -181 711 -199 757 -223 517 -249 880 -259 140 -269 324 -280 488 -291 501 -303 163
Operational EBIT 1 119 971 1 224 904 1 309 683 1 427 735 1 556 964 1 611 738 1 672 245 1 738 837 1 804 275 1 873 656
Non-Operational Items
Fair value adjustments of biological assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income from associates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Onerous Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Badwill) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Non-Operational Items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBIT 1 119 971 1 224 904 1 309 683 1 427 735 1 556 964 1 611 738 1 672 245 1 738 837 1 804 275 1 873 656
Financial Items
Financial income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net interest expenses -79 909 -79 909 -81 307 -100 230 -130 112 -161 377 -179 781 -199 815 -221 848 -243 553
Net currency effects 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other financial expenses -12 905 -13 503 -14 542 -15 975 -17 546 -18 193 -18 907 -19 693 -20 465 -21 284
Net Financial Income (Expenses) -92 814 -93 412 -95 849 -116 205 -147 658 -179 570 -198 688 -219 508 -242 314 -264 837
EBT 1 027 158 1 131 492 1 213 835 1 311 530 1 409 306 1 432 168 1 473 557 1 519 329 1 561 961 1 608 819
Tax -195 160 -214 984 -230 629 -249 191 -267 768 -272 112 -279 976 -288 672 -296 773 -305 676
Profit (Loss) from Continuing Operations 831 998 916 509 983 206 1 062 339 1 141 538 1 160 056 1 193 581 1 230 656 1 265 189 1 303 143
Profit or loss for the year attributable to:
Non-controlling interests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Owners of P/F Bakkafrost 831 998 916 509 983 206 1 062 339 1 141 538 1 160 056 1 193 581 1 230 656 1 265 189 1 303 143
831 998 916 509 983 206 1 062 339 1 141 538 1 160 056 1 193 581 1 230 656 1 265 189 1 303 143
Dividends 332799 366603 393282 424936 456615 464022 477432 492263 506075 521257
Retained Earnings 499199 549905 589924 637404 684923 696034 716149 738394 759113 781886
831998 916509 983206 1062339 1141538 1160056 1193581 1230656 1265189 1303143
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8.4 Statement of Financial Position Forecasting 
Income Statement forecasting is followed by forecasting of Statement of Financial Position. 
Most of the line items in the statement of financial position are often linked to the revenues 
(Koller et al., 2015). Moreover, accounts under the operating liabilities can be expected to 
fluctuate significantly with cost of goods sold (Koller et al., 2015, p. 237). Hence, the author 
has linked the line items of statement of financial position to either revenue or cost of 
purchases. 
8.4.1 Forecast Assumptions: Statement of Financial Position 
The individual line items in the Statement of Financial Position have been forecasted primarily 
as a percentage of revenue or percentage of “cost of purchases”, depending on what drives the 
line item. Most of the non-operational items are presumed to have no change over the years 
(i.e., 2020 values are presumed to remain indefinitely). Moreover, since the forecasted 
effective cash tax rate is presumed to be the same as marginal tax rate, it is presumed that no 
change in deferred tax assets or liabilities would occur and hence, deferred tax assets and 
liabilities are kept at their 2020 levels.  
To balance the statement of financial position, accounts of “excess cash” and “new debt taken” 
have been used, in line with recommendations of Koller et al. (2015). Excess cash and new 
debt taken are non-operational accounts, however, the operational assets and liabilities which 
are financed by new debt or excess cash will be reflected in the FCFF as either change in 
working capital and/or increase in non-current operational assets. 
Detailed explanations for key assumptions are presented in the sub-section below, followed 
by a summary of all Statement of the Financial Position in Table 24. 
Explanations of Key Statement of Financial Position Assumptions 
¨ Inventory 
Salmon farming is a capital-intensive industry and salmon being farmed is the primary 
inventory. Since the salmon (inventory) is dependent on the licenses and tangible assets, 
perhaps a good way to forecast salmon (inventory) is to estimate it as a percentage of total 
operating current assets or PPE or licenses. However, this could lead to circularity problem. 
To avoid this, as an alternative, inventory is forecasted based on 3-year average ratio of 
inventory (salmon) to revenue. 
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¨ Tangible Assets (also called PPE) 
Koller et al. (2015) recommend forecasting PPE as “… a percentage of net PP&E or a 
percentage of revenues” (p. 238), and the author has forecasted PPE as a percentage of 
revenues. 3-year’s average of PPE to Revenues has been taken for forecasting purposes. 
However, the years used for average are 2017, 2018 and 2020 – 2019 has been excluded 
because Scottish Salmon Company was acquired in the 4th quarter of 2019 and including 2019 
would significantly overstate the ratio of PPE to Revenue. 
¨ Licenses 
Over the years, no license has been impaired. Moreover, future increases are difficult to predict 
because salmon farming licenses issuance is not common. Nonetheless, Bakkafrost has 
recently applied for offshore farming licenses in the Faroe Islands, hence, it is likely that 
licenses (assets) will increase. However, Bakkafrost has not provided any details about the 
potential value of offshore farming licenses. Nonetheless, Bakkafrost has disclosed that it 
expects its harvests to increase substantially over the coming years. Hence, it is considered 
appropriate to forecast licenses as a percentage of revenues (3-year average). 
¨ Goodwill & Brands 
Goodwill & brands are recognized in the financial statements only through M&A’s. Since it 
has been presumed that no further M&A’s will happen, no increase in goodwill & brands is 
expected. Moreover, amortization is presumed zero, hence, decrease in brands and goodwill 
is zero as well. 
  
 125 
Summary of Statement of Financial Position Assumptions 
A summary of forecasting assumptions for Statement of the Financial Position is presented in 
Table 24 below. Wherever “no change presumed” has been written, it means that value of 
2020 is presumed to remain constant indefinitely. 
 
Table 24: Statement of Financial Position Assumptions. 
8.4.2 Forecasted Statement of Financial Position 
Based on the assumptions above, Bakkafrost’s forecasted statement of financial position is 
presented in Table 25 below. It is worth noting here that whenever the forecasted non-current 
assets (as forecasted by the forecast ratio) falls below the previous year’s levels, the previous 
year’s value has been used. Based on the forecasted statement of financial position, invested 
capital has been calculated as well and attached as appendix 1. 
Statement of Financial Position Assumptions




Tax Receivables No Change Presumed -
Prepayments % of Revenue, Avg. of 3 years 0%
VAT No Change Presumed -
Other Rcv's % of Revenue, Avg. of 3 years 1%
Total Other Receivables Sum of Prepayments + VAT + Other Receivables -
Excess Cash Balancing Figure -
Receivables from associated companies % of Income from Associates, 3-Yrs Avg 0%
Deposit for interest and currency swap % of Income from Associates, 3-Yrs Avg 0%
Total Non-Op Other Receivables Sum of Rcv from Associates and Deposits for interest & currency swaps -
Line Item Nature Pegged to Rate
Short-term interest bearing debt % of Revenue, 2-Yrs Avg 0%
Trade Payables % of Cost of Purchases, 3-Yrs Avg -29%
Current Tax Liabilities No Change Presumed -
Short-term Debt Liabilities (Leasing) % of Revenue, 2-Yrs Avg 3%
Other Current Liabilities % of Cost of Purchases, 3-Yrs Avg -2%
Financial Derivatives No Change Presumed -
Provisions for onerous contracts No Change Presumed -
Line Item Nature Pegged to Rate
Land buildings & other real estate 32%
Plant machinery & other operating equipment 30%
Other operating equipment 4%
Vessels 9%
Prepayments for purchase of PPE 7%
Leased Assets % of Revenue, 2-Yr Avg 7%
Licenses % of Revenue, 3-Yr Avg 58%
Goodwill No Change Presumed -
Brands No Change Presumed -
Investments in Associates No Change Presumed -
Investments in stocks & shares No Change Presumed -
Long-term Receivables % of Revenue, 3-Yr Avg 0,2%
Deffered Tax Assets No Change Presumed -
Deferred Taxes No Change Presumed -
Long-term interest-bearing debt 31%
Long-term leasing debt 2%
Derivatives No Change Presumed -









% of Revenue, 3-Yr Avg




% of Revenue, Avg. of 3 years
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Table 25: Forecasted & Reorganized Statement of Financial Position (2021-2030). 
  
Forecasted & Reorganized Statement of Financial Position
All values in 1000s DKK 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Assets
Operating Current Assets
Total Inventory 2 924 007 3 059 522 3 294 891 3 619 499 3 975 650 4 122 224 4 284 035 4 462 020 4 637 018 4 822 525
Accounts Receivables 555 646 581 398 626 124 687 809 755 488 783 341 814 090 847 912 881 167 916 419
Tax Receivables 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143
Total Other Receivables 31 323 32 775 35 296 38 774 42 589 44 159 45 892 47 799 49 674 51 661
Cash & Cash Equivalent 187 119 195 791 210 854 231 626 254 418 263 798 274 153 285 543 296 742 308 613
Operating Current Assets 3 770 239 3 941 629 4 239 309 4 649 851 5 100 288 5 285 665 5 490 313 5 715 417 5 936 743 6 171 361
Non-Operating Current Assets
Excess Cash 270 274 113 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Other Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Operating Current Assets 270 274 113 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Current Assets 4 040 513 4 055 294 4 239 309 4 649 851 5 100 288 5 285 665 5 490 313 5 715 417 5 936 743 6 171 361
Non-Current Assets
Land buildings & other real estate 1 608 175 1 682 707 1 812 158 1 990 689 2 186 568 2 267 182 2 356 177 2 454 067 2 550 314 2 652 341
Plant machinery & other operating equipment 1 703 233 1 611 762 1 735 754 1 906 758 2 094 379 2 171 595 2 256 837 2 350 600 2 442 789 2 540 515
Other operating equipment 242 147 226 861 244 313 268 383 294 791 305 659 317 658 330 855 343 831 357 586
Vessels 474 403 496 390 534 577 587 243 645 026 668 807 695 060 723 937 752 329 782 427
Prepayments for purchase of PPE 387 946 396 148 426 624 468 654 514 769 533 748 554 699 577 744 600 403 624 423
Leased Assets 379 380 396 963 427 501 469 618 515 828 534 845 555 839 578 932 601 638 625 707
Total Tangible Assets 4 795 285 4 810 831 5 180 928 5 691 345 6 251 361 6 481 836 6 736 270 7 016 135 7 291 305 7 582 999
Intangible Assets
Licenses 3 794 561 3 870 452 3 947 861 3 995 236 4 000 409 4 147 896 4 310 714 4 489 807 4 665 896 4 852 558
Total Operational Non-Current Assets 8 589 846 8 681 284 9 128 790 9 686 581 10 251 770 10 629 732 11 046 984 11 505 943 11 957 200 12 435 557
Goodwill 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837
Brands 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400
Total Goodwill & Brands 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237
Non-Current Financial Assets
Investments in Associates 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141
Investments in stocks & shares 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318
Long-term Receivables 9 701 10 151 10 932 12 008 13 190 13 676 14 213 14 804 15 384 16 000
Deffered Tax Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Current Financial Assets 132 160 132 610 133 391 134 467 135 649 136 135 136 672 137 263 137 843 138 459
Total Non-Current Assets 9 495 243 9 587 130 10 035 417 10 594 285 11 160 656 11 539 104 11 956 893 12 416 442 12 868 280 13 347 252
Total Assets 13 535 756 13 642 424 14 274 726 15 244 136 16 260 943 16 824 769 17 447 206 18 131 859 18 805 024 19 518 613
Liabilities & Equity
Operating Current Liabilities
Short-term interest bearing debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade Payables 555 280 560 932 605 629 667 274 734 908 762 743 793 472 827 272 860 504 895 733
Current Tax Liabilities 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422
Short-term Debt Liabilities (Leasing) 132 112 138 235 148 869 163 535 179 627 186 249 193 560 201 602 209 508 217 890
Other Current Liabilities 31 856 32 181 34 745 38 281 42 161 43 758 45 521 47 460 49 367 51 388
756 670 768 769 826 665 906 512 994 118 1 030 173 1 069 975 1 113 756 1 156 802 1 202 433
Non-Op Current Liabilities
Financial Derivatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Provisions for onerous contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Current Liabilities 756 670 768 769 826 665 906 512 994 118 1 030 173 1 069 975 1 113 756 1 156 802 1 202 433
Non-Current Liabilities
Deferred Taxes 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222
Long-term interest-bearing debt 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690
Long-term leasing debt 108 488 113 516 122 249 134 292 147 507 152 945 158 948 165 552 172 045 178 928
Additional Debt Taken 0 38 835 564 489 1 394 529 2 262 997 2 774 219 3 330 736 3 942 759 4 545 665 5 183 968
Derivatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Non-Current Liabilities 3 550 400 3 594 263 4 128 650 4 970 733 5 852 416 6 369 076 6 931 596 7 550 223 8 159 622 8 804 808
Total Liabilities 4 307 070 4 363 032 4 955 315 5 877 246 6 846 534 7 399 248 8 001 571 8 663 979 9 316 424 10 007 241
Equity 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487 8 729 487
Add: Retained Earnings 499 199 549 905 589 924 637 404 684 923 696 034 716 149 738 394 759 113 781 886
Total Equity at Year End 9 228 686 9 279 392 9 319 411 9 366 891 9 414 410 9 425 521 9 445 636 9 467 881 9 488 600 9 511 373
Total Liabilities & Equity 13 535 756 13 642 424 14 274 725 15 244 136 16 260 943 16 824 769 17 447 207 18 131 859 18 805 024 19 518 614
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8.5 FCFF Calculation 
FCFF’s framework was introduced earlier in chapter 7. In the FCFF framework, the three 
inputs are NOPLAT, Non-Cash Expenses and CAPEX. For calculation of FCFF, Non-Cash 
Expenses are taken from the forecasted income statement, and CAPEX & Increase in Working 
Capital changes from the forecasted statement of invested capital (attached as appendix 1). 
However, NOPLAT still needs to be calculated. 
8.5.1 NOPLAT Calculation 
In Table 26 below, the calculation of NOPLAT for 2021-2030 is presented. Amortization is 
zero in line with the assumptions taken. Operational EBIT was calculated and presented in 
Table 23: Reorganized & Forecasted Income Statement. Operating tax is presumed to be the 
same rate as marginal tax rate of 19%. 
 
Table 26: Forecasted NOPLAT (2021-2030). 
8.5.2 FCFF Calculation 
With all the input values now available (NOPLAT, Working Capital, and Invested Capital), 
the FCFF has been calculated and presented in Table 27 below. The details of how FCFF is 
calculated is explained in detail in section 7.5 above. 
 
Table 27: Forecasted FCFF (2021-2030). 
Forecasted NOPLAT
All figures in 1000s DKK 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Operational EBIT 1 119 971 1 224 904 1 309 683 1 427 735 1 556 964 1 611 738 1 672 245 1 738 837 1 804 275 1 873 656
Add: Amortization 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operational EBITA 1 119 971 1 224 904 1 309 683 1 427 735 1 556 964 1 611 738 1 672 245 1 738 837 1 804 275 1 873 656
Less: Operating Tax 212 795 232 732 248 840 271 270 295 823 306 230 317 727 330 379 342 812 355 995
NOPLAT 907 177 992 172 1 060 844 1 156 465 1 261 141 1 305 508 1 354 518 1 408 458 1 461 463 1 517 661
FCFF Forecast
All values in 1000s DKK 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
NOPLAT 907 177 992 172 1 060 844 1 156 465 1 261 141 1 305 508 1 354 518 1 408 458 1 461 463 1 517 661
Depreciation & Amortization
Depreciation & Amortization 384 156 401 960 432 883 475 530 522 321 541 578 562 836 586 220 609 211 633 583
Less: Depreciation of Leased Assets 26 770 28 755 30 087 32 402 35 594 39 097 40 538 42 129 43 880 45 600
Add: Total Non-Cash Depreciation 357 386 373 205 402 795 443 128 486 727 502 481 522 299 544 091 565 332 587 983
CAPEX & Working Capital
Increase in Working Capital 85 828 159 292 239 783 330 695 362 831 149 323 164 846 181 323 178 280 188 987
Increases in Tangible Assets (including Licenses) 295 897 91 437 447 506 557 791 565 189 377 962 417 252 458 959 451 258 478 357
381 726 250 729 687 289 888 486 928 019 527 285 582 098 640 282 629 538 667 343
Total Non-Cash Depreciation 357 386 373 205 402 795 443 128 486 727 502 481 522 299 544 091 565 332 587 983
Less: Total investments in CAPEX & Working Capital 24 339 -122 476 284 494 445 359 441 293 24 804 59 800 96 191 64 206 79 360
FCFF before Intangibles 1 240 224 1 487 854 1 179 145 1 154 235 1 306 575 1 783 185 1 817 017 1 856 358 1 962 588 2 026 284
Less: Increase in Intangible Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Free Cash Flow to the Firm 1 240 224 1 487 854 1 179 145 1 154 235 1 306 575 1 783 185 1 817 017 1 856 358 1 962 588 2 026 284
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8.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter assumptions for forecasting Bakkafrost’s financial statements have been 
discussed and presented. Based on those assumptions, financial statements of Bakkafrost have 
been forecasted, followed by the calculation of FCFF. 
The most significant forecasted line item is “revenues”. It has been forecasted by keeping in 
view not only the market’s growth but also Bakkafrost’s capacity enhancements and historic 
premiums over market price. 
Most of the operating line items have been calculated either as a percentage of revenue or as 
a percentage of cost of goods sold. Non-operating items, both in the income statement and 
statement of financial position, mostly are presumed to be zero since they are not only hard to 
predict but also have no impact on FCFF calculated through operating profit only. The line 
items of “new debt taken” and “excess cash” have been used to balance the statement of 
financial position. 
In the following chapter, Bakkafrost’s cost of capital will be calculated, followed by valuation 
in chapter 10. 
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9. Cost of Capital 
The DCF valuation models, as mentioned previously, require certain inputs. One of these is 
the cost of capital. The cost of capital is essentially the opportunity cost that an investor has 
for an asset with similar risk/return profile. It is meant to compensate the investor for both the 
time value and risks (Luehrman, 2017). For a firm to generate economic profits, it must 
generate returns higher than the cost of capital (Bruner et al, 1998).  
9.1 Cost of Capital: WACC 
Since the FCFF based DCF model is being used for valuation, the cost of capital that must be 
calculated is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). It is subdivided into cost of debt 
and cost of equity. The methodology of calculating WACC is discussed in this section, 
followed by calculation of Bakkafrost’s WACC is the subsequent segment. 
9.1.1 Cost of Equity: CAPM 
There are multiple models available to calculate the discount rate for equity investors. Of these 
models, some are theoretically sounder than others. The two well-known models are: 
1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
2. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
 
Bruner et al. (1998) found in their survey of “27 highly regarded corporations” that CAPM is 
the model overwhelmingly preferred by practitioners. This could perhaps be due to the ease 
of use that CAPM provides (Luehrman, 2017). In fact, Fama and French note that CAPM 
model “is often the only asset pricing model taught in … [MBA] courses” (Fama & French, 
2004, p.1). Even though CAPM requires certain assumptions which do not hold true in real 
markets, as per the research of Bruner et al. (1998) none of the participating companies “…  
cited specific modifications… to adjust for any empirical shortcomings of the [CAPM] 
model…” (p. 16), i.e., practitioners tend to use CAPM without modifications. 
Keeping in view that CAPM is the model that underlines modern financial theory and is 
overwhelmingly preferred by the practitioners, the author believes that this is the model that 
should be used for calculating the cost of equity for Bakkafrost. 
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CAPM states that the cost of equity is equal to the risk-free rate plus a market risk premium, 
adjusted for the risk profile/sensitivity of the company (and measured by Beta). 







Each of the inputs in the CAPM model are discussed below. 
Risk-free Rate 
Risk-free rate is the return on investment one would have if one invested in an asset with zero 
risk. Typically, the US government’s issued bills, notes and bonds are considered risk-free 
(i.e., they carry no risk of default). However, since the government issues bills, notes and 
bonds with various maturities, the practitioner must decide which risk-free rate to use. The 
yield curve is typically upward sloping, i.e., the interest rate increases with the length of 
maturity (Warnock, 2006), and the spread between 90-day T-bill and the 10-year treasury bond 
is roughly 1.5% on average and therefore, the choice of risk-free rate will have material impact 
on cost of equity, and consequently, on WACC (Bruner et al., 1998). As per Bruner et al. 
(1998), practitioners prefer using 10-year bonds. Practitioners’ preference for 10-year treasury 
bonds could stem from the fact that corporations make long-term investments and hence, using 
long-term bonds is in line with the matching principle. 
Keeping in line with the above, the author would use 10 years bond as a proxy for risk-free 
rate in this thesis. Question arises of why not use treasury bonds with maturities longer than 
10-years; this is because beyond 10-years, the yield curve is almost flat (and hence, the spread 
becomes immaterial). 
E(Ri) = Rf + ßi(E(Rm) – Rf) 
Where:  
E(Ri) = Expected Return of the Asset 
Rf = Risk-free Rate 
ßi = Sensitivity to the Market 
E(Rm) = Expected Return of the Market 
and 
[E(Rm) – Rf] = Market Risk Premium 
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Beta 
Beta is the measure of sensitivity of a company to the market. It is usually derived by linearly 
regressing a company’s historical returns against market returns (Perold, 2004). It must be 
noted here that as per the CAPM, the regression is to be done against market portfolio (Bruner 
et al., 1998). This market portfolio is not observable and hence, a proxy needs to be used. In 
the US, S&P 500 is mostly used as a proxy for this market portfolio (Damodaran, n.d.-b). 
It must also be noted that finance theory calls for the use of forward-looking betas, but since 
forward looking betas are unavailable, betas based on historical returns are used as proxies 
(Bruner et al., 1998). With the use of historical betas as proxies for the future comes an implicit 
assumption that past is a good predictor of the future, which might not be the case as the 
company’s capital structure, macro environment and/or underlying operations might change. 
Another challenge with calculating beta is related to the period that is chosen for regression 
analysis. The aim is to use historical beta that is the best proxy of the future, and therefore, it 
is better to use shorter estimation window for companies that have undergone changes and 
longer estimation windows for companies which have remained relatively stable (Damodaran, 
n.d.-b). 
Apart from the above challenges, another decision that has to be made while estimating betas 
is choosing the return interval. Returns can be measured not only daily, weekly, annually, but 
also hourly (the list is not exhaustive)! Damodaran (n.d.-b) states that using shorter intervals 
increases the dataset however, this can affect beta estimation of companies which are not 
traded frequently (Damodaran, n.d.-b), as this would lead to “… illiquid firms reporting lower 
betas than they really should have and liquid firms reporting higher betas than is justified” 
(Damodaran, n.d.-b, p. 11). Damodaran further recommends using monthly returns as this 
would solve the illiquidity problem and states that for companies listed for more than 3 years, 
there would be sufficient observations available to estimate beta. It is noteworthy here that 
Bakkafrost has been listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange since 2010. 
An alternative option available to practitioners is to use the beta estimates provided by 
companies such as Bloomberg and Value Line. In fact, Bruner et al. (1998) found in their 
survey of “27 highly regarded corporations”, that only 30% of the companies calculated their 
own betas. However, the challenge here again arises that different beta publishers use different 
time horizons and return intervals, because of which, their betas can materially differ.  
 132
For Bakkafrost, the author will use mix of both the above approaches to calculate Beta38. 
Equity Market Risk Premium 
By definition, equity market risk premium is the premium investors require for investing in 
equity markets relative to the risk-free investments. This premium (or spread) is due to the risk 
that equity market carries. 
Finance theory requires that this risk premium be forward-looking. However, since future 
returns are unavailable at the present, practitioners use historical returns (Bruner et al., 1998). 
As per the survey conducted by Bruner et al. (1998), the chief difference in calculation of 
equity market risk premium was between choosing arithmetic vs geometric return and in “… 
choice of realized returns on T-bills versus T-bonds to proxy for the return on riskless assets” 
(Bruner et al., 1998, p. 20). Koller et al., however, argue that using a market risk premium of 
roughly 5% is suitable and state that “… numbers near 8 percent are too high for valuation 
purposes…” (Koller et al., 2015, p. 278). Schill (2017) also cites 5% as “… a reasonable 
estimate of the market risk premium” for non-US centric companies (p. 8). 
Moreover, Damodaran (2021) has calculated Equity Market Premium for Norway and 
Denmark as 4,72%, after accounting for country default risk. The value of 4,72% is close to 
the 5% value suggested above by Koller et al. (2015) and Schill (2017). 
Due to almost consensus of Damodaran (2021), Koller et al. (2015) and Schill (2017), the 
author will use 5% as the equity market risk premium. This is a more practical approach and 
resolves the challenge of choosing between geometric and arithmetic returns, since there 
seems to be no consensus amongst practitioners. 
9.1.2 Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt is the rate at which a company can borrow at a given time. It includes the 
risk-free rate and a premium or spread which is meant to reflect the probability of default. 
There are primarily two methods through which cost of debt can be calculated. Both the 
 
38 In addition to the 2 methods of Beta estimation referred to above, there are other methods available as well, e.g., calculating 
median of unlevered Beta for the comparable firms and then re-levering it as per the capital structure of the company in 
question; another popular approach is to calculate Beta and then multiply it by 2/3 and give 1/3 weight in final Beta calculation 
to “1” – the argument being that, in the long term, industry and company performance will revert to market performance (i.e., 
1). 
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methods essentially find Yield to Maturity (YTM) of the company’s borrowings. It must also 
be noted that YTM, by definition, is the promised return to an investor whereas the cost of 
debt that is required for valuation and/or capital budgeting purposes need to be expected return. 
By using YTM as the cost of debt, one is assuming that the lender will not default and that all 
the promised payments will be made by the borrower (and on time). This is not a perfect 
assumption because corporate debt is not risk-free. However, academics and practitioners 
agree that this is an immaterial problem since companies with investment grade bonds are 
unlikely to default (Luehrman, 2017). 
Both the methods of calculating YTM of the company’s borrowings are discussed below. 
¨ Calculating YTM from Bonds 
Yield to Maturity is essentially the IRR of a bond, i.e., it is the rate of return an investor will 
receive if the investor holds the bond until maturity and receives all cash flows as promised 
(Fernando & Scott, 2020). YTM can be calculated by using the YTM formula and solving for 
YTM (Koller et al, 290). The price of the bond can be taken from financial markets whereas 
the coupon rate will be given on the bond. 
The challenge while calculating YTM stems from the question of which bond to use for the 
calculation of YTM. What should be the maturity of the bond since companies’ issue bonds 
with various maturities? Should the bond be option-free or is it okay if it has embedded 
sweeteners? Should the bond used for calculation be fixed rate or floating rate? 
Koller et al. (2015) state that the bond used should be option-free. Luehrman (2017) argues 
that the bond should be fixed rate since floating rate bonds are “… pegged to a short-term 
benchmark” (p. 21) and short-term benchmarks are likely to be distorted by short-term noise 
in the macro-environment. With regards to the question of which maturity bonds to use, Lipson 
(2019a) warn of falling into the trap of trying to weigh bonds with different maturities 
separately. Rather, it is recommended that long-term bonds be used to calculate YTM. The 
argument for ignoring short-term debt while calculating YTM is the assumption that 
corporations usually roll-over short-term debt (Lipson, 2019b). 
In summary, the cost of debt can be calculated by calculating YTM of a long-term, fixed rate, 
option-free bond of the company. However, if the bond is illiquid then finding spot-market 
price of the bond for the purposes of calculation of YTM would be difficult. 
 134
It must be noted that calculating YTM by simply using the coupon rate or dividing interest 
payments by interest-bearing debt outstanding are both flawed approaches and will give an 
incorrect YTM unless the bond is trading at par (Luehrman, 2017). 
¨ Determining YTM from Bond Ratings 
An alternative method to determine YTM is to use the bond ratings as provided by various 
ratings agencies (Koller et al, 2015, p. 291). This resolves issue of calculating YTM for 
companies with illiquid debt (where market price of debt cannot be observed) and/or 
companies that lack option-free bonds (Luehrman, 2017). 
9.1.3 WACC Calculation 
Once cost of debt, cost of equity, risk-free rate, tax rate and beta have been calculated, the next 
step is to calculate WACC. The formula for WACC is as follows: 
 
 
The weights for debt and equity should be market weights and not book weights (Lipson, 
2019b). However, finding market value of debt is often impractical because not all information 
about any company’s debt is always available/observable publicly. In such cases, use of book 
values is recommended by Koller et al. (2015, p. 296), if interest rates have not changed 
significantly and the company has not “… entered into financial distress” (Koller et al., 2015, 
p. 296). 
9.2 Bakkafrost’s Cost of Capital Estimation 
9.2.1 Cost of Equity Estimation 
Risk-free Rate 
The risk-free rate being used for calculation of Bakkafrost’s WACC is 10-year Norwegian 
Government’s bond. The 10-year tenor is in line with the literature provided earlier in this 
chapter. The reason for choosing Norwegian Government’s bond rather than Danish 
Government’s or the UK’s bond is that out of these 3 countries, Norway remains the largest 
salmon producer and because Bakkafrost is listed on Oslo Stock Exchange. In light of these, 
WACC = (Weight of Equity x Cost of Levered Equity) + [Weight of Debt x Cost of 
Debt x (1-Tax Rate)] 
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it is considered reasonable to use the 10-year risk free Norwegian Government Bonds. The 
risk-free rate, as of 1st April, is: 1,48% (World Govt Bonds, n.d.). 
Beta Estimation 
As mentioned previously, the method of beta estimation amongst practitioners varies. The 
author has chosen to estimate Beta in two different ways and then used an average of the two. 
Firstly, Beta is calculated as a regression against market returns. Secondly, published Beta 
from yahoo finance has been taken. 
¨ Beta Estimation 1: Regression against market returns (Oslo Børs) 
A common practice of Beta estimation is to regress the company’s returns against the market 
portfolio. The challenge in defining the time horizon and selecting the market portfolio for 
Beta estimation have been explained earlier. The author has decided to take Oslo OBX index 
as the market portfolio since Bakkafrost is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The time 
horizon for Beta estimation has been chosen as the 5-years ending April 2021, with interval 
of monthly returns, in line with recommendations of Damodaran. 
It must be noted that there is no need to do the regression. Using “SLOPE” function in excel 
calculates the beta directly. 
The calculated Beta figure is: 0,63. 
¨ Beta Estimation 2: Published figures from Yahoo Finance (S&P 500) 
Secondly, Beta figures from yahoo finance have been taken as given (5 year, monthly, 
regressed against S&P 500). The Beta for Bakkafrost is: 0,34. 
¨ Final Beta 
For the purposes of WACC, the Beta that has been used is the average of the two Beta’s above. 
The final beta value is: 0,49. 
Market Risk Premium 
The author will use 5% as the market risk premium, in line with the recommendations of 
Damodaran (2021), Koller et al. (2015), and Schill (2017), as mentioned previously. 
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CAPM – Calculation of Cost of Equity 
By putting all the above inputs together, the cost of levered equity is calculated using the 
CAPM equation39 below: 
 
The calculated value is: 3,91%, and the calculation is presented in Table 28 below. 
 
Table 28: Bakkafrost’s Cost of Equity Calculation. 
9.2.2 Cost of Debt 
In the sub-section 9.1.2, framework for calculation of cost of debt was introduced and it was 
mentioned that cost of debt is essentially the YTM of a company’s bonds. However, 
calculation of Bakkafrost’s cost of debt is challenging on several grounds.  
1. The company does not have any published bond rating and hence, it is not possible to 
calculate cost of debt using the bond ratings and their relative spreads. 
2. The company has not disclosed any information about its outstanding bonds. As a 
result, calculation of YTM on bonds is not possible. In fact, as per the given 
information, it seems that the company has no bond issued. 
3. The company has not provided its cost of debt in the annual report. 
Considering the above, the cost of debt has been calculated as the interest for the year divided 
by net debt of year t-1. This is not the preferred approach, however, given the limitations, it is 
 
39 Detailed CAPM equation has been provided earlier and has not been recreated here to ensure brevity. 
Rf (Norwegian Govt. 10 Yr Bond) 1,48%
Beta 0,49
Market Risk Premium 5%
2%
Ke 3,91%
Cost of Equity Calculation
Ke = Rf + ß x (Market Risk Premium) 
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the only feasible approach. The cost of debt is: 3,6%; after adjusting for interest tax shield, the 
cost of debt lowers to: 2,9%; the calculation is shown in Table 29 below. 
 
Table 29: Bakkafrost’s Cost of Debt Calculation. 
9.2.3 Target Capital Structure 
It is presumed that the capital structure will remain constant. This is because, historically, 
Bakkafrost’s capital structure has shown little fluctuation, as can be seen in Figure 11 below. 
The historic book value of debt to total debt and equity has remained within 30% to 35% range. 
The presumption of constant debt to equity ratio, consequently, means that the WACC need 
not be re-adjusted each year for calculation of present value. 
 
Figure 11: Plot of Bakkafrost’s historic Debt to Total Debt & Equity; Data Source: Annual Reports. 
Total Interest Paid (t=2020) 36 317
Interest Bearing Liabilities (t-1) 2 328 231
Less: Excess Cash (t-1) 1 134 335
Net Interest Bearing Debt 1 193 896
Kd 3,0%
Tax Rate (Marginal) 19,00%
Kd (including interest tax shield) 2,5%
Cost of Debt
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9.2.4 WACC Calculation 
WACC is calculated as weighted average of equity and debt cost of capital; the values are 
meant to be market values. However, the author has used market value of equity and book 
value of debt because market value of debt is not clearly observable because Bakkafrost 
primarily has bank issued debt. Koller et al. (2015) approve of this methodology, as mentioned 
previously. The calculation of debt-to-equity ratio is shown in Table 30 below, followed by 
calculation of WACC in Table 31. For debt calculation, excess cash has been deducted from 
the debt to reach the value of net debt. Debt value has been converted to NOK from DKK 
because share price (and consequently, market capitalization) is in NOKs. 
 
Table 30: Bakkafrost’s Debt to Equity Ratio. 
 
Table 31: Bakkafrost’s WACC Calculation 
The estimated WACC is 5,39%. 
Equity
Share Price (Yahoo Finance, 16 May) in NOK 685
Common Shares Outstanding (in 1000s) 59 044
Total Market Capitalization (in 1000s NOK) NOK 40 445 189
Debt (2020); all values in 1000s DKK
Interest Bearing Debt 2 219 690
Post-retirement obligation 0
Provisions 0
Long-term Lease Liabilties IFRS 16 262 235
Derivatives 1 480
Short-term Lease Liabilities IFRS 16 107 808
Total Non-Current Debt 2 591 213
Less: Excess cash 295 404
Total Debt (Book Value) in 1000s DKK DKK 5 477 830
DKK to NOK (Spot rate, 18 May) 1,35
Total Debt (Book Value) in 1000s NOK NOK 7 395 071
Debt/(Debt+Equity) Ratio 15%
Bakkafrost (Debt to Debt+Equity Ratio)
Ke 3,91%
Weight of Equity 84,54%
Weighted Cost of Equity 3,31%
Kd (inclusive of Interest Tax Shield) 2,46%
Weight of Debt 15,46%




To ensure that this WACC is not too low or too high, this WACC has been compared with the 
competitor’s post-tax WACC’s (as disclosed by companies themselves under IAS 36). The 
disclosed WACC of comparable companies in attached in appendix 2. Since the calculated 
post-tax WACC of Bakkafrost does not differ very significantly with disclosed post-tax of 
other companies, the author believes that the calculated WACC figure is okay to be used for 
valuation. 
9.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the methodology for calculating a corporation’s WACC. Different 
methods for calculating different components of WACC were discussed in detail. It was 
observed that the primary challenge in calculation of Bakkafrost’s WACC was in calculating 
its cost of debt, since the company seems to have no public debt outstanding and has no debt 
rating issued. The author calculated cost of debt as a percentage of interest-bearing liabilities 
outstanding at t-1 and used book value of debt for estimating debt to equity ratio. The calculated 
post-tax WACC is 5,39%. Given the positive outlook determined by the strategic analysis, 
coupled with Bakkafrost’s historical success, the author does deem the calculated WACC of 
5,39% as appropriate and has decided to use it for valuation. 
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10. Fundamental Valuation 
In the preceding chapters, Bakkafrost’s financial statements were forecasted, followed by 
calculation of WACC. In this chapter, Bakkafrost’s fundamental valuation would be carried 
out using FCFF based DCF methodology.  
10.1 Terminal Value Calculation 
Bakkafrost’s FCFF was forecasted in chapter 8, in line with the FCFF framework. Since the 
FCFF has been calculated only for the years 2021-2030, beyond 2030 a terminal growth rate 
of 2% is assumed (i.e., the economy’s expected growth rate) to calculate the continuing 
(terminal) value. To calculate the terminal value in 2030, 2030’s FCFF is grown by the 
terminal growth rate; this leads to FCFF value for the year ended 2031. The FCFF value for 
2031 is then discounted for 1 period using the WACC, which results in the terminal value in 
2030; the calculation is shown in Table 32 below. It is important to state that the terminal value 
is in 2030’s DKK and still needs to be discounted further to find out its value on 18th May 
2021.  
 
Table 32: Calculation of Terminal (Continuing) Value of Bakkafrost’s FCFF. 
  
Terminal Value
Long-Term Growth Rate 2%
FCFF in 2030 2026284
FCFF in 2031 2066810
WACC 5,39%
Terminal Value in 2030 DKK 60 967 836
All figures in 1000s DKK
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10.2 Valuation 
Table 33 below shows the conversion of FCFF into present value. The discount factor is 
calculated by adjusting WACC for the period. 
 
Table 33: Calculation of Bakkafrost Present Value (of Operations); All values in 1000s DKK except Discount 
Factor & Period. 
Once the present value of operations has been calculated, all non-operating assets (as of 31st 
December 2020) are added to this present value and all liabilities (as of 31st December 2020) 
are deducted, leading to the enterprise value. The enterprise value is then divided by the shares 
outstanding, leading to per share value of DKK 740 as of 31st December 2020, as shown in 
Table 34 below. Since this thesis aims to find share price as of 18th May, an upward adjustment 
is made accordingly for 4,5 months. The resulting share price is as of 18th May; however, this 
share price is in DKK. Since Bakkafrost’s stock trades in NOK on Oslo Børs, using the spot 
exchange rate as of 18th May, share price is converted from DKK to NOK, leading to a per 
share price of NOK 1019. 
  
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
FCFF 1 240 224 1 487 854 1 179 145 1 154 235 1 306 575 1 783 185 1 817 017 1 856 358 1 962 588 2 026 284
Add: Terminal Value 60 967 836
Total FCFF 1 240 224 1 487 854 1 179 145 1 154 235 1 306 575 1 783 185 1 817 017 1 856 358 1 962 588 62 994 120
WACC 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39% 5,39%
Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Discount Factor 1 0,95 0,90 0,85 0,81 0,77 0,73 0,69 0,66 0,62 0,59
Present Value 47 732 570  1 176 795 1 339 558 1 007 324 935 613 1 004 934 1 301 368 1 258 239 1 219 738 1 223 586 37 265 415
All values in 1000s DKK except Discount Factor & Period
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The entire calculation of EV and price per share is shown in Table 34 below. 
 
Table 34: Calculation of Enterprise Value and Price Per Share of Bakkafrost. 
10.3 Sensitivity Analysis with WACC 
The share price estimated above is based on several assumptions, including future salmon 
prices, capacity enhancement, and WACC. However, given that the future demand growth is 
expected to be twice the future supply growth, it is reasonable to presume that Bakkafrost will 
be able to sell all its output; due to the demand growth higher than supply growth, it is also 
reasonable to presume that the price per kg of salmon will increase at least by inflation, as has 
been presumed for forecasting. In other words, these are conservative assumptions and are 
grounded in economic realities and hence, unlikely to overvalue the company. 
Apart from salmon prices, capacity enhancements and future demand predictions, WACC was 
another major input in the valuation model. WACC was calculated using the book value of 
debt and market value of equity, because the market value of debt was unavailable. Even 
Total Present Value of Operations (in 1000s) DKK 47 732 570
Add: Non-Operating Assets
Non-Operating Current Assets (including Excess Cash) DKK 295 404
Non-Current Financial Assets; Non-operating DKK 157 494
Total Non-Operating Assets (in 1000s) DKK 452 898
Less: Liabilities
Total Non-Current Liabilities DKK 3 708 627
Total Current Liabilities DKK 770 210
Total Non-Operating Liabilities (in 1000s) DKK 4 478 837
Enterprise Value (in 1000s) DKK 43 706 631
Shares Outstanding 59 044 071
Price Per Share (Approximate as at 31 Dec, 2020) DKK 740,24
Price Per Share (18th May) DKK 754,95
DKK to NOK (Spot Rate; 18 May) 1,35
Price Per Share NOK 1 019,19
Calculation of Per Share Price
 143 
though this approach is in line with recommendations of Koller et al. (2015) when public value 
of debt is unavailable, this is not the optimal method of calculating WACC. Moreover, the 
calculation of cost of debt was done by dividing interest paid in time t by net interest bearing 
debt in time t-1. This is not the optimal approach to calculate the cost of debt; however, this 
was done because Bakkafrost seems to have no public debt outstanding. In a nutshell, 
significant assumptions were made to calculate WACC of Bakkafrost (the estimated WACC 
was 5,39%). Therefore, the author considers it important to calculate share price using a range 
of WACCs. Figure 12 below shows that for a 1% increase in WACC, the share price falls by 
26% (and reaches NOK 758 from NOK 1019 estimated at original WACC), and for a 1% 
decrease in WACC, the intrinsic value per share rises by 47% (and reaches NOK 1500 from 
NOK 1019 estimated at original WACC). 
 
Figure 12: Percentage Change in Intrinsic Value/Share for 1% Change in WACC. 
What is interesting to note here is that for an increase in WACC of 1% (that is, WACC 6,39%), 
the share price is NOK 758 and hence, even a WACC as high as 6,39% would lead to intrinsic 
share price that is at least 10% higher than the current market value of NOK 685. In other 
words, a WACC that is 1% higher than the WACC used for valuation purposes would still 
lead to a “BUY” recommendation with a 10% confidence interval vis-à-vis Bakkafrost’s 
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10.4 Chapter Summary 
In chapters 8 and 9, FCFF and WACC were calculated, respectively. This chapter has brought 
together the estimated FCFF and estimated WACC and used the FCFF-based DCF approach 
to first calculate Enterprise Value of Bakkafrost, followed by calculation of price per share. 
The resulting figure is NOK 1019. Given that NOK 1019 is significantly higher than the share 
price of NOK 685 (as of 17th May)40, based on fundamental valuation alone, the author 
recommends a “BUY” position. 
Sensitivity analysis on WACC was carried out in the later part of the chapter and it was seen 
that even if the WACC increases by 1%, the recommendation would still remain “BUY” with 
a 10% confidence interval. Hence, even with 1% increase in WACC, the author would 
recommend a “BUY” position vis-à-vis the share price on 17th May (based on fundamental 
analysis alone). 
In the following chapter, Bakkafrost’s value is calculated using market multiples approach. 
 
40 The share price had already risen to over NOK 744 by 23rd May. 
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11. Multiples Valuation 
In this chapter, methodology for multiples-based valuation approaches is introduced, followed 
by discussion of popular multiples. Ultimately, Bakkafrost’s multiples-based value is 
calculated using P/E and EV/Operational EBIT multiples. 
11.1 Framework 
Multiples based approaches value a company in relation to the value of similar companies 
with the help of relevant and common metrics (Koller et al., 2015). The underlying principle 
in multiples-based approaches is that the market will value assets with similar risk/return 
profiles in a similar manner (Hitchner, 2017). A corollary to this is that markets are presumed 
to be efficient (Vergara-Alter & Gil, 2016). However, it must be noted that multiples-based 
approaches do not attempt to value an asset’s intrinsic value, rather it “… is much more likely 
to reflect the current mood of the market” (Damodaran, 2012, p. 453). Multiples based 
approaches are relatively easy to implement and interpret, however, as per Professor Vergara-
Alter and their researcher Gil, the simplicity offered by the multiples approach comes at the 
expense of accuracy (Vergara-Alter & Gil, 2016). Schill (2017) warns that “multiples can be 
deceptively simple” (p. 12) and could be distorted by market sentiment and accounting 
policies. Schill (2017) recommends using multiples to “triangulate” the valuation, and not to 
avoid the lengthy process of fundamental valuation. 
In a nutshell, one must exercise caution while employing multiples. This approach should be 
conducted to compliment intrinsic valuation, and not as a substitute. 
11.1.1 Methodology  
Like any other model, implementation of multiples-based approaches consists of several steps. 
They are summarized below (identified by author from Koller et al., 2015; Damodaran, 2012; 
Vergara-Alter & Gil, 2016): 
1. Identifying the comparable companies – This step is pivotal for successful 
implementation of multiples-based approach. The companies need not only be 
consistent in terms of their operations and risk profiles but comparability in terms of 
their capital structure, accounting methods and geographic presence need to be 
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accounted for as well (this list is by no means exhaustive). Damodaran warns that a 
key challenge here is in “… how narrowly you define a comparable firm” (Damodaran, 
2012, p. 462), and he advises that “if you can find ways of controlling for differences 
across companies… you will get more reliable estimates…” (Damodaran, 2012, pp. 
462-463). Moreover, to be able to identify comparable companies correctly, it is crucial 
to be able to comprehensively understand the company being valued. 
 
2. Choosing Relevant Multiples – Historically, investors have relied on some well-
known multiples, such as the P/E ratio and hence, it is natural for analysts to follow 
these multiples as well when conducting a valuation. However, such a simplistic view 
of using “popular” multiples can be erroneous, warns Koller et al. (2015). Multiples 
need to be chosen with care and, if necessary, should be tailored to the company and 
sector in question. 
 
3. Application of Multiples – Once the comparable companies have been identified and 
relevant multiples chosen, the next step is to apply the multiple. It must be noted here, 
however, that the value of the parameter could be historical or forecasted, depending 
on what the multiple is being used for. Having said that, it is necessary to understand 
that historic parameters are useful for valuation of a company to the extent that past 
trends can be expected to continue in the future – which might not always be the case. 
Therefore, for valuation, it is recommended to use forward-looking rather than historic 
parameters. However, any forward-looking parameters will themselves be based on 
assumptions, which is a limiting factor. 
 
11.1.2 Popular Multiples 
¨ EV/EBIT(DA): Recommended 
Koller et al. (2015) recommend using EV/EBITA or Net EV/NOPLAT multiple for the 
purposes of valuation. Vergara-Alert and Gil (2016) state that common multiples include P/E 
ratio, EV/EBITDA, and EV/Sales. One of the major reasons why this multiple is 
recommended is because it is not impacted by the capital structure and tax rates of the 
companies.  
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Given the consensus in favour of EV/EBIT(DA) multiple, the author has decided to use it for 
the purposes of multiples valuation; nonetheless, the author has made slight change and used 
EV/Operational EBIT as this would, in the authors opinion, better corelate with the operational 
performance since the non-cash expenses, particularly depreciation, is significant for salmon 
farming industry since it is capital intensive. 
¨ P/E: Very popular, yet not recommended 
P/E ratio is perhaps the most common and widely used multiple. It essentially measures the 
price as a multiple of the company’s earnings, e.g., a P/E ratio of 10 would mean that an 
investor is willing to pay 10x the (current level of) earnings to acquire one share. Generally, a 




Of the inputs that go into calculation of P/E ratio, the numerator, i.e., price per share (or market 
capitalization) is easily observable in the market for liquid firms. The problem in the P/E ratio-
based valuation is in the denominator, i.e., calculation of earnings and earnings per share 
(Damodaran, 2012). Damodaran (2012) states that P/E ratios can “… be computed using 
current earnings per share, trailing earnings per share, forward earnings per share, fully diluted 
earnings per share, and primary earnings per share” (p. 468). The lack of consistency in 
calculation of earnings per share will lead to P/E ratios which cannot be compared across 
companies with reasonable precision. However, this can be overcome if one defines what they 
mean by earnings and then consistently apply it across the companies. 
Moreover, Koller et al. (2015) discourage using P/E ratio because “... it is distorted by capital 
structure and nonoperating gains and losses” (Koller et al., 2015, p. 332). Interestingly, 
however, Alford (1992) finds that adjusting “P/E multiples for differences in leverage across 
comparable firms decreases accuracy…” of P/E valuation (Alford, 1992, p. 96). Beaver and 
Morse (1978) cite research of Beaver and Dukes as an example to show that the differences in 
how depreciation is accounted for can lead to differences in P/E ratios; thus, pointing that 
accounting treatment can impact P/E ratios (the research by Beaver and Dukes was limited to 
treatment of depreciation only). However, Young and Zeng (2015) refer to Foster and state 
P/E Ratio = Price Per Share / Earnings Per Share 
 
P/E Ratio = Market Capitalization / Total Shares Issued & Outstanding 
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that within the same industry, it is common for companies to use similar accounting treatments 
and methods (Foster as cited in Young & Zeng, 2015), which mitigates the chances of 
distortions due to accounting estimates and treatments.  
Given Foster’s and Alford’s research referred to above, coupled with the practitioners’ 
overwhelming use of the P/E ratio, the author consider it appropriate to use it for valuation. 
11.2 Multiples Valuation for Bakkafrost 
11.2.1 Identification of Comparable Companies 
Correct identification of comparable companies is key for a reliable multiples-based valuation. 
Comparability can be on several dimensions, e.g., industry, sector, risk, etc. The author has 
decided to call this type of comparability “economic comparability”, in line with work of 
Young and Zeng (2015). The higher the economic comparability between the companies, the 
better multiples-based valuation techniques tend to work (Young & Zeng, 2015).  
Another relevant factor for deciding on comparable companies could be the accounting 
treatment/methods used by the companies. However, as mentioned previously, Alford (1992) 
refers to Foster and states that “…firms in the same industry often use similar accounting 
methods” (p. 95). 
Considering the above, the author has decided to choose comparable companies only from 
within the salmon farming industry, as they not only have economic comparability but will 
also likely meet accounting comparability. Moreover, due to convergence of accounting 
methods (post-2005), the accounting aspects are presumed to have been further ironed out, in 
line with the findings of Young and Zeng (2015). The selected companies are all listed on the 
Oslo Børs41; they are: 
i. Mowi Group 
ii. Greig Seafood Group 
 
41 These are the same companies that are under coverage of Handelsbanken (as per their 2018 report). 
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iii. Lerøy Seafood Group  
iv. SalMar Group 
v. Norwegian Royal Salmon  
11.2.2  Historical vs Forward Multiples 
Koller et al. (2015) and Vergara-Alter & Gil (2016) recommend using forward estimates rather 
than historical values for calculation of multiples. Vergara-Alter & Gil (2016) state that 
forward-looking multiples have been empirically found to be “… more accurate predictors 
than historical multiples” (p. 5), and Koller et al. (2015) concurs. However, forward-looking 
multiples need to be based on “… reliable forecasts…” (Vergara-Alter & Gil, 2016, p. 5), and 
in case of unavailability of such forecasts, one “… must rely on historical data” (Vergara-Alter 
& Gil, 2016, p. 5). 
The author is constrained by unavailability of Bloomberg Terminal and hence, does not have 
access to analysts’ reports. Therefore, independent future forecasts are not available, and the 
author is forced to rely on historical values for the purposes of multiples valuation. The author 
also does not consider it appropriate to use self-created forecasts for multiples valuation 
because those forecasts would be backed by the same assumptions as the DCF valuation (in 
previous chapters) and any incorrect assumption in the DCF valuation would be reflected in 
multiples valuation. 
11.2.3 Selection of Multiples for Bakkafrost 
Based on the discussion above, the multiples the author has decided to use are P/E and 
EV/Operating EBIT multiples.  
i. P/E Ratio 
ii. EV/Operating EBIT 
Why not use EV/kg of Salmon multiple? 
A popular multiple within the salmon farming industry is EV/kg of salmon. However, the 
author believes that it is inappropriate to use EV/kg because the salmon industry of today is 
significantly different from the salmon industry of the past. The industry today is vertically 
integrated, and the value is generated not only by harvesting (or farming) fresh salmon, but 
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also through sale of other salmon-related products. For instance, Bakkafrost does not only sell 
fresh fish but also sell value-added products (packaged/processed fish) and fish feed. 
Moreover, the level of integration varies across companies, which would lead to comparability 
issues if EV/kg of salmon is used. Therefore, using EV/kg multiple for the valuation of the 
entire Bakkafrost group is deemed inappropriate by the author. 
Nonetheless, EV/kg can be used if it is applied independently on different segments and then 
added together. This requires, however, that EV for each segment (of each comparable) be 
readily available, which is impractical in case of Bakkafrost. 
In light of the above, the author has decided not to use EV/kg metric. 
11.2.4 Application of Multiples 
To ensure comparability across companies, the author has calculated Operational EBIT 
himself using relevant annual reports for the year ended 2020. The EPS figures used to 
calculate P/E ratio is also for the year ended 2020. This ensures consistency across companies 
because, as of the writing of this thesis, not all companies had disclosed their earnings for Q1 
of 2021. Hence, using quarterly earnings would have impacted the comparability across 
companies. 
Share price estimation based on EV/EBIT and P/E multiples are done below. 
¨ EV/Operational EBIT 
In Table 35 below, the author has calculated enterprise value and operating EBIT of 
comparable companies and Bakkafrost; it can be seen that there is immense variation within 
the salmon farming companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Mowi, world’s largest 
salmon farming company, has market capitalization of well over NOK 109 billion whereas 
Grieg Seafood and Norway Royal Salmon has capitalization of a little under NOK 10 billion 
each. Bakkafrost has market capitalization of over NOK 40 billion. 
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In general, the EV/EBIT42 can be interpreted as the payback period of acquiring a company43, 
if the earnings remain at the current level. A high EV/EBIT, therefore, signifies that the 
investors expect the earnings to grow considerably. The range of EV/EBIT is from 12 to 46 in 
the salmon farming companies under consideration; with Bakkafrost having EV/EBIT of 46. 
 
Table 35: Calculation of EV/EBIT Multiple for comparable companies & industry average; Currency spot rates 
as of 16th May (from Morningstar, via Google). 
  
 
42 The EBIT has been calculated by the author. It consists only of operational items and hence, is comparable across 
companies. 
43 This is because EV can be interpreted as amount of money one has to pay to acquire a company. 
Enterprise Value/EBIT
Mowi ASA Lerøy Grieg Seafood SalMar Norway Royal Salmon Bakkafrost 
Enterprise Value Calculation
Shares Issued (incl. Non Controlling Interest) 517 111 091 595 774 000 113 447 042 113 531 370 43 730 307 59 143 000
Treasury Shares 0 298 000 1 171 494 232 071 653 398 98 929
Shares Outstanding, net of Treasury Shares 517 111 091 595 476 000 112 275 548 113 299 299 43 076 909 59 044 071
Share Price in NOK (as of 16th May) NOK 211 NOK 75 NOK 73 NOK 576 NOK 199 NOK 685
Market Capitalization (in 1000s NOK) NOK 109 162 151 NOK 44 398 691 NOK 8 212 956 NOK 65 283 056 NOK 8 572 305 NOK 40 456 997
All following figures in 1000s except exchange rate and ratios
Total Long-Term Debt 2 362 400 8 250 870 4 817 271 6 274 864 567 786 3 708 627
Total Short-Term Debt 719 400 4 279 460 968 509 4 736 427 4 664 479 770 210
Total Debt 3 081 800 12 530 330 5 785 780 11 011 291 5 232 265 4 478 837
Less:  Total Cash 107 200 2 966 407 275 427 223 447 38 753 466 939
Net Debt EUR 2 974 600 NOK 9 563 923 NOK 5 510 353 NOK 10 787 844 NOK 5 193 512 DKK 4 011 898
EUR to NOK & DKK to NOK (Spot rate) 9,99 1,35
Net Debt (NOK) NOK 29 716 254 NOK 9 563 923 NOK 5 510 353 NOK 10 787 844 NOK 5 193 512 NOK 5 416 062
Enterprise Value (NOK) NOK 79 445 897 NOK 34 834 768 NOK 2 702 603 NOK 54 495 212 NOK 3 378 793 NOK 35 040 935
EBIT Calculation
Operational EBIT (in 1000s) EUR 325 400 NOK 1 949 655 NOK 233 057 NOK 3 007 500 NOK 246 252 DKK 567 574
EUR to NOK & DKK to NOK 9,99 1,35
Operational EBIT (in 1000s) NOK 3 250 746 NOK 1 949 655 NOK 233 057 NOK 3 007 500 NOK 246 252 NOK 766 225
EV/Operational EBIT 24 18 12 18 14 46
Average EV/EBIT (excl. Bakkafrost) 17,15
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Share price calculation of Bakkafrost using EV/EBIT Multiple is illustrated in Table 36 below.  
 
Table 36: Estimation of Bakkafrost’s Share Price using EV/EBIT Multiple 
Based on the EV/EBIT multiple, a single share of Bakkafrost should have an approximate 
value of NOK 315. The current share price is NOK 685. Given that the difference between the 
current share price and estimated share price is significant, based on EV/EBIT ratio alone, it 
would seem that the market is overvaluing Bakkafrost by more than 50%! 
 
¨ P/E Ratio 
In Table 37 below, P/E ratios have been calculated for Bakkafrost and peer group companies. 
The P/E ratios and EPS do tend to fluctuate significantly from company to company, however, 
the P/E ratios of all the companies, except for Grieg Seafood Group, are significantly high. 
Mowi has a P/E ratio of 92 whereas Bakkafrost has a P/E ratio of 82. As a rule of thumb, the 
higher the growth perspectives of a company, the higher P/E ratio it has. Based on the P/E 
ratios, it can be said that most of the salmon companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange are 
regarded by investors as “growth stock”. Greig Seafood’s negative P/E ratio signifies that the 
company has been losing money in the last year, nonetheless, with a share price that is only 
NOK 1 less from Lerøy’s share price, it can be inferred that Greig’s negative earnings in 2020 
was most likely a one-off event. This can be investigated further, however, the author has not 
done so since Greig falls outside the immediate scope of this thesis. 
Shares Issued &  Outstanding 59 044 071
Share Price - Bakkafrost NOK 685,20
Market Capitalization (1000s) NOK 40 456 997
Net Debt (1000s NOK), converted from DKK NOK 5 416 062
EV (1000s) NOK 35 040 935
Operational EBIT (1000s) NOK 766 225
EV/Op EBIT (NOK) 45,73
Average EV/EBIT (excl. Bakkafrost) 17,15
Share Price - as calculated by EV/EBIT NOK 314,27
Estimated Share Price by EV/EBIT
 153 
 
Table 37: Calculation of P/E Ratio for the comparable companies & industry average; Currency spot rates as of 
16th May (from Morningstar via Google). 
Calculation of Bakkafrost’s share price using the P/E ratio is illustrated in Table 38 below. 
The share price has been calculated twice, once including and once excluding the impact of 
Grieg Seafood’s negative P/E ratio. However, the author has decided to use the share price 
excluding Grieg Seafood’s P/E ratio for calculation of Bakkafrost’s share price because it is, 
in all likelihood, a one-off event and including it would only bring downward biasedness in 
Bakkafrost’s estimate share price. 
 
Table 38: Estimation of Bakkafrost’s Share Price using P/E Ratio. 
Based on the share price calculated using P/E ratio (calculated excluding Bakkafrost and Grieg 
Seafood), the market is overvaluing the company by almost 14%, the current market price is 
NOK 685, whereas the price estimated by P/E ratio is NOK 602. 
11.3 Conclusion from Multiples Approach 
From the two multiples, the EV/EBIT has led to an estimated value of Bakkafrost that is 
significantly lower than the current market value, whereas the P/E ratio leads to a value that is 
12% lower than the current market value. The final value from the multiples approach is NOK 
P/E Ratios
Mowi ASA Lerøy Grieg Seafood SalMar Norway Royal Salmon Bakkafrost 
Diluted EPS (Company Reported) EUR 0,23 NOK 1,33 -NOK 4,80 NOK 17,49 NOK 1,86 DKK 6,20
EUR to NOK & DKK to NOK 9,99 - - - - 1,35
EPS in NOK NOK 2,30 NOK 1,33 -NOK 4,80 NOK 17,49 NOK 1,86 NOK 8,37
Share Price in NOK (as of 16th May) 211,1 74,56 73,15 576,2 199 685,2
P/E Ratio 92 56 -15 33 107 82
Average P/E Ratio (excl. Bakkafrost) 55
Average P/E Ratio (excl. Bakkafrost & Grieg) 72
Average P/E Ratio (excl. Bakkafrost) 54,53
Bakkafrost's EPS NOK 8,37
Share Price NOK 456,38
Average P/E Ratio (excl. Bakkafrost & Grieg) 71,97
Bakkafrost's EPS NOK 8,37
Share Price NOK 602,36
Estimated Share Price by P/E Ratio
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458, with equal weight given to both the ratios. Nonetheless, as mentioned previously, it must 
be kept in mind that multiples do not provide intrinsic value of a company.  
Based solely on the multiples approach, the author would recommend a “SELL” position (with 
50% weight to each of the two multiples). 
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12. Chapter: Conclusion 
This thesis was sub-divided into several parts, and each part analysed Bakkafrost from a 
different perspective, with the aim of answering the following research question: 
“Is Bakkafrost an attractive investment for equity investors as of 18th May 2021?” 
Based on the strategic analysis, it was seen that in the foreseeable future, the demand for 
salmon outstrips the supply. The industry faces threats and challenges of salmon lice and 
extreme weather events. However, the industry is well-suited to the global trends of 
sustainability, health, and aging (and growing) population. Within the industry, Bakkafrost is 
well-situated to capitalize on these trends because not only does it have demonstrated 
expertise, but also because its affiliation with the Faroe Islands allows it to avoid diplomatic 
downside that being based in the EU (or Norway) brings. Furthermore, salmon farming does 
not have significant political and social opposition in Norway and the Faroe Islands, however, 
in Scotland there seems to be rising criticism of the industry, primarily with the goal to make 
the industry more sustainable like it is in Norway and the Faroe Islands. Moreover, salmon 
farming licenses are limited, because of which, the barriers to entry in the industry are high, 
further strengthening the position of incumbents. Therefore, based on the strategic analysis, it 
was concluded that Bakkafrost is a good financial statement. 
Strategic analysis was followed by analysis of Bakkafrost’s financial health, and no major 
problem was identified with the company’s financial health and capital structure. Rather, it 
was seen that Bakkafrost’s liquidity, solvency and ROIC positions were better than the 
industry averages. It was also seen that the industry is moderately leveraged vis-à-vis the 
general economy and highly leverage vis-à-vis the “agricultural production livestock and 
animal specialties” sector, the reason for the latter being that salmon farming is more 
industrialised than other livestock farming, and hence, has high CAPEX & OPEX 
requirements. 
Strategic and financial analyses were followed by fundamental valuation and multiples-based 
valuation. Fundamental valuation was driven primarily by the insights gathered in the strategic 
analysis, and as per FCFF based DCF method, the share price was estimated at NOK 1019. 
With a 10% confidence interval, the author recommends a “BUY” position on Bakkafrost 
based on fundamental valuation alone. To check for sensitivity, the share price was calculated 
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again by increasing WACC by 100 basis points, and even after the WACC’s increase, the 
estimated share price was still more than 10% higher than the share price observed in the 
market as of 17th May. The multiples-based approach, however, painted a relatively more 
pessimistic picture, with P/E ratio valuing the company at NOK 602 and EV/EBIT multiple 
valuing the company at NOK 314. 
The final estimated share value is NOK 850 as of 18th May 2021, with 70% weight to 
fundamental valuation and 15% to each of the multiples. The share price in the market as of 
17th May was NOK 685. Hence, the estimated share price offers an upside of over 24%. It 
already seems that the market has started correcting itself as the share price rose from NOK 
685 on 17th May to NOK 744 by 23rd May; the share price as of 23rd May still offers more than 
14% upside. 
Based on the entirety of analysis, the author concludes that Bakkafrost is a good equity 
investment as of 18th May 2021 and recommends a “BUY” position. 
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Appendix 1: Invested Capital Forecast of Bakkafrost 
 
Table 39: Calculation of Bakkafrost’s forecasted invested capital 
Invested Capital Calculation
All figures in 1000s DKK 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Operating Current Assets
Total Inventory 2 924 007 3 059 522 3 294 891 3 619 499 3 975 650 4 122 224 4 284 035 4 462 020 4 637 018 4 822 525
Accounts Receivables 555 646 581 398 626 124 687 809 755 488 783 341 814 090 847 912 881 167 916 419
Tax Receivables 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143 72 143
Total Other Receivables 31 323 32 775 35 296 38 774 42 589 44 159 45 892 47 799 49 674 51 661
Cash & Cash Equivalent 187 119 195 791 210 854 231 626 254 418 263 798 274 153 285 543 296 742 308 613
Operating Current Assets 3 770 239 3 941 629 4 239 309 4 649 851 5 100 288 5 285 665 5 490 313 5 715 417 5 936 743 6 171 361
Operating Current Liabilities
Short-term interest bearing debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade Payables 555 280 560 932 605 629 667 274 734 908 762 743 793 472 827 272 860 504 895 733
Current Tax Liabilities 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422 37 422
Short-term Debt Liabilities (Leasing) 132 112 138 235 148 869 163 535 179 627 186 249 193 560 201 602 209 508 217 890
Other Current Liabilities 31 856 32 181 34 745 38 281 42 161 43 758 45 521 47 460 49 367 51 388
Operating Current Liabilities 756 670 768 769 826 665 906 512 994 118 1 030 173 1 069 975 1 113 756 1 156 802 1 202 433
Working capital 3 013 568 3 172 860 3 412 644 3 743 339 4 106 169 4 255 493 4 420 338 4 601 661 4 779 942 4 968 928
Non-Current Assets
Land buildings & other real estate 1 608 175 1 682 707 1 812 158 1 990 689 2 186 568 2 267 182 2 356 177 2 454 067 2 550 314 2 652 341
Plant machinery & other operating equipment 1 703 233 1 611 762 1 735 754 1 906 758 2 094 379 2 171 595 2 256 837 2 350 600 2 442 789 2 540 515
Other operating equipment 242 147 226 861 244 313 268 383 294 791 305 659 317 658 330 855 343 831 357 586
Vessels 474 403 496 390 534 577 587 243 645 026 668 807 695 060 723 937 752 329 782 427
Prepayments for purchase of PPE 387 946 396 148 426 624 468 654 514 769 533 748 554 699 577 744 600 403 624 423
Leased Assets 379 380 396 963 427 501 469 618 515 828 534 845 555 839 578 932 601 638 625 707
Total Tangible Assets 4 795 285 4 810 831 5 180 928 5 691 345 6 251 361 6 481 836 6 736 270 7 016 135 7 291 305 7 582 999
Intangible Assets
Licenses 3 794 561 3 870 452 3 947 861 3 995 236 4 000 409 4 147 896 4 310 714 4 489 807 4 665 896 4 852 558
Total Operational Non-Current Assets 8 589 846 8 681 284 9 128 790 9 686 581 10 251 770 10 629 732 11 046 984 11 505 943 11 957 200 12 435 557
Goodwill 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837 664 837
Brands 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400 108 400
Totall Goodwill & Brands 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237 773 237
Total Non-Current Assets (Except Financial Assets) 9 363 083 9 454 521 9 902 027 10 459 818 11 025 007 11 402 969 11 820 221 12 279 180 12 730 437 13 208 794
Working capital 3 013 568 3 172 860 3 412 644 3 743 339 4 106 169 4 255 493 4 420 338 4 601 661 4 779 942 4 968 928
Invested Capital (with Intangibles) 12 376 652 12 627 381 13 314 670 14 203 157 15 131 176 15 658 461 16 240 559 16 880 841 17 510 379 18 177 722
Invested Capital (without Goodwill & Brands) 11 603 415 11 854 144 12 541 433 13 429 920 14 357 939 14 885 224 15 467 322 16 107 604 16 737 142 17 404 485
Non-Operating Current Assets
Excess Cash 270 274 113 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Other Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Operating Current Assets 270 274 113 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Current Financial Assets
Investments in Associates 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141 67 141
Investments in stocks & shares 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318 55 318
Long-term Receivables 9 701 10 151 10 932 12 008 13 190 13 676 14 213 14 804 15 384 16 000
Deffered Tax Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Current Financial Assets 132 160 132 610 133 391 134 467 135 649 136 135 136 672 137 263 137 843 138 459
Total Funds Invested 12 779 086 12 873 655 13 448 061 14 337 624 15 266 825 15 794 596 16 377 231 17 018 103 17 648 222 18 316 181
Liabilities & Equity
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Non-Op Current Liabilities
Financial Derivatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Provisions for onerous contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Current Liabilities
Deferred Taxes 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222 1 222 222
Long-term interest-bearing debt 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690 2 219 690
Long-term leasing debt 108 488 113 516 122 249 134 292 147 507 152 945 158 948 165 552 172 045 178 928
Additional Debt Taken 0 38 835 564 489 1 394 529 2 262 997 2 774 219 3 330 736 3 942 759 4 545 665 5 183 968
Derivatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Non-Current Liabilities 3 550 400 3 594 263 4 128 650 4 970 733 5 852 416 6 369 076 6 931 596 7 550 223 8 159 622 8 804 808
Total Liabilities 3 550 400 3 594 263 4 128 650 4 970 733 5 852 416 6 369 076 6 931 596 7 550 223 8 159 622 8 804 808
Equity 9 228 686 9 279 392 9 319 411 9 366 891 9 414 410 9 425 521 9 445 636 9 467 881 9 488 600 9 511 373




Appendix 2: Company Reported WACCs 
 
Table 40: Presentation of company reported WACCs of Bakkafrost and comparable companies. “-” means that 
the rate was unavailable. 
Pre-tax WACC Post-tax WACC
SalMar Norway - 5,36%
Greig Seafood Norway - 5%
Lerøy Seafood 6,67% 6,05%
Mowi Norway Farming 8,80% -
Mowi Scotland Farming 8,20% -
Mowi Feed 8,70% -
Norway Royal Salmon - 7,50%
Average 8,09% 5,98%
Bakkafrost (Company Reported) 7,20% -
Company Reported Comparables WACC (Under IAS 36)
